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l)AN INSTITUTION-BASED VIEW OF OWNERSHIP
The past two decades have witnessed an exponential growth of research on corporate
governance around the world and on the role of the ownership concentration more specifi -
cally. In line with a longer tradition of ownership studies in the U.S. context, most corpo -
rate governance researchers have commonly taken a classical agency-theoretical view of
ownership concentration. The research presented in this dissertation shows that this classical
view of ownership seems overly crude. 
I provide a more fine-grained understanding of the role of ownership in different
contexts; one that takes into account the subtly different formal and informal institutional
constellations that can be found around the world on the one hand, and that distinguishes
between the various identities of different concentrated owner types on the other. I show,
first, that a crucial factor with respect to the ownership concentration – firm strategy and
performance relationships is owner identity: who owns a firm matters significantly for
that firm’s objectives, strategies, and performance. Second, I contribute to the emerging
institution-based view of corporate governance by expanding its empirical domain and by
testing novel hypotheses concerning the interaction between formal and informal institutions.
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Chapter 1. Introduction  
The separation of ownership and control has long functioned as a defining condition 
for the field of corporate governance (Berle & Means, 1932). The generally accepted 
explanation for this separation involves the specialization of economic functions over 
the different parties involved in the firm. In this view, informational and decision-
making economies require that the bulk of everyday decision-making is centralized in 
the hands of professional managers (Arrow, 1974), whilst residual risk is best borne by 
dispersed shareholders due to their ability to diversify their equity holdings over 
many different firms. Precisely because risk is borne most efficiently by dispersed 
shareholders holding relatively small portions of any particular firm’s equity, 
shareholders of dispersedly held publicly listed firms are typically uninvolved in the 
firms they own, as transaction costs and collective action problems stand in the way of 
them undertaking any effective decision-making or monitoring activities (Black, 1990; 
Downs, 1957).  
However, this combination of an efficient assignment of ownership rights to 
external providers of equity capital (Hansmann, 1996) and the need to centralize 
everyday decision-making with the firm’s professional managers (Arrow, 1974; 
Bainbridge, 2003) also creates problems in its own right, because professional 
managers may use their decision-making powers to serve their own interests rather 
than the interest of the owners of the publicly listed firms they manage (Dalton et al., 
2007). The emergence of these so-called agency problems between professional 
managers and the shareholders that result from the separation of ownership and 
control of publicly listed firms (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983) has shifted the focus 
of the defining problem of corporate governance to “the ways in which suppliers of 
finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment” 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997: 737). As a result, most corporate governance research and 
theory building to date has predominantly focused on the different mechanisms— 
both internal and external to the publicly listed firms (Walsh & Seward, 1990)—that 
mitigate the agency costs resulting from the separation of ownership and control 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
 In line with this currently dominant agency-theoretic perspective on corporate 
governance (Dalton et al., 2007), the functioning of blockholding ownership (i.e. or the 
concentration of ownership in the hands of a single or a few large shareholders) as a 
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disciplinary mechanism to remedy manager-owner agency problems has been a long-
standing area of research interest in the field of corporate governance (Holderness, 
2003). In this context, there are three reasons why blockholding functions as a remedy 
for these problems. First, by concentrating ownership in the hands of a single or few 
owners, blockholding alleviates the transaction costs and collective action problems 
that dispersed shareholders face in monitoring managers (Black, 1990). Due to 
economies of scale, second, large blockholders are able to develop monitoring 
capabilities that are unavailable to smaller, more dispersed shareholders (Ryan & 
Schneider, 2002). Third, blockholders may function as a countervailing power against 
the claims of influential non-shareholding corporate constituencies, such as managers 
(Bebchuk & Fried, 2004) or employees (Roe, 2003), in the ex post distribution of a firm’s 
earnings (Zingales, 1998).  
Consistent with these theoretical conjectures, the bulk of empirical research on 
blockholding ownership as a disciplinary mechanism has focused on the U.S. This is 
not only because agency problems between managers and shareholders loom large in 
the U.S. due to the prevailing dispersed ownership structures of U.S. publicly listed 
firms, but also because levels of ownership concentration can smoothly adjust to the 
needs of any particular firm as a result of the high liquidity of both equity markets and 
firms in the U.S. context (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). Yet in spite of the fact that the 
theoretical logic behind the conventional understanding of blockholding seems to 
apply seamlessly to the U.S. context, empirical research on ownership concentration 
has found it to be of little empirical consequence there, as there hardly be seems to be 
any consistent relationship between blockholding, on the one hand, and firm financial 
performance, on the other (Dalton et al., 2003).  
This disconnect between the dominant agency theoretical view of the role of 
owners in corporate governance, on the one hand, and the currently available 
empirical evidence, on the other, suggests that field of corporate governance can 
benefit from a substantial reevaluation of the role of owners in corporate governance. 
This PhD thesis aims to contribute to such a reevaluation in two rather broad 
directions. First, several studies of which this thesis is comprised look at the influence 
that different institutional contexts may have on the role and effectiveness of owners in 
the management and governance of publicly listed firms. To date, most research in 
corporate governance continue to focus on the U.S., which differs in a number of 
important respects from the institutional contexts that countries in the rest of the 
world offer for corporate governance (Denis & McConnell, 2003). Second, this thesis 
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will explore the broad question of whether different kinds of owners of publicly listed 
firms are differentially involved and effective in the firms they own. In exploring these 
two broad empirical research questions, this thesis aims to contribute to the 
development of an institution-based view of ownership of publicly listed firms in 
comparative corporate governance (e.g. Aguilera et al., 2008; Peng & Khoury, 2008; 
Peng et al., 2008, 2009).  
1.1 Towards an Institution-Based View of Ownership 
Although both the dominant theoretical rationale behind the function of ownership in 
corporate governance and the bulk of empirical evidence about the performance 
consequences of concentrated ownership are derived from the U.S. context, in which 
dispersed ownership is the norm, concentrated ownership structures are much more 
prevalent in the rest of the world (La Porta et al., 1999). In fact, ownership is so 
concentrated in both continental Europe (Barca & Becht, 2001; Faccio & Lang, 2002) 
and Asia (Claessens et al., 2000b; La Porta et al., 1999) that one can seriously question 
whether the separation of ownership and control that has played such a defining role 
in the development of the field of corporate governance, has actually taken place in 
these countries (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). Regardless of how one answers this 
question, this observation raises the question why blockholding is such a dominant 
corporate governance strategy for shareholders of publicly listed firms in the vast 
majority of countries around the world. 
  One interesting answer to this question comes from an emerging, but fast-
growing paradigm in organizational research, which emphasizes the importance of the 
institutional context of business in understanding firm strategies and their outcomes 
(Fiss, 2008; Peng & Khoury, 2008; Peng et al., 2008, 2009). Different countries are 
known to have rather diverse economic systems (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Whitley, 1999) 
that have been developed within different institutional contexts (Jackson & Deeg, 2008; 
North, 1990) and which are bound to influence both the prevalence and effectiveness 
of any particular corporate governance practice or strategy (Bebchuk & Roe, 1999; 
Denis & McConnell, 2003). In line with these general observations, we expect the costs 
and benefits of blockholding ownership, and hence its prevalence as a generic 
corporate governance strategy available to shareholders, to play out differently at 
different institutional contexts. 
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1.1.1 Ownership and performance of Asian firms: The effects of institutions  
An increasingly influential stream of research in comparative corporate governance 
has focused on the question of how formal institutions, such as the various legal 
provisions that protect the interests of investors in a country and the overall quality of 
legal institutions, affect the development of financial markets (La Porta et al., 1997), the 
prevalence of corporate governance structures and strategies (Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Maksimovic, 1998; La Porta et al., 1998; Mitton, 2002), and their effects on the financial 
performance and value of a firm in a country (La Porta et al., 2002). This ‘law and 
finance’ research shows that a country’s legislation and general degree of institutional 
development matter with respect to the development of financial markets, the degree 
to which ownership has been able to separate from control in publicly listed firms, and 
the value these firms generate for their owners. Overall, this strand of literature shows 
that the legal framework has important economic consequences (cf. La Porta et al., 
2008 for an overview of this literature).  
 Chapter 2 of this dissertation therefore focuses on the relationship between 
country level institutions, on the one hand, and the effectiveness of the involvement of 
large blockholding owners of Asian publicly listed firms on the other. Characteristic 
for the Asian region is that investors have opted massively for the governance strategy 
of concentrated ownership (Carney & Gedajlovic, 2002b; Claessens et al., 2000a; La 
Porta et al., 1999). It is commonly held that concentrated ownership offers the best 
protection to shareholders when legal protection is relatively weak, as is the case in 
most Asian jurisdictions (Denis & McConnell, 2003; La Porta et al., 2008). Yet this ‘law 
and finance’ thesis seems overly crude, as it cannot account for the fact that although 
concentrated ownership is an endemic feature of practically all Asian economies, the 
levels of protection offered to shareholders differ greatly across Asian jurisdictions. 
Another recalcitrant finding that necessitates us to qualify the ‘law and finance’ 
explanation is that concentrated ownership has remained remarkably stable over time 
despite a marked improvement in corporate governance standards and legal 
institutions catering to shareholders needs in many Asian jurisdictions over the past 
two decades (Douma et al., 2006; Gedajlovic et al., 2005). This warrants a more fine-
grained and contextualized account of the costs and benefits of concentrated 
ownership in Asia, which takes into account the subtly different institutional and 
corporate governance configurations found in Asia. Chapter 2 aims to provide such an 
account. 
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 Using both Hedges & Olkin-type meta-analysis (HOMA; Hedges & Olkin, 
1985) and meta-analytic regression analysis (MARA; Stanley & Jarrell, 2005) on a 
sample covering 1,149,629 firm-year observations derived from 14 Asian countries, this 
chapter develops and tests hypotheses about possible complementing and substituting 
features between jurisdiction-level institutions, on the one hand, and the corporate 
firm-level strategy of blockholding on the other (Aguilera et al., 2008; Gilson, 2001). 
We focus more specifically on the following institutions: (a) rule of law (Kaufmann et 
al., 2005), (b) legal anti-self-dealing provisions (Djankov et al., 2008), (c) private 
benefits of control (Dyck & Zingales, 2004), (d) shareholder disclosure requirements 
(Bushman et al., 2004), and (e) labor protection (Botero et al., 2004). These institutions 
can be seen as complementary to ownership concentration when they increase its overall 
effect on firm performance (Aguilera et al., 2008; Fiss, 2008; Gilson, 2001). In contrast, 
they can be seen as substitutes when they decrease the effectiveness of the ownership 
concentration mechanism (Aoki, 2001).  
The results presented in this chapter offer at least three new insights on the 
relationship between concentrated ownership and firm performance in Asia. First, 
concentrated ownership contributes positively to performance, as firms with 
blockholders outperform dispersedly held firms.  
Second, the strength of the focal relationship varies significantly across Asian 
jurisdictions. Asian nations differ markedly in the degree to which ownership 
concentration is an effective remedy against familiar agency problems. More 
specifically, this chapter shows that the general quality of a jurisdiction’s legal 
institutions, functions as a complement to ownership concentration via its positive 
influence on owners’ capacity to contribute to the performance of firms. In other 
words, the effectiveness of ownership concentration as a corporate governance 
strategy is to some degree contingent on the overall quality of the institutional matrix 
in a given jurisdiction (North, 1990; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). A noticeable substitution 
effect exists between two other factors, i.e. shareholder disclosure (Bushman et al., 
2004) and private benefits of control (Dyck & Zingales, 2004), and effectiveness of 
ownership concentration. Blockholders can positively contribute to corporate 
performance in countries in which the scores on these variables are low, but 
increasingly less so when the variable scores increase.  
Finally, this chapter finds that the identity of the concentrated owner matters. 
More specifically, we find that foreign owners outperform domestic owners and that 
market investors outperform inside investors, who in turn outperform stable owners.  
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1.1.2 Labor institutions and blockholder effectiveness in European countries 
In order to further investigate how country-level institutional factors affect the 
effectiveness of the firm-level corporate strategy of blockholding, chapter 3 focuses on 
the European context for three reasons. First, blockholding is the dominant corporate 
governance strategy for shareholders in most European countries except for the U.K. 
(Faccio & Lang, 2002), which makes Europe uniquely suitable for empirical analysis of 
this generic corporate governance strategy (Barca & Becht, 2001; Connelly et al., 2010). 
Second, as many European countries are economically and institutionally well-
developed compared to the rest of the world (including most Asian countries), 
ownership is allowed to separate from control from the outset, which makes 
blockholding a discretionary rather than necessary feature of European corporate 
governance. Third, compared to the rest of the world, European countries feature 
rather specific institutions with respect to the role of employees in the economy and in 
corporate governance more specifically, which to date have received relatively little 
attention in corporate governance research (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). 
Using a variety of advanced meta-analytic methods on a sample of 748,569 
firm-year observations derived from 162 studies covering 23 European countries, this 
chapter finds that the effectiveness of blockholding is affected by the specific labor 
institutions that distinguish European countries from the rest of the world. More 
specifically, first, this chapter finds that employment protection laws in European 
countries entrench the interests of employees vis-à-vis shareholders in the competitive 
processes through which corporate earnings are distributed over corporate 
constituencies, making blockholding a less effective corporate governance strategy in 
countries that feature strong employment protections laws.  
Yet at the same time, second, this chapter finds that the part of labor 
institutions that facilitates the development and continuation of collective labor 
relations and a country’s ‘union density’ have a positive effect on blockholder 
effectiveness, arguably because the associated centralization and consolidation of 
capital and labor interests enable strategic coordination that benefits for both. 
Together, these findings suggest that the effects of labor institutions on blockholder 
effectiveness involve both competition and complementarity of blockholding and 
institutionally facilitated employee interests.  
Finally, this chapter also finds that relational blockholders are not only 
generally more effectively involved in the firms they own than arm’s-length 
blockholders of the European context, but are also better able to cope with the specific 
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institutional challenges that European countries present to highly concentrated 
publicly listed firms. Together, these findings suggest that the scope, duration, and 
dedication of relational blockholder involvement in European publicly listed firms 
matter to the performance of European firms in ways that will need to be explored 
further by future research. 
1.1.3 An institutional perspective on IPO underpricing 
Chapter 4 focuses on the effects of country-level institutions on another aspect of firm 
ownership. A critical phase in the ownership of any publicly listed firm involves the 
initial public offering (IPO) of its shares. The purpose of an IPO is to transfer the 
ownership of a privately held firm from the hands of a single or a few owners to the 
hands of a potentially much larger number of smaller shareholders who are able to 
trade their newly acquired ownership stake freely in (secondary) equity markets. This 
shift in firm ownership from ‘private’ to ‘public’ ownership is economically important, 
first, because by issuing shares of stock to a large number of investors, the firm secures 
an infusion of new capital and broadens its long-term investor base through future 
capital increases during seasoned offerings. IPOs are economically significant, second, 
because a successful IPO, and the trading in public equity markets that it enables, will 
assure that a firm’s shares will end up in the hands of those who value it the most, 
which, all other things being equal, will maximize the value of a firm. Finally, IPOs 
enable a high degree of economic specialization between relatively small and highly 
dispersed risk-bearing owners, on the one hand, and a sufficiently small number of 
managerial decision-makers on the other, which is especially efficient for large capital 
intensive economic enterprises (Hansmann, 1996).  
A well-documented phenomenon in finance literature is the underpricing of 
IPOs, however. On average, shares seem to be sold in IPOs at a price lower than the 
market price that is realized once shares are freely traded. Underpricing is 
economically significant because it leaves money on the table that investors would 
have otherwise been willing to pay for the same securities at a higher price (Loughran 
& Ritter, 2002). When the level of underpricing is larger, firms receive less money for 
selling securities to the market, which raises the cost of capital of those firms.  
Although many studies have looked at various causes of IPO underpricing at 
the firm level (Chen et al., 2004; Ritter, 1984), at the issue level (Benveniste & Spindt, 
1989), and industry level (Kor et al., 2008), few have looked at the effect of institutional 
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features of the countries in which IPOs take place and none have looked more 
specifically at the effects of the legal environment in which an IPO takes place. 
This chapter argues, first, that the quality of legal protection offered by a 
country will affect IPO underpricing in two different ways. First, a weaker legal 
system may increase the ex ante uncertainty (Beatty & Ritter, 1986) about the firm value 
over and above firm-level risk factors. Second, weaker legal institutions also increase 
the ex ante uncertainty of the distribution of firm value (both potential and realized) 
among different corporate constituents (Johnson et al., 2000b). In countries with better 
legal protection, managers or controlling shareholders have fewer opportunities to 
transfer profits or assets out of the firm at the expense of minority shareholders. The 
protection against these expropriation issues also reduces the ex ante uncertainty about 
the return on investment in IPOs.  
Using hierarchical linear modeling on a major, firm-level dataset of 2,920 IPOs 
in 21 countries having different institutional and legal frameworks, this chapter finds 
broad support for these conjectures. It finds, first, that country specific characteristics 
explain about ten percent of the variation in the level of underpricing. Second and 
most importantly, a better developed legal framework, as measured by the country’s 
level of investor protection, the quality of its legal system, and the degree of legal 
enforcement, reduces the level of IPO underpricing in these countries significantly. By 
unveiling the effects of legal institutions on the efficiency of the process through which 
shares of a company are first offered to public equity markets, this study contributes to 
the development of an institution-based view of ownership.  
1.1.4 An institution-based view of executive compensation 
Chapter 5 develops an institution-based view of executive compensation. Although 
this chapter does not directly contribute to the institution-based view of ownership that 
this thesis seeks to develop, it can be seen to contribute to the institution-based view of 
ownership indirectly in three ways. As was discussed at length in chapter 3, first, 
employees and managers can be seen as competing with the owners of the firm in the 
distribution of corporate earnings over corporate constituencies. Similar to employee 
wages and benefits, executive compensation is one concrete channel through which 
corporate earnings can be redistributed away from the residual claim that 
shareholders have on those earnings. Understanding how this channel works will 
therefore not only increase our understanding of the functioning of executive 
compensation in corporate governance, but will also increase our understanding of 
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how owners can secure their residual claim on corporate earnings more effectively. 
Second, this chapter sheds new light on the role that concentrated ownership plays in 
assuring the performance dependence of executive pay. By developing an institution-
based view of executive compensation, third, this chapter contributes to the 
development of a more comprehensive institution-based view of corporate governance 
of which the institution-based view of ownership is also a part.  
 Specifically, this chapter synthesizes the relationship between firm financial 
performance and executive compensation across international contexts and offers 
three substantive contributions to the literature. Based on analyses of a synthetic 
dataset, comprised of more than four million primary observations in 29 countries, this 
chapter finds, first, a modest but positive and significant association between firm 
performance and executive compensation.  
Second, using meta-analytic hierarchical linear modeling (HiLMMA; 
Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002), this study demonstrates that the association between firm 
performance and executive compensation is not universal, but is conditioned by 
formal and informal country-level institutions, as well as interactions between these 
factors. More specifically, the currently available evidence reveals that 25 percent of all 
variance in the firm performance-executive compensation relationship is attributable 
to country level factors.  
Furthermore, the results show that both formal institutions like the rule of law 
and shareholder protection provisions, on the one hand, and informal institutions like 
ownership concentration and codes of good corporate governance on the other, can 
help strengthen the association between firm performance and executive 
remuneration. Finally, the results presented in this chapter show that these formal and 
informal institutions should be seen as complementary (Hall & Gingerich 2009; Hall & 
Soskice 2001) in that the contribution of formal institutions towards a stronger focal 
relationship is dependent on the level of development of informal institutions, and 
vice versa (Milgrom & Roberts, 1995). 
1.2 The Role and Functioning of Different Owner Types 
Although the first four chapters of this thesis focus predominantly on the effects of 
country-level institutional factors on the role and functioning of blockholders in 
publicly listed firms, chapters 2 and 3 also demonstrate that different types of owners 
significantly influence firm’s objectives, strategies, and performance. In order to 
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further explore the role that different types of owners play in public firms, the two 
final chapters of this thesis focus on two specific ownership types, namely, business 
groups (BGs) (chapter 6) and U.S. publicly listed family-owned firms (chapter 7).  
1.2.1 Understanding business groups 
The past decade has witnessed a surge in research on BGs, which Khanna and Rivkin 
(2001) define as “firms which though legally independent, are bound together by a 
constellation of formal and informal ties and are accustomed to taking coordinated 
action” (47). BGs are mostly bound by persistent ties of ownership. Some business 
groups are vertically controlled, whereas others are horizontally linked through 
multiple and reciprocated equity. Moreover, BGs are ubiquitous in many countries 
with such types as Japanese Keiretsus and Zaibatsu (Gerlach, 1992), South Korean 
Chaebols (Chang, 2003), Latin America’s Grupos Economicos (Strachan, 1976), Hong 
Kong’s Hongs (Wong, 1996), India’s Business Houses (Encarnation, 1989), Taiwan’s 
Guanxiqiye (Numazaki, 1996), Russia’s Oligarchs (Perotti & Gelfer, 2001) and China’s 
Qiye Jituan (Keister, 2000), becoming emblematic of their nation’s enterprise systems. 
Despite their prevalence, disagreement fueled by ambiguous research 
findings is apparent over the general question of whether the net economic and social 
effects of BGs are positive (Fisman & Khanna, 2004; Keister, 2000). Such disagreement 
is evident in characterizations of BGs by scholars as either ‘heroes or villains’ 
(Claessens et al., 2000a), ‘paragons or parasites’ (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007), ‘red barons or 
robber barons’ (Perotti & Gelfer, 2001), or ‘anachronisms or avatars’ (Granovetter, 
2005). These contradictory and rather unsophisticated qualifications clearly suggest 
that our understanding of BGs is currently far from sufficient.  
Through meta-analytical techniques employed on a database of 141 studies on 
BGs covering 28 different countries chapter 6 shows that such categorical 
classifications are unwarranted and that their character is considerably more complex. 
Specifically, this chapter offers four substantive contributions to the BG literature that 
each enhances our understanding of this highly prevalent and complex phenomenon.  
First, this chapter conducts a meta-analysis on the BG literature that 
synthesizes all empirical evidence available to date on the effect of BG affiliation on 
performance (Geyskens et al., 2009). Although this effect is negative and significant, its 
magnitude offers no grounds to disregard BGs as a dysfunctional organizational form. 
Rather, our research synthesis shows that the performance implications of affiliation 
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are very heterogeneous and must be qualified by the moderating effects of 
institutional contingencies and the mediating effects of strategic actions taken by 
group- and affiliate-level managers.  
Second, chapter 6 unpacks the notion of ‘institutional voids’ (Khanna & 
Palepu, 1997; 2000b) by exploring the moderating effects of a broad set of theoretically 
derived institutional variables on the focal relationship. This chapter reveals not only 
that affiliates perform relatively well in contexts characterized by ‘soft’ voids in labor 
and financial market institutions, but also that BGs add no value in contexts lacking 
‘hard’ infrastructure and actually impair affiliate performance in settings with 
underdeveloped legal institutions.  
Third, chapter 6 identifies differences in the revealed strategic choices of BG 
affiliates (relative to non-affiliates) and assesses the performance implications of these 
choices. This chapter finds that affiliates tend to be more leveraged, diversified, and 
locally oriented than their standalone counterparts, which explains much of the 
performance discount they incur.  
Fourth, chapter 6 advances prevailing theoretical accounts of the drivers of 
group-level performance (e.g. Chang & Hong, 2002; Luo & Chung, 2005; Mahmood & 
Mitchell, 2004). Whereas current theorizing often conflates various processes 
associated with BG size, this chapter disentangles these into positive scale and 
negative scope effects. Owing to factors like size-related cost savings and increased 
market and political power, a greater scale improves BG performance. However, a 
greater scale also tends to broaden the operational scope of BGs which increases 
bureaucratic and control costs and negatively impacts their performance. Scope is 
therefore best seen as a mediator suppressing the otherwise positive effect of scale on 
group-level performance. Together, these four findings do not only increase our 
understanding of BGs, but also contribute to the institution-based view of ownership 
that this thesis aims to further develop. 
1.2.2 Understanding publicly listed family firms in the U.S. context  
Publicly listed family firms (FF) are often considered to be archaic and unremarkable 
and have long been neglected by scholars, as a result. Yet, general consensus has 
emerged in the literature that the publicly listed FF represents a unique and 
theoretically interesting organizational form for a number of related reasons. (e.g. 
Anderson & Reeb, 2003a, 2003b; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003, 2007; Miller et al., 2008). 
First, relative to the classic public corporation, which is characterized by the separation 
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of ownership and control (Berle & Means, 1932; Chandler, 1977), the executives of FFs 
(and their families) often own a controlling stake. Second, families actively participate 
in the firm’s management by providing the CEO or other senior executives or they 
may ensure themselves of some influence on corporate policy by supplying the chair 
of the board or other family directors (Anderson & Reeb, 2003a). Third, the placement 
of family members in key managerial positions (Villalonga & Amit, 2006) has the effect 
of centralizing decision-making authority (Gedajlovic et al., 2004; Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2003), and may lead to the adoption of important decisions on the basis of 
particularistic criteria (Carney, 2005; Luo & Chung, 2005). Finally, the trans-
generational intent of FFs (i.e. the intent to hand over control of the firm to a 
succeeding generation of family members) results in complex executive succession 
issues not apparent in other firms (Bennedsen et al., 2007; Perez-Gonzalez, 2006).  
Using advanced meta-analytic techniques on a sample of 55 studies about FFs 
in the U.S., chapter 7 investigates how FFs perform in the context of U.S. medium- to 
large-sized publicly traded corporations, a setting that is both highly competitive and 
where a well-developed legal and institutional environment requires that 
organizations establish and maintain specialized exchange relationships and complex 
business systems (Coffee, 1999; Gilson, 2006).  
This chapter finds, first, that family control has a modest, but statistically 
significant positive effect on firm performance. U.S. publicly listed FFs outperform the 
control group (i.e. non-family publicly listed firms), indicating that the family business 
enterprise enjoys performance-enhancing advantages in precisely the sort of highly 
competitive and complex business environment that many scholars see as 
incompatible with its capabilities, resources, and managerial capacities (cf. Chandler, 
1990).  
Second, this chapter finds that although the tendency for FFs to engage in 
fewer international ventures than non-FFs harms their performance, their inclination 
to diversify less and utilize less debt provide them with profit-enhancing advantages. 
These findings suggest that the net positive effect of family control on performance is 
partially attributable to specific strategic choices made by FF managers, rather than to 
inherent weaknesses in other forms of business enterprise. 
Chapter 7 finds, third, that firms controlled by founding generations are 
substantially more profitable than those controlled by successor generations. In fact, 
successor generation FFs underperform not only founding generation FFs, but also 
non-family public corporations, effectively turning the founding generation premium 
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into a successor generation discount. These findings suggest a stark difference in the 
performance characteristics of first- and successor-generation FFs. These same results 
suggest that the general performance advantages of FFs are driven by first-generation, 
founder-controlled firms.  
While the lower performance levels of successor-generation firms are well-
documented in prior research (e.g. Bennedsen et al., 2007; Perez-Gonzales, 2006; 
Villalonga & Amit, 2006), fourth, the empirical literature is largely silent on the 
possible strategic and governance causes behind the successor discount. The findings 
presented in chapter 7 indicate that successor firms employ more conservative 
strategies by investing much less in R&D and by generally avoiding risk and that 
successor FFs are less likely to have their shares in the hands of external blockholders 
and more likely to utilize dual class shares, traits suggestive of attempts to entrench 
family control and avoid external constraints on the discretion of the controlling family 
(Villalonga & Amit, 2008). In contrast, firms controlled by founding generations 
appear highly innovative, risk taking, and much more profitable.  
Overall, several chapters in this thesis demonstrate that a crucial factor with 
respect to the ownership concentration and firm strategy-performance relationship 
pertains to the identity of the concentrated owners involved, in that who owns a firm 
matters significantly for that firm’s objectives, strategies, and performance. 
1.3 Structure of Dissertation 
The remainder of the dissertation is structured as follows: Chapters 2 and 3 present 
two meta-analyses of the relationship between blockholding and firm performance in 
that part of the world where it has historically been highly prevalent: Asia and Europe. 
Chapter 4 presents the third study which examines the role of institutions during a 
major milestone in the lifecycle of a firm, namely going public. More specifically, this 
chapter tests the relationship between quality of national institutions and IPO 
underpricing through the mechanism of ex ante uncertainty. Chapter 5 presents the 
influence of formal and informal institutions on the firm performance-executive pay 
relationship. Finally, chapters 6 and 7 investigate two specific organizational forms in 
great detail: business group affiliation and U.S. publicly-listed family firms. 
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Chapter 2. The ownership and performance of 
Asian firms: A meta-analytic test of identity and 
institutional effects1 
 
ABSTRACT 
Ownership concentration is the most prevalent corporate control strategy in Asia, but 
its capacity to contribute positively to corporate performance varies considerably 
across Asian jurisdictions. Prior theorizing fails to account for this variance because it 
largely treats concentrated ownership as a context-independent mechanism with 
universal applicability. We challenge this view through a theory building and testing 
meta-analytic study. We find that the identity of the concentrated owner conditions 
the effectiveness of ownership concentration. Foreign owners outperform domestic 
owners, and market owners outperform inside and stable owners. We also show that 
jurisdiction-level institutions, such as the effectiveness of the legal system and the 
degree of information disclosure towards shareholders, affect the effectiveness of 
concentrated ownership. Our evidence stems from the largest database on the 
ownership and performance of Asian firms to date, containing 1,149,629 firm-year 
observations from 14 countries. 
2.1 Introduction  
One of the most prominent research topics in the field of corporate governance 
concerns the relationship between concentrated ownership and the performance of 
modern firms (Berle & Means, 1932). Historically, there are two competing views on 
how this relationship is constituted. The first view suggests that concentrated 
ownership improves firm performance, because it allows for close monitoring of 
potentially self-serving managers (David, Hitt, & Liang, 2007; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). 
The second view proposes that ownership concentration is detrimental to 
performance. Wealth concentration could lead to overly risk-averse behavior, making 
                                                             
1 A previous version of this paper was included in the 2008 Academy of Management Best Paper 
Proceedings (International Management Division) and published article by:  
Heugens, P. P. M. A. R., Van Essen, M., & Van Oosterhout, H. 2009. Meta-Analyzing Ownership 
Concentration and Firm Performance in Asia: Towards a More Fine-Grained Understanding. Asia-
Pacific Journal of Management, 26 (3), 481-512. 
This paper is under review by Journal of Management Studies (revise and resubmit, 2nd round). 
 16 
 
large owners choose to forego maximum profits in exchange for more stable returns 
(Demsetz & Lehn 1985; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Concentrated owners are also poor 
stewards towards smaller shareholders, as their actions tend to be guided by diverse 
interests rather than by the singular objective of maximizing firm value (Fama & 
Jensen, 1985; Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton & Jiang, 2008).  
However, these views are increasingly replaced with a third view suggesting 
that there is likely no relationship between ownership concentration and performance, 
because owners will adjust the size of their equity holdings according to the 
monitoring needs of the firm (Demsetz, 1983; Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). When 
monitoring needs increase (e.g., due to diversification), owners consolidate their 
holdings to curb managerial opportunism. Inversely, when monitoring needs decrease 
(e.g., through organizational restructuring), owners decrease their holdings to benefit 
from a better diversification of their income risk. If ownership structure is indeed 
endogenously determined, its equilibrium effect on performance will be null.  
 Prior research has shown that ownership is indeed endogenous upon 
performance in North America (see King & Santor (2008) for Canada, and Demsetz & 
Villalonga (2001) and Himmelberg, Hubbard, & Palia (1999) for the United States), as 
well as in various European countries (see Claessens & Djankov (1999) for the Czech 
Republic, Grosfeld & Hashi (2007) for Poland, Pindado & De la Torre (2006) for Spain, 
and Davies, Hillier, & McColgan (2005) for the United Kingdom). However, the Asian 
evidence points in a different direction (Douma, George, & Kabir, 2006). Ownership 
concentration is negatively related to performance in China (Liu & Lu, 2007) and Japan 
(David, Yoshikawa, Chari, & Rasheed, 2006), and positively so in Hong Kong (Carney 
& Gedajlovic, 2002b), Singapore (Chen & Ho, 2000), and South Korea (Yoo, 2008). 
Moreover, the evidence reported in this paper shows that the associational strength of 
the focal relationship differs markedly across the 14 Asian nations included our study. 
Apparently, Asia is a special case warranting additional research. We therefore 
address the following research question: Which firm- and jurisdiction-level factors 
condition and contextualize the relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
performance in Asia? 
At the firm level, we find that the identity of the concentrated owner 
conditions the focal relationship, as suggested by several contemporary researchers 
(Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach, 2009; Douma et al., 2006; Gedajlovic, Yoshikawa, & 
Hashimoto, 2005; Thomsen, Pedersen, & Kvist, 2006). Different types of owners are 
differentially successful at driving firms to maximum performance, because they 
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themselves differ in terms of their: (a) preferences for risk, stability, and growth 
(Douma et al., 2006); (b) ability to monitor and discipline managers (Gillan & Starks, 
2007); and (c) capacity to contribute resources and managerial capabilities (Djankov & 
Hoekman, 2000). We focus on two influential classifications of firm ownership: (a) 
foreign versus domestic owners (Douma et al., 2006); and (b) stable, versus market, 
versus inside owners (Gedajlovic et al., 2005; Gerlach, 1992). Specifically, we test two 
ordinal hypotheses stating which owner types will outperform their counterparts. 
At the jurisdiction level, we find that the quality of national institutions affects 
the effectiveness of concentrated ownership. This speaks to what some have called the 
institution-based view of corporate governance (Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008; also see: 
Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, & Jackson, 2008; Jackson & 
Deeg, 2008; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2008; Roe, 2003). Specifically, we 
test whether jurisdiction-level institutions and firm-level control strategies jointly form 
a configuration of governance mechanisms with complementing and substituting 
features (Aguilera et al. 2008; Gilson, 2001). We focus on the following institutions: (a) 
rule of law (Kaufman, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2005), (b) legal anti-self-dealing provisions 
(Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2008), (c) private benefits of control 
(Dyck & Zingales, 2004), (d) shareholder disclosure requirements (Bushman, Piotroski, 
& Smith, 2004), and (e) labor protection (Botero, Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes, 
& Shleifer, 2004). Such institutions are complementary to ownership concentration when 
they increase its overall effect on performance (Aguilera et al., 2008; Fiss, 2008; Gilson, 
2001). In contrast, they are substitutes when they decrease the effectiveness of the 
ownership concentration mechanism (Aguilera et al., 2008; Fiss, 2008; Gilson, 2001).  
To tests our hypotheses, we employ a set of meta-analytical techniques on the 
largest database on Asian firms to date. We assess our owner identity hypotheses with 
Hedges and Olkin-type meta-analyses (HOMA; Hedges & Olkin, 1985) and subject 
them to a formal test using Feingold’s (1992) z-test statistic. In line with meta-analytic 
conventions (Geyskens, Krishnan, Steenkamp, & Cunha, 2009), we use the Pearson 
product-moment correlation (r) as our preferred effect size. However, our reliance on r 
is potentially problematic, since r can only provide information on the linear 
association between two variables but not on the direction of causality between them. 
We therefore retest our hypotheses on a separate set of effect sizes, this time partial 
correlation coefficients (rxy.z). In our study, rxy.z is the partial correlation between 
ownership concentration (X) and firm performance (Y), given a set of n controlling 
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variables (Z). As Z oftentimes contains a control for endogeneity2, in addition to a 
varying set of other firm-level controls, rxy.z provides an assessment of the direction of 
causality between X and Y. In all, our HOMA analyses are based on 637 correlations 
representing 1,149,629 firm-year observations and 223 partial correlations representing 
375,292 firm-year observations. Finally, we test our jurisdiction-level hypotheses using 
meta-analytic regression analysis (MARA; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). Concretely, we 
model a significant proportion of the heterogeneity present in a distribution of 498 
effect sizes. 
The contributions of our study are threefold. First, through a quantitative 
synthesis of the literature on ownership concentration, we sort out several 
contradictory research findings on the effectiveness of that mechanism in Asia, thereby 
complementing earlier ownership meta-analyses on North-America (Dalton, Daily, 
Certo, & Roengpitya, 2003) and Europe (Van Essen, Van Oosterhout, & Heugens, 
2009). Second, we contribute to the literature on ownership identity (Douma et al., 
2006; Gedajlovic et al., 2005; Thomsen et al., 2006) by showing that two conceptual 
ownership typologies can fruitfully be employed as empirical taxonomies in the Asian 
context. Third, we add to the institution-based view of corporate governance (cf. 
Aguilera et al., 2008; Fiss, 2008; Gilson, 2001; Peng et al., 2008) by demonstrating that 
national institutions can complement as well as substitute for the control mechanism 
of concentrated ownership. 
2.2 Theory and Hypotheses 
2.2.1 Concentrated owner identity 
An emerging insight in corporate governance is that concentrated owner identity 
matters for firm performance. In Europe, for example, Pedersen and Thomsen (2003) 
found that ownership concentration is positively associated with performance when 
the concentrated owner is a financial institution or another corporation, ineffectual 
when the owner is a family or a single individual, and has a negative effect when the 
                                                             
2 In econometrics, the problem of endogeneity occurs when the independent variable is correlated with 
the error term in a regression model, or when the dependent variable (i.e., the firm performance 
measure) simultaneously affects the independent variable (i.e., the degree of concentrated ownership) 
(Bhagat & Jefferis, 2002). There are several accepted methods of controlling for endogeneity. 
Endogeneity-conscious researchers usually use a fixed or random effects panel data model, and 
calculate instrumental variables using two- or three-stages least squares (2/3SLS) or the generalized 
method of moments (GMM) (Sánchez-Ballesta & García-Meca, 2007). 
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owner is a government organization (also see Pedersen & Thomsen, 1997; Thomsen & 
Pedersen, 2000). Although these fine-grained European findings are important, they 
may not translate directly to Asia due to prevailing institutional differences between 
the two regions. Recent research has produced two typologies of owner identity that 
may resonate more clearly with the Asian context. A first categorization distinguishes 
between foreign and domestic owners (Douma et al., 2006). This distinction matters in 
Asia, as many Asian economies are rapidly opening up and attracting ever-increasing 
levels of foreign direct investment (Fukao, Ishido, & Ito, 2003). A second categorization 
differentiates between stable, market, and inside owners (Gerlach, 1992). Empirical 
research has shown the contextual validity of this typology, as it covers three distinct 
identities which are well-represented in many Asian economies (Gedajlovic et al., 2005; 
Heugens, Van Essen, & Van Oosterhout, 2009).  
Foreign owners versus domestic owners. Prior research shows that there can 
be marked performance differentials between foreign- and domestically-owned firms, 
with the former generally outperforming the latter. Three reasons are commonly given 
for the superior performance of firms with a sizeable foreign ownership stake. First, 
there may be selection effects at work, in that foreign investors are better equipped 
than domestic parties to acquire sizeable stakes in well-performing firms (Berger, 
Clarke, Cull, Klapper, & Udell, 2005). Selection effects may yield better performance 
either because foreign parties apply better selection criteria (cherry picking) or because 
they have greater financial resources at their disposal (deeper pockets) than local 
investors. Second, there may be a knowledge transfer effect at play, in that foreign 
owners can positively contribute to the performance of firms by bolstering their 
organizational and managerial capabilities (Chibber & Majumdar, 1999; Djankov & 
Hoekman, 2000). Third, governance effects may materialize when foreign owners 
contribute to the implementation of better governance practices, especially when they 
expect of their local acquisitions that they comply with higher foreign standards for 
transparency and accountability. In sum, due to the combination of selection, 
knowledge transfer, and governance effects, foreign-owned firms will outperform 
domestically-owned rivals. See Hypothesis 1a: 
Hypothesis 1a: The association between concentrated 
ownership and firm performance in Asian countries 
will be more strongly positive when the concentrated 
owner is foreign, as opposed to domestic. 
 20 
 
Stable, market, and inside owners. Parties can also be characterized in terms 
of their motivations to pursue concentrated ownership. Gerlach (1992) distinguishes 
between ‘stable,’ ‘inside,’ and ‘market’ owners. Each of these groups has distinct 
investment objectives, which are likely to result in differential firm performance. 
Characteristic for stable owners is that they are multiply tied to the firms in which they 
own shares. In addition to owning equity, stable owners are often also simultaneously 
creditors, debtors, buyers, or suppliers. Typical stable owners are parties like affiliated 
firms, banks, families, and insurance companies. The crucial point about them is that 
they will continuously balance the returns on their equity stakes with all other 
concurrent interests they have in the focal firm (Abegglen & Stalk, 1985; Gedajlovic & 
Shapiro, 2002). They usually refrain from implementing performance-enhancing 
policies that put unwarranted pressures on their other relationships with the firm 
(Brickley, Lease & Smith, 1988; David, Kochhar & Levitas, 1998). We therefore consider 
them poor candidates for improving firm performance.  
Inside owners are individuals or groups who have both a substantial equity 
stake in the firm as well as direct managerial control over it (Fama & Jensen, 1983). In 
Asia, the dominant form of inside owner is the corporate founder and his/her 
immediate family. Such owners may not be efficient guardians of firm profitability for 
three reasons. First, since inside owners concentrate a large proportion of their 
personal wealth in the firms they own, their income streams are usually sub optimally 
diversified. This makes them more risk averse than other types of concentrated 
owners, encouraging them to forego risky but potentially lucrative investment 
opportunities (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Second, in many Asian nations, it is customary 
for inside owners to build family dynasties by appointing family members rather than 
external professional managers in key managerial positions (Granovetter, 2005). Such 
appointments are usually motivated by a combination of altruism towards kin and 
distrust of outsiders (Schulze et al., 2001). Since merit is often not a primary 
consideration for managerial appointments, firm profits tend to suffer under inside 
ownership. Third, through their executive powers, inside owners have the opportunity 
to engage in minority shareholder disadvantaging policies that benefit them privately 
while simultaneously hurting the public performance of the firm (Bae, Kang & Kim, 
2002; Johnson et al., 2000b). In short, inside ownership in Asia is unlikely to result in 
strong firm performance. Finally, market owners differ from stable owners in that they 
are tied to the firm only with their equity stakes, and from inside owners because they 
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operate at arm’s length from firm management. Their primary objective is to realize 
maximum equity returns (Fukao, 1999). 
 We expect firms to be sensitive to market owners’ pressures for two reasons. 
First, due to the singularity of their tie to the firm, market owners will not hesitate to 
liquidate their shareholdings when they become dissatisfied with the firm’s future 
earnings potential. As the selling off of large blocks of equity lowers the firm’s share 
price and increases its cost of capital, this is a disciplining force to be reckoned with 
(La Porta et al., 2000b). Second, market owners factor in a risk premium when they are 
exposed to shareholder disadvantaging strategies, which also drive up the firm’s cost 
of capital. Market owners can therefore ensure that managers choose policies that are 
consistent with their objectives. In short, we expect that market owners will 
outperform both inside and stable owners. See Hypothesis 1b: 
Hypothesis 1b: The association between concentrated 
ownership and firm performance in Asian countries 
will be more strongly positive when the concentrated 
owner is a market owner, as opposed to an inside or 
stable owner. 
2.2.2 Jurisdiction-level institutions 
Another emerging scholarly insight is that the effectiveness of corporate governance 
mechanisms is not universal, but instead conditioned by jurisdiction-level institutions 
(Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Aguilera et al., 2008; Jackson & Deeg, 2008; La Porta et al., 
2008). Even seemingly straightforward mechanisms, like incentive schemes tied to 
performance or monitoring by independent boards, have to be thoroughly adapted 
when applied in a new context, to make them fit in with the local configuration of 
interdependent governance elements (Davis & Useem, 2002; Fiss & Zajac, 2004). We 
expect the mechanism of ownership concentration to be likewise conditioned by local 
institutions, focusing specifically on the following variables: (a) rule of law (Kaufmann 
et al., 2005), (b) legal anti-self-dealing provisions (Djankov et al., 2008), (c) private 
benefits of control (Dyck & Zingales, 2004), (d) shareholder disclosure requirements 
(Bushman et al., 2004), and (e) labor protection (Botero et al., 2004). 
 Rule of law. A first variable to condition the effectiveness of concentrated 
ownership is the overall quality of legal institutions, commonly operationalized 
through the ‘rule of law’ index (Kaufmann et al., 2005). When large investors lack 
outright control over the firm, they may induce managers to work in their interest by 
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engaging with them privately (Gillan & Starks, 2007). Yet the effectiveness of private 
engagement hinges on a relatively amicable relationship between manager and 
concentrated owner. When this relationship is less amicable, large minority owners 
can only govern through voting. But voting is often a deficient governance mechanism 
(Bebchuk, 2007; Easterbrook & Fishel, 1991), as its effectiveness depends on the quality 
of legal institutions. As Shleifer and Vishny have put it: “large minority share holdings 
may be effective only in countries with relatively sophisticated legal systems” (1997: 
755). Therefore, good quality legal institutions complement concentrated ownership, 
as they help protect the voting rights of large minority shareholders. See Hypothesis 
2a: 
Hypothesis 2a: The association between concentrated 
ownership and firm performance is positively 
moderated by the quality of the background 
institutions of the firm’s home country.   
 
Legal protection against self-dealing. A second factor to condition the 
effectiveness of concentrated ownership is the degree of specific protection against 
minority shareholder expropriation, commonly operationalized through the ‘anti-self-
dealing’ index (Djankov et al., 2008). In Asia, where many firms have large owners 
(Claessens, Djankov & Klapper, 2003; La Porta, López-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 1999), 
minority shareholders are at least as likely to be expropriated by larger shareholders as 
by opportunistic managers (cf. Young et al., 2008). Minority shareholders who fear 
expropriation by their larger counterparts have two control strategies at their disposal: 
further concentrating their ownership stakes to become dominant owners themselves 
or investing only in jurisdictions in which a sophisticated legal system offers them 
protection against controlling shareholders. Both strategies independently help 
investors to obtain a return on their investments. We therefore expect concentrated 
ownership and legal protection to be substituting governance strategies (Heugens et 
al., 2009; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). See Hypothesis 2b: 
Hypothesis 2b: The association between concentrated 
ownership and firm performance is negatively 
moderated by the level of legal protection against self-
dealing offered by the firm’s home country.  
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Private benefits of control. A third conditioning variable is the extent to 
which concentrated owners can reap ‘private benefits of control’ (PBoC; Dyck & 
Zingales, 2004; Nenova, 2003). PBoC involve the fraction of firm value that does not 
accrue to all shareholders in proportion to their equity stake, but is enjoyed exclusively 
by parties who control the firm (Horner, 1988; Zingales, 1994). Positive PBoC exist in 
many Asian jurisdictions, as can be inferred from the premiums above the prevailing 
market price at which controlling blocks of shares tend to trade (Dyck & Zingales, 
2004). At modest levels, PBoC may create value because they incentivize owners to 
engage in actions that benefit shareholders as a class (Gilson, 2006). Concretely, PBoC 
reward owners for increased monitoring of management (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985), for 
aggressively pursuing entrepreneurial strategies (Dyck & Zingales, 2004), and for 
inviting value-enhancing takeovers (Grossman & Hart, 1980). Things change, however, 
when PBoC become larger. When jurisdictions offer little protection against blatant 
forms of self-dealing, the consumptive aspects of PBoC will outweigh their incentivizing 
effects (Zingales, 1994). The consumption of firm value by concentrated owners may 
involve the sale of corporate assets at sub-market transfer prices, or the effectuation of 
mergers which only benefit the controlling shareholder (Bae et al., 2002). See 
Hypothesis 2c: 
Hypothesis 2c: The association between concentrated 
ownership and firm performance stands in an inverted 
U-shaped relationship to the level of private benefits 
the concentrated owner is allowed to reap in its home 
country. 
 
Information disclosure towards shareholders. A fourth factor to influence the 
effectiveness of ownership concentration is the availability of firm-specific information 
to parties outside publicly traded firms, as commonly captured by the ‘corporate 
transparency’ index (Bushman et al., 2004). Each jurisdiction possesses a multi-faceted 
information disclosure regime, which comprises a number of actors who jointly 
produce, collect, validate, and disseminate information about listed firms (Bushman et 
al., 2004). These parties include the business press, auditing firms, credit rating 
agencies, and investor watchdog organizations. They play a pivotal role in the 
economy, because information asymmetries between corporate insiders and outsiders 
are associated with higher transaction costs, fraud, mispricing of assets, and 
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misallocated resources (Core, 2001; Gelb & Zarowin, 2000; Healy & Palepu, 2001). We 
expect (public) information disclosure and (private) direct monitoring by concentrated 
shareholders to act as substitutes (La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 1998). 
When information disclosure regimes are poorly developed, investors must alleviate 
information asymmetries by concentrating their shareholdings. Alternatively, when 
sufficient information about firms is publicly available, concentrated owners have no 
informational advantages over dispersed shareholders. See Hypothesis 2d: 
Hypothesis 2d: The association between concentrated 
ownership and firm performance is negatively 
moderated by the level of shareholder disclosure 
requirements imposed by the firm’s home country. 
 
Protection of labor. A fifth variable to condition the effectiveness of ownership 
concentration is the level of legal protection offered to workers, as captured by Botero 
et al.’s (2004) ‘labor protection’ index. Laborers commonly enjoy protection though 
employment laws regulating labor contracts at the individual level, collective relations 
laws structuring the processes giving rise to collective agreements and regulating 
unionized labor activity, and social security laws stipulating the benefits accruing to 
individuals who temporarily or permanently drop out of the working population 
(Atanassov & Kim, 2009). Labor protection laws touch upon several corporate 
governance issues. First, stronger union laws empower workers, allowing them to 
claim a greater part of the corporate residual (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). Second, when 
the law dictates that workers should be represented on corporate boards, as in China, 
they can exercise direct control over the firm (Cho & Rui, 2007). Third, better labor 
protection makes it more difficult for concentrated owners to pursue value-enhancing 
strategies that affect workers negatively, such as corporate restructuring after a 
performance crisis (Atanassov & Kim, 2009). Fourth, empowered workers can collude 
with managers by demanding above market wages in exchange for support to keep 
poorly performing managers entrenched, to the detriment of shareholders’ interests 
(Pagano & Volpin, 2005a). In short, better protection of workers limits the strategic 
latitude that concentrated owners enjoy to effectuate better performance. See 
Hypothesis 2e: 
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Hypothesis 2e: The association between concentrated 
ownership and firm performance is negatively 
moderated by the level of labor protection offered by 
the firm’s home country. 
2.3 Methods 
2.3.1 Sample and coding 
The value of meta-analytic work depends on the availability of a substantial number of 
high-quality replication studies, and on the inclusion of the greatest possible fraction 
of these in the analysis (Eden, 2002: 841). We used a set of five complementary search 
strategies to minimize the chance of missing essential studies (White, 1994). First, we 
read two meta-analyses on the relationship between equity holdings and firm 
performance in Asia (Heugens et al., 2009) and the United States (Dalton et al., 2003). 
Second, we explored five electronic databases: (1) ABI/INFORM Global, (2) EconLit, 
(3) Google Scholar, (4) JSTOR, and (5) SSRN, using the following search terms: 
‘blockholder,’ ‘equity,’ ‘inside ownership,’ ‘institutional ownership,’ ‘ownership,’ 
‘ownership concentration,’ and ‘shareholders.’ Third, we conducted a manual search 
of 25 relevant journals in the fields of accounting, economics, finance, and 
management. Examples of included journals are: Academy of Management Journal; 
Journal of Corporate Finance; Journal of Finance; Journal of International Business Studies 
and Strategic Management Journal. Fourth, after collecting an initial set of studies, we 
used a two-way ‘snowballing’ technique that involved backward-tracing all references 
reported in the articles and by forward-tracing all articles that cited the original articles 
using Google Scholar and ISI Web of Knowledge. Fifth, we corresponded with 44 
researchers that had previously written one or several papers on the focal relationship 
in which effect size information was not reported, asking them for a correlation table 
listing Pearson correlation coefficients.  
These strategies yielded a final sample of 637 effect sizes derived from 145 
primary studies, which in turn consisted of 97 journal articles, 46 working papers, and 
2 PhD theses. We finished the search for data in November 2008 (See Appendix A). We 
then read all articles in the final set and developed a coding protocol (Lipsey & Wilson, 
2001) for extracting data on all relevant variables. To test Hypotheses 1a and 1b we 
collected information on the average percentage of equity held by the largest owner in 
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a given jurisdiction, bivariate correlation coefficients and multivariate t-statistics for 
the ownership-performance relationship, sample sizes, and the degrees of freedom of 
sampled regression analyses. We also differentiated (when possible) between ‘foreign’ 
and ‘domestics’ owners, and classified owners alternatively as ‘stable-’, ‘market-’, or 
‘inside’ owners. To test Hypotheses 2a through 2e we furthermore collected additional 
covariates from several secondary sources. Table 1 provides a description of all 
variables included in the analysis. 
 
Table 1: Description of Variables 
Variable Description 
Ownership The most generic category of concentrated ownership on which data 
can be obtained. It encompasses inside owners as well as controlling or 
non-controlling outside blockholders who, depending on the disclosure 
laws of any particular jurisdiction, own 3 percent or more of the 
company’s shares (see for example, Seifert et al., 2005). 
Ownership 
concentration 
A more specific measure of ownership concentration, which is 
differentially defined across research studies. First, it may be 
operationalized as ‘largest owner,’ representing a measure of the 
degree to which ownership in the firm is concentrated in the hands of a 
single investor. Second, it may be operationalized as ‘ultimate owner,’ 
which identifies any party – a substantial minority shareholder or the 
majority shareholder – who enjoys outright control over the firm. 
Common cut-off points for determining ultimate ownership are the 10 
and 20 percent levels of ownership (Faccio and Lang, 2002). Third, it 
may be operationalized as a continuous measure of the degree to which 
ownership is concentrated in the hands of the largest owners, such as 
the largest three or five shareholders, with a Herfindahl or entropy 
measure (Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998).  
Foreign owner A variable which assumes a positive value (either ‘1’ in case of dummy 
operationalizations or a percentage in case the degree of ownership 
concentration is known) when the owner is a foreign party (e.g., a 
foreign firm, financial institution, business group, or other; see for 
instance Douma et al., 2006). 
Inside investor A variable which assumes a positive value (either ‘1’ in case of dummy 
operationalizations or a percentage in case the degree of ownership 
concentration is known) when the owner is an insider in the firm (e.g., 
managers, founders, and their immediate family members; see for 
instance Veliyath and Ramaswamy, 2000). 
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Market investor A variable which assumes a positive value (either ‘1’ in case of dummy 
operationalizations or a percentage in case the degree of ownership 
concentration is known) when the dominant owner is solely tied to the 
firm via an arm’s length equity stake (e.g., foreign shareholders and 
investment trusts; see for instance Gedajlovic et al., 2005). 
Stable investor A variable which assumes a positive value (either ‘1’ in case of dummy 
operationalizations or a percentage in case the degree of ownership 
concentration is known) when the owner is durably tied to the firm via 
multiple business ties over and above the equity tie (e.g., family firms 
or firms affiliated to business group; see for instance Gedajlovic et al., 
2005). 
Accounting 
performance 
Any indicator of the financial performance of the firm that is expressed 
in the form of an accounting-based measure of firm profits (ROA, ROE 
and PM). 
Market performance Any indicator of the financial performance of the firm that is expressed 
in the form of a market-based measure of firm value (stock returns, 
market-to-book ratio, Tobin’s Q). 
Firm risk A variable which reflects the degree to which the financial valuation of 
a firm’s stock varies in relation to movements of the broader market. 
(see for instance Gedajlovic et al., 2005). 
Firm size An indicator of the size of the firm, commonly measured as a firm’s 
total assets, sales, or employees (see for instance Veliyath and 
Ramaswamy, 2000). 
Rule of law A variable which measures the extent to which agents have confidence 
in and abide by the rules of society in 2002. These include perceptions 
of the incidence of violent and non-violent crime, the effectiveness and 
predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts 
(source: Kaufmann et al., 2005). 
Anti-self-dealing index A variable which measures the extent to which national jurisdictions 
offer minority shareholders protection against expropriation by 
controlling shareholders, expressed in the form of a zero (low 
protection) to one (high protection) index. The index includes ex-ante 
and ex-post controls around self-dealing transactions (source: Djankov 
et al., 2008). 
Private benefits of 
control index 
A variable which measures the excess value (over and above the market 
value) of a controlling block of shares as measured in an exchange 
transaction. This excess value, which is paid in the form of a ‘block 
premium,’ captures the discounted future cash flows the acquirer 
expects to expropriate from minority shareholders. The block premium 
is computed by taking the difference between the price per share paid 
for the control block and the exchange price two days after the 
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2.3.2 Analysis 
To test Hypotheses 1a and 1b we used HOMA (Hedges & Olkin, 1985). In HOMA 
there are two methods for combining study estimates. The first, the fixed effects 
model, assumes no heterogeneity between study results, and collected effect sizes are 
solely corrected for sampling error to explain variability between effect sizes. The 
second, the random effects model, assumes that studies estimate different effect sizes, 
which are corrected for sampling error plus a value that represents other sources of 
variability that are assumed to be randomly distributed (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; 
Kisamore & Brannick, 2008). This method produces more conservative estimates when 
effect size distributions are heterogeneous, but it becomes computationally similar to 
the fixed effects model when the effect size distribution is homogeneous (Lipsey & 
Wilson, 2001). Because of its more realistic assumptions (Geyskens et al., 2009), we opt 
for the random effects model. 
  announcement of the control transaction, dividing by the exchange 
price and multiplying by the ratio of the proportion of cash flow rights 
represented in the controlling block (source: Dyck and Zingales, 2004). 
Labor protection Measures the protection of labor and employment laws as the average 
of: (1) Alternative employment contracts; (2) Cost of increasing hours 
worked; (3) Cost of firing workers; and (4) Dismissal procedures 
(source: Botero et al., 2004). 
Stock market 
capitalization/GDP 
Average of the ratio of stock market capitalization to gross domestic 
product for the period 1999-2003 (source: WDI at: 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/). 
Disclosure Average ranking of the answers to the following questions: A6g (R&D), 
B3f (capital expenditure), Ca (subsidiaries), Cb (segment-product), Cc 
(segment-geographic), and D1 (accounting policy) (source: Bushman et 
al., 2004). 
Publication year For journal articles: year in which the article first appeared in print. For 
working papers: year in which the paper was first included in a 
publicly accessible working paper series. 
Published A dummy variable measuring whether a specific study was published 
in a scholarly peer reviewed journal (1) or not (0). 
Cross-sectional design A dummy variable measuring whether the data included in a specific 
study was based on a cross-sectional (1) or a longitudinal (0) 
observation plan. 
Ln GDP/capita Natural log of per capita gross domestic product in 2003 US dollars 
(source: World Development Indicators at: 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/). 
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We use MARA (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001) to test Hypotheses 2a through 2e. 
MARA is a special type of weighted least squares (WLS) regression analysis designed 
specifically to assess the relationship between effect size and moderator variables in 
order to model previously unexplored heterogeneity in the effect size distribution 
(Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). One of the unique benefits of MARA is that it allows for the 
modeling of such heterogeneity with the help of data that were not part of the primary 
studies. In our case, we included the additional jurisdiction-level variables. 
2.3.3 HOMA procedure 
The effect size statistics we used for the HOMA are the Pearson product-moment 
correlation r and the partial correlation coefficient rxy.z. r is commonly used in meta-
analysis, because it is an easily interpretable and scale-free measure of linear 
association. When studies reported different effect size statistics, such as Cohen’s 
standardized means difference measure d, we converted them back into an r value 
using the appropriate formulas (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). r provides appropriate effect 
size information when the direction of causality of the underlying relationship has 
been established by prior research. However, for the present study it is necessary to 
also establish the direction of causality for the focal relationship. Since r does not 
provide this information, we also require a different type of effect size. 
We therefore also use rxy.z to check whether ownership concentration indeed 
causes firm performance, when controlling for endogeneity and firm characteristics (cf. 
Sánchez-Ballesta & García-Meca, 2007). In addition to its ability to provide an 
endogeneity-corrected reassessment of the overall mean effect size, partial correlation-
based HOMA is also an attractive method because of its potential for exploring non-
linear effects, such as squared and cubed terms. A potential deficit of the method is 
that the control variables included in the analysis tend to vary from sample to sample, 
such that the actual content of the aggregate z-vector is unknown and difficult to 
interpret. Given our specific interest in endogeneity controls, the impact of this deficit 
on our analysis is limited. We compute partial correlation coefficients on the basis of 
the t-statistics and degrees of freedom reported in primary studies (Greene, 2008).3 The 
number of partial correlation coefficients which can be harvested from primary studies 
                                                             
3 The formula used to calculate partial correlations is: √(t2/ (t2+df)) 
where t is the t-statistic and df is degrees of freedom. Note that this will always produce a positive 
number, so it is necessary to convert it to a negative number if the regression coefficient is negative (see 
Greene 2008, chapter 3). T-values result from the scaling of primary coefficients by their respective 
standard errors. They thus are by definition standardized and defined on a dimensionless scale. 
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is usually lower than the number of Pearson correlations, because studies must use 
firm performance as the dependent variable for partial correlations to be retrievable 
(Doucouliagos & Ulubasoglu, 2008). The partial correlation coefficients were then 
analyzed using HOMA procedures identical to those used for Pearson correlations. 
HOMA is applicable when effect sizes are normally distributed. However, when the 
underlying (or true) population values of r or rxy.z differ substantially from zero, the 
effect size distribution tends to become skewed (Rosenthal, 1991). A common remedy 
to this problem is to apply Fisher’s (1928) Zr transformation to the data, to bring them 
closer to the normal distribution (Hedges & Olkin, 1985; Silver & Dunlap, 1987). In our 
HOMA we therefore used Fisher’s Zr transformed correlations.4  
 An important question in meta-analysis is how to deal with studies containing 
multiple measurements of the focal effect (Geyskens et al., 2009). In our study, 
multiple measurements of the focal relationship are often reported due to different 
operationalizations of ownership and performance. The issue at stake is the trade-off 
between stochastic independence of the various effect sizes in the analysis on the one 
hand, and the use of all available information on the other. A Monte Carlo simulation 
by Bijmolt and Pieters (2001) shows that procedures using the complete set of 
measurements outperform those representing each study by only a single value (such 
as a composite effect size) in areas like parameter significance testing and parameter 
estimation accuracy. We therefore included all available measurements in our study. 
To arrive at an appropriate estimate of the meta-analytic mean effect size, we 
had to account for differences in precision across effect sizes plus variability in the 
population of effects (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). These differences derive from 
differences in the sample sizes of the underlying primary studies on which the effect 
sizes are based, plus a constant that represents the variability across the population 
effects. Hedges and Olkin (1985) demonstrated that the optimal measure of precision 
for a given effect size is the inverse variance weight w: the inverse of the squared 
standard error value of the effect size.5 With the help of these weights, we can 
                                                             
4 Fisher’s Zr transformed correlations are calculated as follows: ¹¸
·
©¨
§

 
r
rzr 1
1ln
2
1
, where r is the 
untransformed correlation coefficient.   
5 w is calculated as follows: 
Tvse
w
i
i ˆ
1
2  , where SE is the standard error of the effect size and Tvˆ
is the random effects variance component. 
 31 
 
subsequently calculate the meta-analytic mean effect size, its standard error, and the 
corresponding confidence interval.6  
2.3.4 MARA procedure 
Variables. We used MARA to test Hypotheses 2a through 2e. In addition to 
the institutional moderator variables discussed in the Theory and Hypotheses section, 
we assessed the influence of three methodological moderator variables. Specifically, 
we tested whether a particular effect size was derived from: (1) a recent or an older 
study; (2) a published or unpublished study; and (3) a study using cross-sectional or 
longitudinal data. We also included three substantive factors: (1) gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita to account for any spurious differences in development 
across the countries in our sample; (2) stock market capitalization (World 
Development Indicators, 1999-2003) to control for the effect of market liquidity; and (3) 
dummy variables for the identity of the concentrated owner to corroborate Hypotheses 
1a and 1b. All variables are summarily described in Table 1. 
Analysis. We used WLS regression analysis to assess the relationship between 
effect size and moderator variables (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). We used weighted 
regression to account for differences in precision across effect sizes. Research shows 
that the optimal weighting variable for MARA is the inverse variance weight w 
(Hedges, 1982; Hedges & Olkin, 1985). We use a modified type of WLS, because most 
statistical analysis programs will provide correct estimates of the regression 
coefficients, but report incorrect standard errors and significance levels for MARA.  
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This is the case when the software interprets the inverse variance weights as 
“representing multiple effect sizes rather than weightings of single effect sizes and 
attributes an exaggerated n to the effect size sample” (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001: 122). This 
problem is easy to correct. Hedges and Olkin (1985) demonstrated that a correct 
standard error can be computed for the unstandardized regression coefficients using 
the incorrect standard error and the mean-square residual. A significance test (z-test) 
can then be conducted by dividing the unstandardized regression coefficient by its 
corrected standard error (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). In line with current conventions 
(Geyskens et al., 2009), we estimated the regression parameters with mixed effects 
models. In such models, variability in the effect size distribution is attributed to 
systematic between-study differences and subject-level sampling error (as in fixed 
effects models) as well as to a remaining unmeasured or even immeasurable random 
component (as in random effects models; Lipsey and Wilson, 2001).  
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 General overview 
 Ownership concentration and performance. We first present a generic 
overview of the relationship between firm ownership and performance in Asia (see 
Table 2). The results show that firms with a blockholding owner outperform 
dispersedly held firms, and the confidence interval does not include zero (implying 
that the effect is significant). The mean effect size (mean rho) for the focal relationship 
is .04 (k = 637; N = 1,149,629) and the confidence interval does not include zero 
(implying that the effect is significant). The effect is independent of the chosen 
dependent variable, as the difference between market- and accounting-based measures 
of performance is negligible. A different way of assessing the focal relationship is to 
test for the effect of ownership concentration on performance (see Table 2). Here we add 
information concerning the degree of concentrated ownership, measured as the 
fraction of a firm’s total equity that is concentrated in the hands of a select few owners. 
We find few significant effects for this more fine-grained measure, implying that the 
size of the ownership stake might not be monotonically related to performance (cf. 
Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988; McConnell & Servaes, 
1990).  
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Additional HOMA analyses, exploring the moderating effect of the size of the 
ownership stake on the focal relationship, confirm this intuition (see Table 2). When 
ownership is wholly dispersed, no significant relationship between ownership 
structure and performance can be detected (mean rho = -.04, but the effect is not 
significant). When a blockholder is present while ownership concentration remains 
modest, such that owners can influence managers but lack full control over the firm, 
we find a positive and significant effect (0–30 percent: mean rho = .04). As the 
ownership stake increases (30–50 percent), such that owners can exert full control over 
the firm (usually with the help of pyramidal equity schemes), the effect on 
performance becomes negligible (mean rho = .01) and insignificant. The same is true 
for even higher levels of ownership (50–100 percent). We therefore conjecture that 
beyond a certain threshold level, the benefits of concentration are offset by increased 
opportunities for self-dealing (Bae et al., 2002; Johnson et al., 2000b).  
Endogeneity of ownership. A common critique of the literature we surveyed is 
that corporate ownership is an endogenous variable rather than an exogenous 
influence on firm profitability (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). As Demsetz and Villalonga 
have put it: “the ownership structure of a corporation should be thought of as an 
endogenous outcome of decisions that reflect the influence of shareholders and of 
trading on the market for shares” (2001: 210). Central to this view are the monitoring 
needs of the firm: when the performance of the firm is more likely to fluctuate due to 
self-serving managerial behaviors, it is better managed by concentrated owners; when 
performance is more predictable it is also safe in the hands of dispersed shareholders 
(Davis, 2005). As an equilibrium outcome, the effect of ownership on performance is 
therefore expected to be null (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). 
Although the endogeneity argument holds in many jurisdictions, especially in 
those with large, liquid, and informationally transparent capital markets, it has never 
been shown satisfactorily that ownership is endogenous upon performance in Asia. In 
fact, there may be few possibilities for endogenous adjustments of ownership structure 
in this region due to the prevalence of small, illiquid, and informationally opaque 
financial markets in many jurisdictions (Douma et al., 2006; Selarka 2005). Under such 
conditions, large shareholders cannot dispense of sizeable blocks of shares through the 
stock market, such that equilibrium conditions will not obtain easily and ownership 
will remain exogenous. Concentrated owners are then better off exercising direct 
control over the firm, either through representation on the board or through private 
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engagement with management (Gillan & Starks, 2007). The results of a meta-analytic 
test of the endogeneity effect are presented in Table 3. 
The results reported in Table 3 replicate those of Table 2 almost completely. 
When controlling for potentially influential variables, the effect of blockholdings on 
performance remains positive and significant (mean rho = .03; k = 223; N = 375,292) 
and the effect of ownership concentration remains null (mean rho = .01 (n.s.); k = 77; N 
= 125,210). Furthermore, the differential effect of linear and quadratic measures of 
concentration in studies employing both confirms that the focal relationship is non-
monotonic. Most importantly, the results confirm the robustness of these findings 
against the inclusion of endogeneity controls. Blockholders continue to contribute to 
firm performance (mean rho = .06; k = 52; N = 61,248) and the effect of ownership 
concentration continues to be null. Ownership is therefore not endogenous upon 
performance, or other variables, in Asia. 
 
Table 2: Correlation-Based HOMA Results for the Focal Relationship 
* Significant 
 
Contextual differences. Although these findings speak to the importance of 
concentrated ownership as a control strategy, they must be nuanced in light of 
contextual differences across Asian countries. Cochran’s (1954) Q test, which assesses 
Predictor K N Mean SDρ CI 95% Q test 
Ownership to performance 637 1,149,629 0.04* 0.00 0.03 / 0.05 10,275.45 (0.00) 
Accounting measures 354 781,770 0.04* 0.01 0.03 / 0.05 5,809.25 (0.00) 
Market measures 283 367,859 0.03* 0.01 0.01 / 0.04 4,438.81 (0.00) 
       
Ownership concentration 
to performance 278 
576,855 
 0.01 0.00 -0.00 / 0.02 2,892.06 (0.00) 
Accounting measures 174 427,948 0.01* 0.01 0.00 / 0.02 1,893.43 (0.00) 
Market measures 104 148,907  -0.00 0.01 -0.02 / 0.02 974.40 (0.00) 
0 t/m 30% 26 40,867 0.04* 0.02 0.00 /0.08 279.39 (0.00) 
30 to 50 % 94 205,646 0.01 0.01 -0.00 / 0.03 1,014.19 (0.00) 
50 to 100 % 158 330,342  -0.00 0.01 -0.02 / 0.01 1,567.47 (0.00) 
Dispersed ownership to 
performance 6 653 -0.04 0.06 -0.17 / 0.06 12.11 (0.03) 
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the heterogeneity of the effect size distribution, is highly significant (Q = 10,275.45; p < 
.001).7  
 
Table 3: Partial Correlation-Based HOMA Results for the Focal Relationship 
* Significant 
 
An important question is whether this heterogeneity derives from cross-
jurisdictional differences. Table 4 therefore reports country-specific results. The results 
confirm that the associational strength of our focal relationship varies across national 
contexts. The effect of blockholdership and/or ownership concentration was positive 
and significant in six cases: Hong Kong, India, Jordan, Singapore, South Korea, and 
Taiwan. Here, ownership clearly matters for performance, with mean effect sizes 
ranging from .02 (Hong Kong) to .09 (Taiwan). In five other nations – Bangladesh, 
China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand – no significant effects could be identified. 
Only for Armenia did we find negative effects of blockholdership (-.03) and ownership 
concentration (-.05) on performance. Japanese firms perform better when they have a 
blockholder on board (.04), but increasingly worse as the degree of ownership 
concentration increases (-.02). As more concentratedly owned firms tend to be those in 
                                                             
7 The Q test is computed by summing the squared deviations of each study’s effect estimate from the 
overall effect estimate (Cochran, 1954). In this exercise, each study is weighted by its w. The Q test 
assumes homogeneity, following a Chi-square distribution with k – 1 degrees of freedom (k = the 
number of studies). When Q is significant, as it is in our case, the assumption of homogeneity is 
rejected. 
Predictor K N Mean SDρ CI 95% Q test 
Ownership to performance 223 375,292 0.03* 0.00 0.02 / 0.04 1,423.93 (0.00) 
Accounting 
measures 104 133,127 0.04* 0.01 0.02 / 0.05 509.70 (0.00) 
Market measures 119 242,165 0.02* 0.01 0.01 / 0.04 913.32 (0.00) 
Control for endogeneity 52 61,248 0.06* 0.01 0.03 / 0.08 428.41 (0.00) 
Non-linear relationship       
Linear term 24 20,701 -0.04 0.02 -0.09 / 0.00 266.71 (0.00) 
Quadratic term 25 21,404 0.03 0.02 -0.00 / 0.07  191.76 (0.00) 
Cubic term 2 1,406 -0.01 0.29 -0.56 / 0.55 114.20 (0.00) 
       
Ownership concentration 
to performance 77 125,210 0.01 0.01 -0.01 / 0.02 463.59 (0.00) 
Accounting 
measures 31 36,474 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 / 0.02 116.36 (0.00) 
Market measures 46 88,736 0.02 0.01 -0.00 / 0.04 330.81 (0.00) 
Control for endogeneity 13 13,839 0.04 0.03 -0.01 / 0.09 97.31 (0.00) 
Non-linear relationship       
Linear term 6 5,021 -0.04 0.04 -0.11 / 0.03 28.55 (0.00) 
Quadratic term 6 5,021 0.07* 0.03 0.01 / 0.13 19.66 (0.00) 
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the lower tiers of Japanese supply systems, this effect likely derives from profit 
redistribution practices (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 2002). 
2.4.2 Owner identity 
Foreign owners versus domestic owners. Tables 5 and 6 report the correlation-
based and partial correlation-based HOMA results for Hypotheses 1a and 1b. Related 
evidence can be found in Table 4 (which reports country-specific results whenever 
available) and Table 7 (which reports the MARA results with owner identity controls). 
Hypothesis 1a is confirmed by the results in Table 5. Whereas having a 
domestic concentrated owner does not lead to improved performance (mean rho = .01 
(n.s.); k = 220; N = 492,332), foreign owners make a positive difference (mean rho = .12; 
k = 99; N = 154,728). A z-test (Feingold, 1992) confirms the significance of this ordinal 
ranking (z = 37.91; p < .001). The results in Table 6 similarly show a positive and 
significant effect for foreign ownership (mean rho = .07; k = 32; N = 59,185), which is 
robust against the inclusion of endogeneity controls (.06). These findings are 
corroborated by the results in Table 7 (Model 1), which show that foreign owners 
significantly outperform the reference category (p < .01) while domestic owners do not. 
Table 4 shows that these findings are largely driven by the excellent performance of 
foreign owners as compared to domestic owners in India (.11 vs. -.03), South Korea (.11 
vs. .04), Japan (.19 vs. -.01) , and Taiwan (.27 vs. .05). 
Stable, market, and inside owners. The results in Table 5 also confirm 
Hypothesis 1b, as market investors (mean rho = .07; k = 92; N = 169,055) outperform 
inside investors (mean rho = .03; k = 137; N = 177.881). A z-test confirms this ordinal 
difference (z = 11.80; p < .001). Likewise, inside investors outperform stable investors 
(mean rho = .00 (n.s.); k = 235; N = 513.147), and again this rank-ordering is confirmed 
statistically (z = 10.90; p < .001). Ordinally similar results are reported in Table 6 (.14 vs. 
.02 vs. -.00 (n.s.)), which are again largely robust against the inclusion of endogeneity 
controls (.19 vs. .01 (n.s.) vs. .00 (n.s.)). MARA analyses (Table 7; Model 1) similarly 
show that market investors outperform the reference category (p < .05), inside 
investors are on par with it (difference is not significant), and stable investors 
underperform the referents (p < .01).  
Table 4 shows that market investors do especially well in the heavily 
industrialized Asian nations of Japan (.08 vs. .05 vs. -.05), Korea (.07 vs. .01 (n.s.) vs. 
.02), and Taiwan (.24 vs. .10 vs. .01 (n.s.)). In contrast, only in the service industry-
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driven economy of Singapore are market investors (and inside investors) modestly 
outperformed by stable investors (.01 (n.s.) vs. -.03 (n.s.) vs. .03). 
2.4.3 Jurisdiction-level institutions 
Table 7 shows the MARA results for Hypotheses 2a through 2e. Two models are 
reported. The dependent variable for each model is the correlation between ownership 
(i.e., blockholder presence) and performance. Both models fit the data reasonably well 
(R2 = .24, .29). Model 1 reports evidence pertaining to all jurisdiction-level hypotheses 
except 2c (PBoC) and includes a control for effect sizes stemming from Japan. The 
model is based on 497 observations. Model 2 does not include the Japan dummy (due 
to limited degrees of freedom at the jurisdiction level), but does report evidence 
pertaining to all jurisdiction-level hypotheses. Since scores on the PBoC variable are 
not available for all countries, the number of observations for this model drops to 389.  
Rule of law. The results confirm Hypothesis 2a. The quality of legal 
institutions, captured by the rule of law variable (Kaufmann et al., 2005), positively 
moderates the focal relationship (p < .01). The effectiveness of ownership concentration 
as a control strategy is therefore contingent on the overall quality of the institutional 
matrix in a given jurisdiction (North, 1990; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
Protection against self-dealing. Hypothesis 2b is rejected. Protection against 
self-dealing transactions by organizational insiders (Djankov et al., 2008) does not 
moderate the focal relationship. In spite of the prominence comparative corporate 
governance scholars tend to attribute to the role of law in corporate governance (La 
Porta et al., 2008), specific legal remedies against self-dealing fail to make it easier for 
large owners to achieve adequate returns on their investment and do not function as a 
more efficient substitute to the potentially costly strategy of ownership concentration. 
Private benefits of control. Hypothesis 2c is supported. When PBoC are 
modest, they do not affect the focal relationship, because the consumption effect is 
wholly offset by the incentive effect. Yet when PBoC increase (as indicated by the 
squared term in Model 2), the consumption effect begins to prevail and moderate the 
focal relationship negatively (p < .05). In other words, the interests of smaller 
shareholders are hurt by the presence of a concentrated owner in jurisdictions that are 
exceptionally lenient towards the extraction of PBoC. 
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Shareholder disclosure. Hypothesis 2d is supported. A noticeable substitution 
effect exists between shareholder disclosure and ownership concentration. When 
shareholder disclosure provisions are firmly in place, shareholders can afford 
themselves to monitor firms from a distance and diversify their investment portfolios. 
When adequate shareholder disclosure is not guaranteed, however, the monitoring 
needs of firms increase due to informational opacity (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). This 
makes concentrated share ownership more attractive, because it allows for closer 
monitoring of managers. 
Labor protection. The findings for Hypothesis 2e are mixed. Model 1 shows a 
significant negative moderation effect of labor protection on the associational strength 
of the focal relationship (p < .01). Although this finding suggests that ownership 
concentration is a less effective control strategy in the face of strong labor protection 
laws, it is not robust against the combined effects of statistical control and sample 
attrition that obtain when the PBoC variable is included in the analyses. 
Control variables. Several control variables were incorporated in the 
regression work. First, we accounted for the fact that the Japanese economy is very 
large relative to the other economies in the region by creating a separate dummy 
variable, coded as ‘1’ in case an effect size represented Japanese data and ‘0’ otherwise. 
Removing the Japan dummy from Model 1 did not significantly affect our results: 
model fit statistics and parameter estimates remained within the same order of 
magnitude. Second, no significant effect was found for publication year, implying that 
the results we found for our focal relationship are stable over time. Third, we found no 
significant effect for the published variable, which means that our results are unlikely to 
be affected by the most common form of publication bias, notably: mean effect size 
inflation due to confirmatory publication bias (Pfeffer, 2007). Fourth, the cross-sectional 
design variable came out modestly significant in Model 1 but was wholly insignificant 
in Model 2, implying that the choice between cross-sectional and longitudinal research 
did not critically influence study outcomes. Fifth, the effect of gross domestic product on 
our focal relationship was significant and negative, implying that the benefits of 
concentrated ownership are more pronounced in emerging markets than in mature 
economies (Stiglitz, 1994). Sixth, in contrast to prior literature (cf. Bolton & Von 
Thadden, 1998; Coffee, 1991), we found no substitution effect between stock market 
liquidity and control through concentrated ownership.  
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This finding is robust against all common operationalizations of stock market 
liquidity, such as stock market capitalization as a fraction of GDP, total value of stocks 
traded as a fraction of the shares outstanding, and total value of stocks traded as a 
percentage of GDP. This finding lends further credence to the insight that corporate 
ownership is not endogenous upon performance in Asia: the ease with which blocks of 
shares can be transferred from one owner to the next does not affect the focal 
relationship. 
 
Table 6: Partial Correlation-Based HO MA Results for Owner Identity 
 
 
* Significant 
2.5 Discussion  
Three stylized facts characterize the relationship between concentrated ownership and 
firm performance in Asia. First, concentrated ownership contributes positively to 
performance, as firms with blockholders outperform dispersedly held firms. Second, 
ownership is not endogenous upon performance, implying that the direction of 
causality of this relationship really runs from ownership to performance and not the 
 
Predictor K N Mean SD
ρ 
CI 95% Q test 
Foreign owners 
to performance 
32 59,185 
 
0.07* 0.01 0.04 / 0.09  176.91 (0.00) 
Accounting 
measures 
20 39433 
 
0.06* 0.02 0.03 / 0.09 143.78 (0.00) 
Market 
measures 
12 19,752 0.07* 0.01 0.04 / 0.10 32.51 (0.00) 
Control for 
endogeneity 
6 10,176 0.06* 0.01 0.01 / 0.11 30.81 (0.00) 
       
Inside owners to 
performance 
39 51,573 
 
0.02* 0.01 0.00 / 0.04 118.01 (0.00) 
Accounting 
measures 
20 23,802 
 
0.02 0.01 -0.01 / 0.04 47.35 (0.00) 
Market 
measures 
19 27,771 0.02 0.01 -0.01 / 0.05 67.95 (0.00) 
Control for 
endogeneity 
7 9,902 0.01 0.02 -0.02 / 0.04 12.66 (0.05) 
       
Market owners to 
performance 
17 28,097 
 
0.14* 0.03 0.09 / 0.19 230.28 (0.00) 
Accounting 
measures 
12 17,335 
 
0.11* 0.02 0.06 / 0.15 79.15 (0.00) 
Market 
measures 
5 10,762 0.20* 0.07 0.07 / 0.34 150.65 (0.00) 
Control for 
endogeneity 
9 3,716 0.19* 0.02 0.16 / 0.22 126.74 (0.00) 
       
Stable owners to 
performance 
85 161,546 
 
-0.00 0.01 -0.01 / 0.01 423.22 (0.00) 
Accounting 
measures 
40 52,789 
 
0.01 0.01 -0.02 / 0.03 195.88 (0.00) 
Market 
measures 
45 108,757 -0.00 0.01 -0.02 / 0.01 224.92 (0.00) 
Control for 
endogeneity 
24 34,311 0.00 0.01 -0.01 / 0.02 55.04 (0.00) 
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other way around. Third, and most importantly, the associational strength of the focal 
relationship varies significantly across jurisdictions. The main contribution of our 
work is that we managed to trace this variety to two systematic sources: owner 
identity and jurisdiction-level institutions.   
2.5.1 Owner identity 
The associational strength of our focal relationship varies systematically across owner 
types. An interesting opportunity to further investigate the sources of differential 
performance of the various owner types derives from the fact that during our window 
of observation (1965-2008) a severe financial crisis struck Asia (in 1997-1998; Mitton, 
2002). The question at stake is how the various owner types dealt with it respectively. 
Some contributors suggest that concentrated owners are more prone to self-dealing 
during crises than during business-as-usual periods (Johnson et al., 2000b).  
According to this view, the link between concentrated ownership and 
performance should be weaker during the crisis than before or after it. To test this 
intuition, we split our sample into four sub-groups, notably: observations covering the 
pre-crisis period (from 1965 to 1996; N = 274,702); the crisis period (1997 and 1998; N = 
13,794); the post-crisis period (1999 and after; N = 222,262); and the ‘mixed’ category of 
observations covering two or more of these periods (N = 638,871). We then conducted 
separate HOMA analyses on each sub-group and on each owner type (see Table 8). 
   Our findings go against conventional wisdom. During the pre-crisis period, 
firms with a concentrated owner did not perform any different from dispersedly held 
firms (mean rho = .01 (n.s.), with the exception of firms controlled by a market owner 
(.04). During the crisis, however, concentratedly owned firms significantly 
outperformed their dispersedly held counterparts (.07). The differences between the 
various owner categories are telling. Firms controlled by stable owners performed 
poorly during the crisis (-.03). One possible explanation for this effect is that stable 
owners are more likely than other owner types to engage in self-dealing when they 
experience financial setbacks (Bae et al., 2002). Another explanation derives from the 
revealed investment preferences of stable owners in terms of firm risk (see Table 9; 
also see Table 1 for variable definitions). They are the only category of owners who are 
decidedly risk-averse (-.04). Due to their tie multiplicity, they might be more interested 
in the long-run stability of the firms in which they hold equity than in maximizing 
short-run performance. This could result in lower firm performance during crises, 
when the trade-off between stability and profitability becomes more acute. 
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Table 7: Mixed Effects MARA Results for Institutional Contextual Factorsa 
Variable Model 1 
Ownership 
Model 2  
Ownership 
   
Publication year 0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) 
Published -0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
Panel design -0.02 (0.01)* -0.02 (0.01) 
   
Rule of law  0.10 (0.02)** 0.18 (0.08)** 
Anti-self dealing index -0.06 (0.06) -0.89 (-0.50) 
Private benefits of control  0.16 (0.07) 
Private benefits of control 
squared 
 -0.70 (0.30)* 
Shareholder Disclosure -0.74 (0.15)** -1.11 (0.5)* 
Liquidity -0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Labor protection -0.44 (0.17)** -0.27 (0.22) 
   
Inside owners 0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
Stable owners -0.03 (0.01)** -0.05 (0.01)** 
Market owners 0.03 (0.01)* 0.03 (0.01)* 
Foreign owners 0.10 (0.01)** 0.09 (0.01)** 
Domestic owners 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 
Japan -0.02 (0.01)**  
Gross domestic product -0.03 (0.01)** -1.13 (0.52)* 
   
R2 0.24 0.29 
K 497 389 
 QModel (p) 181.33 (0.00) 188.37 (0.00) 
QResidual (p) 577.12 (0.06) 464.10 (0.01) 
V .00544 0.005 
a Unstandardized regression coefficients are presented for study moderators and substantive 
moderators with standard errors in parentheses. k is the total number of effect sizes; Q is the 
homogeneity statistic with its probability in parentheses; v is the random effects variance component.   
*    p < 0.05 
**  p < 0.01 
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Table 8: Effect of the Asian Crisis on the Focal Relationship 
* Significant 
In contrast, firms with market owners performed significantly better than 
dispersedly held firms during the crisis (.27). This effect also persisted after the crisis 
(.06), suggesting that firms with market owners also recovered faster in the post-crisis 
period. The excellent performance of these firms might well derive from the ability of 
market owners to force bold strategic actions upon firms – such as corporate 
restructurings or synergistic mergers – during a time when they badly needed them. 
As market owners have a revealed preference for sizeable firms, their differential 
performance may in part be ascribed to selection effects (Berger et al., 2005).  
Firms with large inside owners similarly outperformed dispersedly held firms 
both during (.16) and after (.04) the crisis. These firms are likely to have benefitted 
from the fact that their blockholding executives were properly incentivized to pursue 
shareholder value maximizing policies. The results in Table 9 show that inside owners 
are indeed risk-neutral, implying that they are probably more interested in increasing 
firm value than in entrenched positions with secure performance-insensitive salaries. 
Table 9 furthermore shows that inside owners are associated with smaller firms (-.09). 
It is likely that this revealed preference for smaller firms is actuality an artifact of the 
predominance of founding families in this class of owners, who tend to be dominant 
owners only during the earlier (pre-expansion) stages of a firm’s life cycle. If this is the 
case, the incentivizing effect of inside ownership affects both professional managers 
and executives recruited from founding families.  
Predictor Pre-crisis 
period 
Crisis period Post-crisis 
period 
Mixed 
Ownership to 
performance 
0.01 (274,702) 0.07* (13,794) 0.04* (222,262) 0.05* (638,871) 
 
Foreign owners to 
performance 
0.02 (13,282) _ 0.13* (43,056) 
 
0.14* (98,390) 
Domestic owners 
to performance 
-0.00 (117,749) 0.06 (8,222) -0.00 (57,061) 0.02 (309,300) 
 
Inside owners to 
performance 
0.01 (60,548) 0.16* (3,119) 0.04* (34,294) 0.03* (79,920) 
Market owners to 
performance 
0.04* (71,847) 
 
0.27* (1,140) 
 
0.06* (53,491) 
 
0.07* (42,577) 
Stable owners to 
performance 
-0.01 (127,226) -0.03* (8,222) 0.01 (74,656) 
 
0.00 (303,043) 
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Table 9: Correlation-Based HOMA Results for Owner Type Investment Preferences 
Predictor K N Mean SDρ CI 95% Q test 
Ownership to size 391 492,066 0.07* 0.01 0.05 / 0.09 21,918.75 (0.00) 
      
Foreign owners to size 61 87,045 0.22* 0.02 0.18 / 0.26 2,064.11 (0.00) 
       
Market  owners to size 55 53,342 0.15* 0.02 0.10 /0.19 1,386.36 (0.00) 
       
Stable owners to size 140 196,999 0.11* 0.02 0.07 / 0.15 9,407.61 (0.00) 
       
Inside owners to size 70 76,449 -0.09* 0.02 -0.12 / -0.06 1,122.95 (0.00) 
      
Ownership to risk 72 130,827 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 / 0.00 1,026.95 (0.00) 
      
Foreign owners to risk 15 14,823 0.00 0.03 -0.06 / 0.06  170.45 (0.00) 
       
Stable owners to risk 22 59,865 -0.04* 0.00 -0.04 / -0.03 531.97 (0.00) 
       
Inside owners to risk 14 35,042 0.01 0.02 -0.03 / 0.04 79.18 (0.00) 
 
* Significant 
Finally, firms with foreign owners performed comparatively strong in the 
post-crisis period (.13). Foreign owners’ revealed investment preferences indicate that 
their good performance is likely attributable to a selection effect, as they tend to invest 
primarily in very large firms (.22). Because they are also risk-neutral (.00 (n.s.)), this 
preference probably does not derive from a desire to avoid risks by investing only in 
well-known and well-governed firms. Instead, for foreign owners whose home market 
was not severely affected by the Asian crisis, blocks of shares in financially troubled 
but structurally healthy Asian firms were probably temporarily cheap and easy to turn 
around in terms of performance.  
2.5.2 Jurisdiction-level institutions 
Our results also speak to the emerging institution-based view of corporate governance 
(Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Aguilera et al, 2008; Jackson & Deeg, 2008; La Porta et al., 
2008; Peng et al., 2008; Roe, 2003) by showing that the associational strength of our 
focal relationship is critically affected by the level of development of several 
jurisdiction-level institutions. One factor in particular, notably: the overall quality of a 
jurisdiction’s legal background institutions (Kaufmann et al., 2005), acts as a 
complement to ownership concentration through its positive influence on owners’ 
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capacity to contribute to the performance of firms. Two other factors – shareholder 
disclosure (Bushman et al., 2004) and PBoC (Dyck & Zingales, 2004) – act as 
moderators affecting the costs and benefits of ownership, in that blockholders can 
positively contribute to corporate performance in countries in which the scores on 
these variables are low, but increasingly less so when the variable scores increase.  
 
Figure 1: The Adaptation of Concentrated Ownership to Jurisdiction-Level 
Institutions 
  The question is whether these individual effects mesh into jurisdiction-level 
institutional configurations, which collectively affect the prevalence and attractiveness 
of ownership concentration (Aguilera et al., 2008; Gilson, 2001). To answer this 
question, we conducted further exploratory analyses. First, we z-transformed the 
scores of the countries represented in our dataset on the three aforementioned 
institutional variables, which were selected because they produced robustly significant 
results in the MARA analyses (see Table 7). Second, we compiled a new ‘ownership 
embeddedness scale’ by summing these individual scores, taking into account the 
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effect signs of the MARA output (i.e., we left the sign of countries’ z-scores on the rule 
of law variable as-is, but reversed the sign of their scores on the other two variables, as 
these showed negative effect signs in the regression work). Third, we ran a univariate 
non-linear OLS regression, in which we regressed countries’ scores on an average 
ownership concentration variable (operationalized as the average fraction of equity 
held by the three largest owners of the firm) on our self-compiled scale. The regression 
fitted the data very well (R2 = .60), and revealed that there are indeed three broad 
institutional configurations in Asia which each condition ownership concentration in 
unique ways. The visual plot of this regression work is presented in Figure 1. 
Tracing the graph from left to right, we first come across a group of Asian 
countries with intermediate to high levels of ownership concentration which includes 
a set of strong Asian economies like South Korea, China, and India, but also Thailand 
and the Philippines. What sets these countries apart from other Asian nations is that 
they allow for high levels of PBoC and that they have comparatively low scores on the 
rule of law variable. In line with our theoretical predictions, it appears that ownership 
concentration is an attractive control strategy in these nations because it can be highly 
lucrative. The caveat for these countries in particular is that the concentrated owner 
must enjoy full control over the firm, because the court system can most likely not be 
relied upon to enforce (minority) shareholders’ rights.  
Moving further right along the graph, we come along a qualitatively very 
different cluster of countries that includes Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong. 
Ownership concentration is still high in these nations, although Singapore and Hong 
Kong are already beyond the ‘tipping point’ of the graph. What makes this cluster of 
countries institutionally distinct from other Asian jurisdictions is that they combine 
fairly high PBoC with high scores on the rule of law and shareholder disclosure 
variables. Concentrated ownership is thus attractive in these nations because it is again 
profitable, but what is salient here is that smaller shareholders are also comparatively 
well-off because they can count on reliable firm-specific information and adequate 
protection by the courts. That this combination of moderate PBoC and a strong 
position of smaller shareholders represents a fairly unique and attractive ‘sweet spot’ 
is demonstrated by the relative depth of the stock markets of the countries in this 
cluster: Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia outperform all other countries in our 
sample in terms of stock market capitalization per capita.  
Towards the right-hand side of the graph we find a cluster of countries 
comprising Taiwan and Japan. This is again a qualitatively different cluster in that 
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these nations do not allow for any PBoC and can further boast excellent scores on the 
rule of law and shareholder disclosure variables. The degree of concentrated 
ownership in these nations is amongst the lowest in Asia, both because it is not 
exceptionally profitable to be a concentrated owner in these jurisdictions and because 
minority shareholders are well-protected and well-informed. In short, we identify at 
least three different clusters of Asian nations, which each have a unique set of 
institutional features conditioning the prevalence and attractiveness of concentrated 
ownership. 
2.5.3 Conclusion 
Corporate governance scholars have long seen concentrated ownership as a universal 
control mechanism, treating it as if it had predictable, context-independent effects on 
the relationship between owners and managers, as well as on corporate performance. 
Yet our meta-analytic study of 14 Asian countries shows that the associational strength 
of the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance varies 
considerably across Asian jurisdictions. We therefore raised and addressed the 
question which firm- and jurisdiction-level factors condition and contextualize this 
relationship in Asia. At the firm level, we found strong owner identity effects, 
implying that it matters considerably for performance who owns firms. At the 
jurisdiction-level, we found that the attractiveness and effectiveness of the 
concentrated ownership mechanism is critically conditioned by configurations of 
interacting institutions. This implies that it also matters significantly for performance 
where firms are owned. We therefore recommend the inclusion of identity and 
institutional effects as control or explanatory variables in future research studies 
exploring issues of firm governance and performance in Asia. 
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Chapter 3. Competition and complementarity in 
corporate governance: The effects of labor 
institutions on blockholder effectiveness in 23 
European countries8 
 
ABSTRACT 
Using a variety of advanced meta-analytic methods on a sample of 748,569 firm-year 
observations derived from 162 studies covering 23 European countries, this study 
provides an analysis of the costs and benefits of blockholding in a region of the world 
in which it is a dominant yet discretionary corporate governance strategy for 
shareholders of publicly listed firms. We find that the effectiveness of blockholding is 
affected by the specific labor institutions that distinguish European countries from the 
rest of the world, and that these institutional effects can be seen to involve both 
competition and complementarity between blockholding and institutionally facilitated 
employee interests. We also find that relational blockholders are better able to deal 
with these institutional effects than arm’s-length blockholders.  
3.1 Introduction  
Although the separation of ownership and control in publicly listed firms functions as 
a defining condition for the field of corporate governance (Berle and Means 1932), 
‘blockholding’, or the concentration of ownership in the hands of a single or a few 
large shareholders, has been a long standing focus of corporate governance research 
(Holderness 2003). According to the established agency theoretical view of corporate 
governance (Fama 1980, Jensen and Meckling 1976), blockholding functions as a 
remedy for the agency problems between managers and owners that result from the 
separation of ownership and control in dispersedly held publicly listed firms because 
it: alleviates the incentive problems and transaction costs that dispersed shareholders 
face in monitoring managers (Black 1990), facilitates the development of monitoring 
capabilities that are unavailable to dispersed shareholders (Ryan and Schneider 2002), 
                                                             
8 Paper by Van Essen, M., Heugens, P. P. M. A. R., & Van Oosterhout, H. Earlier versions of this paper 
have been presented at the Academy of Management (2009) and American Law and Economic 
Association (2009). Paper under review by Organization Science (revise and resubmit, 2nd round). 
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provides a countervailing power against the claims of non-shareholding corporate 
constituencies on a firm’s earnings (Rajan and Zingales 1998, Roe 2003), and functions 
as a substitute for poor legal investor protection in a country (Heugens et al. 2009, 
Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
This widely accepted agency theoretical understanding of blockholding can 
be questioned, however, for several reasons. First, the balance of empirical evidence on 
blockholding mounted thus far does not support the existence of any straightforward 
positive relationship between blockholding and firm performance (Dalton et al. 2003), 
suggesting that the costs and benefits to blockholding are presently insufficiently 
accounted for. Some studies have suggested, for example, that the relationship may be 
non-monotonic, and that the ability of blockholders to add value to the corporation 
may be contingent on the size of their ownership stake (Demsetz and Villalonga 2001, 
McConnell and Servaes 1990, Morck et al. 1988). 
 Second, much of the theoretical rationale behind blockholding as a corporate 
governance strategy available to shareholders is premised on the separation of 
ownership and control that actually exists in the US and the UK, but that is hardly true 
for the rest of the world where concentrated ownership remains the norm (La Porta et 
al. 1999). This raises the question which function blockholding serves in countries 
where ownership has hardly separated from control to begin with (La Porta et al. 
1999). Although the prevailing answer in the literature is that blockholding serves as a 
substitute for legal protection in institutionally poorly developed countries (La Porta et 
al. 2008, Shleifer and Vishny 1997), this answer does not explain why blockholding is 
also the dominant corporate governance strategy in quite a number of economically 
and institutionally well developed countries, such as Sweden for example (Gilson 
2006, Holderness 2008). The existence of such anomalies in respect to this so-called 
‘law and finance’ thesis (La Porta et al. 1998, 2008) not only suggests that blockholding 
may serve different functions in different institutional contexts (Gilson 2001), but also 
that these functions need not exclusively involve those identified by agency theoretical 
understandings of the phenomenon.9  
                                                             
9 We understand the agency theoretical view of corporate governance to include so-called principal-
principal agency problems between different (often large controlling versus non-controlling small) 
shareholders (Young et al. 2008). As we will argue below, we believe that agency theory can fruitfully 
be seen to be part of a broader theoretical framework that seeks to explain corporate governance 
configurations, as well as their strategic and distributional outcomes, from the competition for 
corporate earnings between corporate constituencies (Zingales 1998). In this more comprehensive 
view, agency theory is just one perspective which looks at these issues mostly from the perspective of a 
firm’s owners, with a somewhat instrumental focus on the remedies against agency problems. 
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More specifically, third, an emerging literature suggests that at least some of 
the benefits of blockholding may not derive from its function to secure shareholder’s 
residual claims in the competition for corporate earnings with other corporate 
constituencies (e.g. managers, employees), but from its complementarity with certain 
country-specific institutional features (Hall and Soskice 2001, North 1990) that enable 
mutually beneficial strategic coordination between blockholders, on the one hand, and 
labor interests, on the other, that may ultimately benefit both (Hopner 2005, Jackson 
2005). Finally, as some studies have found different types of blockholders to be 
differentially successful in creating value for the firms they own (Douma et al. 2006, 
Gedaljovic et al. 2005, Thomsen and Pedersen 2000), different types of blockholders 
may also be differentially effective in performing dissimilar functions in diverse 
institutional contexts.  
In order to complement the prevailing, mostly agency theory inspired 
understanding of blockholding, we develop and test hypotheses about blockholder 
effectiveness in the European context. We look at Europe for three reasons. First, 
blockholding is the dominant corporate governance strategy for shareholders in most 
European countries except for the UK (Faccio and Lang 2002), which makes Europe 
uniquely suitable for an empirical analysis of this generic corporate governance 
strategy (Barca and Becht 2001, Connelly et al. 2010). As many European countries are 
economically and institutionally well developed, second, ownership is allowed to 
separate from control to begin with, making blockholding a discretionary rather than 
necessary feature of European corporate governance. Third, compared to the rest of 
the world, European countries feature rather specific institutions in regard to the role 
of employees in the economy and in corporate governance more specifically, which to 
date have received relatively little attention in corporate governance research 
(Aguilera and Jackson 2003). 
We clarify, first, how the costs and benefits of blockholding may explain an 
inverted U-shape relationship between blockholding and firm performance, and test 
whether this relationship holds in the European context. In line with the leading 
agency theoretical perspective we argue, second, that certain economic and 
institutional features of European countries, such as the degree of labor regulation and 
union density in a country, empower employees to claim a larger part of corporate 
earnings, which will negatively affect blockholder effectiveness. Drawing on the 
emergent literature on institutional complementarities (Hall and Gingerich 2009), 
third, we develop an alternative hypothesis that blockholders are able to positively 
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influence firm performance in countries where labor institutions are relatively strongly 
developed, because the centralization of shareholder and employee interests enables 
strategic coordination that may benefit both (Gospel and Pendleton 2003, Hall and 
Soskice 2001). Finally, we test whether ‘relational owners’ that are durably and 
multiply tied to the firms they own, are better able to add value in the European 
context than owners that have only arm’s-length involvement with their firms (Ayres 
and Cramton 1993). 
Because there already exists a wealth of studies on blockholding in European 
countries, we use both Hedges and Olkin-type meta-analyses (HOMA; Hedges and 
Olkin 1985) and meta-analytic regression analyses (MARA; Stanley and Jarrell 2005) on 
a dataset involving 23 European countries and consisting of 748,569 firm-year 
observations derived from 162 primary studies that report 866 effect sizes of the 
ownership-performance relationship. These methods not only allow us to synthesize a 
sizeable body of mostly inconclusive research findings on blockholder effectiveness in 
the European context, but also enable us to develop and test new hypotheses that to 
date have not yet been researched (Combs et al. 2010, Eden 2002). More specifically, by 
combining the results from multiple single-country studies into a single multi-country 
study, we are able to test the influence of institutional variables that protect and enable 
the role of employees in corporate governance on the effectiveness of blockholding, on 
the one hand, and the interaction between—possibly opposite—institutional effects 
and the involvement of relational and arm’s-length blockholders, on the other.  
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. Overall, first, we develop a 
theory of blockholding that explains its costs and benefits as a corporate governance 
strategy available to shareholders from both country level institutional factors, on the 
one hand, and the interaction between these institutional factors and the types of 
blockholders involved, on the other. We thereby contribute to an emerging 
organizational theory of comparative corporate governance that seeks to explain the 
effectiveness of firm level corporate governance practices from both firm and country 
level contingencies (Aguilera et al. 2008, Denis and McConnell 2003). More specifically, 
second, by focusing on the effect of institutions that protect and facilitate the role of 
employees in corporate governance on the effectiveness of blockholding, we not only 
address a topic that thus far has received relatively little attention in corporate 
governance research (Aguilera and Jackson 2003), but also highlight the corporate 
governance role of institutional features of the European context that distinguish it 
from the rest of the world. We thereby contribute to the emerging institution-based 
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view of firm strategies and their outcomes (Carney et al. 2010, Engelen and Van Essen 
2010, Fiss 2008, Peng and Khoury 2008, Peng et al. 2008, 2009). Theoretically, third, we 
show how the concept of institutional complementarity that is central to the variety of 
capitalisms literature can fruitfully complement the currently dominant agency 
theoretical understanding of the role of blockholding in corporate governance (Hall 
and Gingerich 2009, Hall and Soskice 2001). 
3.2 Theory and Hypotheses 
Blockholding is conventionally understood to function as a remedy for agency 
problems that result from the separation of ownership and control in dispersedly held 
publicly listed firms (Holderness 2003). In such firms, shareholders face significant 
transaction costs and collective action problems that negatively affect their willingness 
and ability to monitor managers (Black 1990), who, in the leading agency theoretical 
view of corporate governance, are assumed to serve their own interests over those of 
the shareholders (Dalton et al. 2007). Blockholding functions as a remedy for these 
problems in this view for several reasons. First, by concentrating ownership in the 
hands of a single or a few owners, blockholding alleviates the transaction costs and 
collective action problems that dispersed shareholders face in monitoring managers 
(Black 1990). Due to economies of scale, second, large blockholders are able to develop 
monitoring capabilities that are unavailable to smaller more dispersed shareholders 
(Ryan and Schneider 2002). Third, blockholders may function as a countervailing 
power against the claims of powerful non-shareholding corporate constituencies, such 
as employees or managers, in the ex post distribution of a firm’s earnings (Roe 2003, 
Zingales 1998). Finally, blockholding functions as a substitute for poor legal protection 
in a country (Heugens et al. 2009, Shleifer and Vishny 1997), which may stand in the 
way of ownership separating from control to begin with (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998). 
It has become increasingly clear, however, that there are costs as well as 
benefits attached to blockholding. First, concentrated ownership has been argued to 
lead to suboptimal risk exposure and diminished liquidity of the firm’s equity (Bolton 
and Von Thadden 1998, Maug 1998). This not only increases the cost of capital to the 
firm, but may also make controlling owners pursue more risk-averse and potentially 
less lucrative corporate strategies, such as unrelated diversification for example (Rajan 
et al. 2000), in order to offset their increased risk exposure. Second, certain 
blockholders may pursue goals that deviate substantially from the end of maximizing 
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shareholder value. This is particularly true in Europe, where government ownership 
continues to play an important role in many firms and where it often serves as a 
substitute for regulation or formal policies (Thomsen and Pedersen 2000: 694). Third, 
controlling blockholders may enjoy benefits of their control that they do not share with 
other shareholders—so-called ‘private benefits of control’ (Zingales 1994)—by 
adopting self-dealing strategies that hurt not only firm performance and minority 
shareholders, but possibly also employees and creditors (Johnson et al. 2000b).  
Several scholars have argued that the balance of costs and benefits of 
blockholding may vary with the size of the ownership stake in the firm (Demsetz and 
Villalonga 2001, McConnell and Servaes 1990, Morck et al. 1988). In this view, this 
balance initially increases up to an optimum degree of ownership concentration, after 
which it declines and eventually becomes negative. One explanation for this is that the 
benefits of increased owner control over the firm, such as increased monitoring, 
already kick in at lower levels of concentration, while the costs that result from self-
dealing by a controlling owner increase with the size of the ownership stake until it 
becomes so large that there are few if any minority owners left to expropriate 
(Heugens et al. 2009). A similar but slightly different explanation can be given about 
other costs of blockholding, such as reduced liquidity and the performance effects of 
strategies adopted to offset increased risk exposure, as these can be seen to increase 
with block size, assuming again that the benefits of blockholding are already realized 
at lower levels of ownership concentration. We therefore hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1: In the European context, the relationship between 
blockholding and firm performance has an inverted U-
shape. 
 
3.2.1 Blockholding in the European institutional context 
An emerging but fast growing paradigm in organizational research emphasizes the 
importance of the institutional context of business in understanding firm strategies as 
well as their outcomes (Carney et al. 2010, Fiss 2008, Peng and Khoury 2008, Peng et al. 
2008, 2009). Different countries are known to have rather diverse economic systems 
(Hall and Soskice 2001, Whitley 1999) that have been developed within different 
institutional contexts (Jackson and Deeg 2008, North 1990) and that are bound to 
influence both the prevalence and the effectiveness of any particular corporate 
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governance practice or strategy (Bebchuk and Roe 1999, Denis and McConnell 2003). 
In line with these general observations, we expect the costs and benefits of 
blockholding to play out differentially within different institutional contexts.   
This is, first, because the strategy of blockholding to discipline managers 
makes most theoretical sense in the context of dispersed ownership regimes, such as 
the US and the UK, where manager-shareholder agency problems loom large and 
levels of ownership concentration can smoothly adjust to the needs of any particular 
firm due to the higher liquidity of firms and equity markets there (Demsetz and 
Villalonga 2001). Yet it is a well-documented fact that blockholding is more prevalent 
in the rest of the world than in the UK and the US (La Porta et al. 1999), where it was 
found to be of little empirical consequence (Dalton et al. 2003).  
It is, second, because blockholding is often claimed to constitute a response by 
shareholders to low levels of institutional development (Gilson 2006, 2007) and legal 
protection more specifically (La Porta et al. 2008), which makes blockholding an 
invariant corporate governance feature of many institutionally poorly developed 
countries (La Porta et al. 1999). But although blockholding is indeed the dominant 
corporate governance strategy in most European countries similar to the rest of the 
world, levels of institutional development are actually quite high in Europe, as can be 
observed from Table 1, which compares European countries with the rest of the world 
in terms of a number of economic and institutional indicators. This makes 
blockholding a discretionary rather than a necessary feature of European corporate 
governance.  
Taken together, these observations suggest that the European context offers 
additional benefits to the strategy of blockholding that derive neither from its 
disciplinary role in dispersed ownership regimes, nor from its functioning as a 
substitute for poor institutional and legal development.  
One important dimension in which the European institutional context differs 
from the rest of the world involves the role of employees in the economy and in 
corporate governance more specifically (Aguilera and Jackson 2003, Jackson 2005). A 
combination of a long standing presence of socialist or social democratic parties in 
European countries, on the one hand, and a high prevalence of electoral systems that 
promote coalition government and consensus building over partisan majoritarian 
decision making (Lijphart 1999), on the other, has resulted in comprehensive 
institutional compromises between labor and capital that are quite unique in the world 
(Gourevitch and Shinn 2005). 
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Table 1: Institutional and Economic Indicatorsa 
‘a Number of countries is in parentheses. SE = Standard error of mean. We used two-tailed significance 
levels. Descriptions of the variables are in Table 2. 
*    p < 0.1 
**  p < 0.05 
*** p< 0.01 
 
More specifically, and as can be observed from Table 1, European countries 
distinctively feature a legal environment that protects employee interests and 
facilitates collective labor to play an important role in corporate governance (Botero et 
al. 2004). These institutional features conducive to employee interests can be seen to 
have two different effects on the effectiveness of blockholding in the European context.  
On the one hand, they can empower employees in the competitive processes through 
which corporate earnings are distributed over corporate constituencies. On the other 
hand, they can enable comprehensive strategic coordination between organized labor 
and blockholders that may ultimately benefit both. Different theoretical perspectives 
underlie the articulation of these alternative expectations.  
3.2.2 The empowering and constraining effects of labor institutions 
According to an increasingly influential view, corporate governance is about the 
structures and processes, both at the firm and country levels of analysis, through 
which corporate constituencies, such as shareholders, managers and employees, 
competitively seek to appropriate corporate earnings (Zingales 1998). Although this 
perspective is largely consistent with the leading agency theoretical view of corporate 
governance, it broadens agency theory’s somewhat instrumental focus on the remedies 
for agency problems in public firms with a more comprehensive ambition to explain 
extant corporate governance configurations (Rajan and Zingales 2003) and the strategic 
and distributional outcomes that result from them (Zingales 2000), at both the firm and 
country levels of analysis (Durnev and Kim 2005). Pagano and Volpin (2005a), for 
         Europe  Rest of World 
Variables Mean SE Mean SE 
GDP per capita 26.520*** (23) 10.131 9.312 (160) 10.849 
Rule of law index  1.03*** (23) 0.94  -0.16 (160) 0.91 
Anti-self-dealing index 0.38 (22)  0.18 0.47 (50) 0.25 
Employment laws index 0.60*** (23) 0.16 0.45 (62) 0.19 
Collective relations laws index 0.50** (23) 0.12 0.43 (62) 0.13 
Union density 34.63 (22) 21.67 29.99 (12) 20.61 
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example, explain the levels of investor and labor protection in a country from possible 
coalitions that the interested parties involved can build under majoritarian or coalition 
governments, showing that the former favor investor interests, while employees 
benefit more from the latter. Our explanatory focus here is on the firm-level strategy of 
blockholding and on the question how country-level labor institutions, once they are 
in place, affect its effectiveness more specifically.  
 Consistent with the core tenets of agency theory, the main function of 
blockholding in this broader competitive perspective is for shareholders to create a 
countervailing power against other corporate constituencies in order to secure the 
residual returns on their investments. In contrast to the US, where managers have been 
very effective in appropriating an increasing part of corporate earnings through their 
compensation packages (Bebchuk and Fried 2004), employees are believed to be a 
more powerful corporate constituency in many European countries (Gourevitch and 
Shinn 2005). As a result, some have argued that in most European countries 
blockholding serves predominantly to counter legally protected and empowered labor 
interests (Roe 2003). There exist at least two different mechanisms through which labor 
institutions may influence the effectiveness of blockholding in this competitive view of 
corporate governance. 
First, labor institutions may affect the balance of power between corporate 
constituencies in employees’ favor and thereby negatively affect the effectiveness of 
blockholding in so far as it depends on their relative power vis-à-vis other corporate 
constituencies. Thus the degree in which labor regulation facilitates collective labor 
relations to form and be maintained (henceforth: collective relations law), and the 
union density in a country, are expected to increase the relative power of labor 
(Blanchard and Giavazzi 2003, Botero et al. 2004), thereby correspondingly decreasing 
the effectiveness of blockholders in securing their residual claim on corporate 
earnings. When firms are confronted with negative revenue shocks, for example, 
strong collective labor interests may be able to pressure management to refrain from 
restructurings, or even to engage in value destroying asset sales, in order to relieve 
financial distress and avoid layoffs (Atanassov and Kim 2009). In this view, organized 
labor may side with either management (Pagano and Volpin 2005b) or blockholders 
(Pagano and Volpin 2005a), in attempts to preserve above market wage levels 
(Bertrand and Mullainathan 1999) or to shield against disciplining takeovers (Rauh 
2006), at the expense of firm performance.  
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Second, a different mechanism through which labor institutions may affect 
blockholder effectiveness is by structurally constraining the options available to 
blockholders to pursue value-enhancing strategies. This is the case with the specific 
kind of labor regulation that protects employees against dismissals (henceforth: 
employment protection law), as this will limit the possibilities for blockholders to gain 
financially by restructuring and downsizing the firms they own (Atanassov and Kim 
2009). Because this kind of labor regulation is found to increase the rigidity of labor 
markets (Botero et al. 2004), controlling blockholders may face difficulties in adjusting 
the scale of operations to optimal levels of output. Again, this problem becomes 
particularly acute when firms are confronted with negative revenue shocks. Atanassov 
and Kim (2009), for example, found that when firms are confronted with such shocks, 
employment protection law decreases the likelihood that these firms will lay-off 
employees, and increases the probability that they resort to value decreasing asset 
sales, as selling even a firm’s crown jewels may be the only way to absorb falls in 
demand and meet short-term financial obligations. Similarly, firms in countries with 
high levels of employment protection are likely to grow slower when the market picks 
up again, as they anticipate this regulation-induced lack of flexibility in their growth 
and hiring policies (Besley and Burgess 2006). We therefore hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 2a: In European countries, the strength of labor 
institutions will negatively affect the effectiveness of 
blockholding.    
 
3.2.3 Institutional complementarity between blockholding and labor institutions 
An alternative perspective on the relationship between labor institutions and 
blockholder effectiveness has been suggested by a variety of scholars studying the 
extant variety of business systems in international business (Whitley 1999). Proceeding 
from the observation that different forms of capitalism co-exist durably across the 
world (Bebchuk and Roe 1999), these scholars seek to explain both this variety of 
business systems (Amable 2003, Crouch 2005) and their effects on economic 
performance (Hall and Soskice 2001), from possible complementary relationships 
between institutional features on the one hand, and firm level strategies, on the other 
(Aguilera et al. 2008, Amable 2000, Hall and Gingerich 2009, Hopner 2005). 
Institutional and organizational features are complementary in this view, when their 
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combined presence increases the positive welfare implications of each (Aoki 1994, 
2001, Milgrom and Roberts 1995). We focus here on complementarities between 
country level labor institutions and the firm level strategy of blockholding, which may 
derive from three related yet distinctive sources. 
 Similar to how blockholding concentrates the pursuit of shareholder interests 
in the hands of a single or a few large owners, first, labor institutions that facilitate the 
formation and maintenance of collective labor relations in an economy can be seen to 
concentrate and consolidate the articulation and pursuit of employee interests in 
corporate governance (Gospel and Pendleton 2005). The resulting centralization of 
capital and labor interests will enable strategic coordination between shareholders and 
employees because it economizes on transaction costs that otherwise dispersed 
employees and shareholders would face in bargaining over mutually beneficial 
agreements (Black 1990, Schnabel et al. 2006, Traxler 2003). 
 A second source of complementarity builds on the first, and involves the 
scope of exchange between employees and blockholding owners of the firm. 
Compared to individual bargaining in a context of relatively unconstrained labor 
markets, more centralized bargaining facilitated by collective labor relations law will 
allow for the exchange of individual for collective employee benefits that are difficult to 
realize in decentralized individual bargaining (Moskow 1971). Thus blockholders may 
come to agree with unions, for example, to absorb downfalls in firm revenues by 
accepting a lower return on investment in return for a commitment from labor to 
exercise wage restraint (Visser 1998), or invest in innovation (Koeninger 2005) and 
flexible employment within the firm (Volberda 1998). This broadening of the scope of 
exchange to include collective arrangements increases the chance of reaching mutually 
beneficial agreements.  
A third source of complementarity between blockholding and labor 
institutions pertains to assurance problems that may stand in the way of mutually 
beneficial strategic coordination between employees and shareholders in public firms. 
In labor markets where employees have little employment protection, workers have 
incentives to invest in general rather than firm-specific skills because the latter may not 
lead to sufficient return on investments in alternative sources of employment (Blair 
1995, Rajan and Zingales 1998). This lack of assurance may lead to underinvestment in 
human capital, which may be detrimental to firm performance (Belot et al. 2007, Hitt et 
al. 2001). This problem is especially likely to burden dispersedly owned firms, because 
the higher liquidity of such firms will pressure managers to defect on implicit job 
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security contracts with employees in order to make good on short term equity market 
expectations (Blair and Stout 1999, Shleifer and Summers 1988). Labor institutions that 
provide more job security could therefore offer the assurance necessary to make 
specific human capital investments. More specifically, by providing assurance in 
regard to specific human capital investments that can increase the value of workers 
employed within the firm, employment protection laws will allow employees and 
blockholders to trade flexibility between alternative sources of employment for flexible 
employment within the firm (Volberda 1998). On account of these three different 
sources of complementarity, we hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 2b: In European countries, strength of labor 
institutions will positively affect the effectiveness of 
blockholding.   
 
3.2.4 Relational and arms’-length blockholders 
Thus far, we have understood blockholding exclusively in terms of the level of 
ownership concentration in a firm and have thereby implicitly assumed that 
blockholders make up a homogenous class. Empirical research has increasingly 
questioned this assumption, however, as several researchers have found that different 
types of blockholders are differentially successful in contributing to the performance of 
the firms they own (Douma et al. 2006, Gedaljovic et al. 2005, Thomsen and Pedersen 
2000). These findings suggest that different types of blockholders may suffer or benefit 
differentially from labor institutions in European countries. Although the 
development of a full-fledged theory of blockholder types is beyond the scope of this 
paper, we do want to account for the possibility that different types of blockholders 
will be differentially able to cope with the effects of labor institutions by distinguishing 
relational from arm’s-length blockholders in European firms (Ayres and Cramton 
1993, Bhagat et al. 2004). 
Analogous to how in an exchange situation arm’s-length contractors can be 
distinguished from relational contractors in terms of the degree in which they value 
their ongoing economic relationship over any of their individual transactions (MacNeil 
1978, Williamson 1985), we distinguish relational from arm’s-length blockholders on 
the basis of the scope, duration, and dedication of their involvement in the firms they 
own. Thus we consider banks, other corporations, and business groups to be relational 
 61 
 
rather than arm’s-length blockholders because these types of owners are typically 
multiply and often durably tied to the firm, featuring creditor, supplier, or client 
relationships in addition to their ownership stake (Gedajlovic and Shapiro 2002, 
Gerlach 1992). This multiple involvement will lead them to maximize the returns from 
all their relationships with the firm rather than just the value of their equity stake 
(Brickley et al. 1988, David et al. 1998). Similarly, inside and family owners are not 
only multiply and durably tied to the firm through managerial positions and ongoing 
business relationships, but also tend to be more actively involved in, and socio-
emotionally committed to, the firms they own than arm’s-length blockholders 
(Gomez-Mejia et al. 2007, 2010).  
Although government owners could also be seen as relational blockholders, 
we do not do so here because government ownership is driven by regulatory or policy 
considerations rather than economic objectives, which makes them a different kind of 
blockholder altogether (Thomsen and Pedersen 2000).  
Finally, because their investment strategy is premised on the strategy of 
liquidity and exit (Parrino et al. 2003), institutional blockholders typically hold highly, 
often internationally diversified equity portfolio’s (Ferreira and Matos 2008), in which 
the relatively small size of even their largest positions will keep them from being 
actively involved in the firms they own altogether (Dharwadkar et al. 2008, Faccio and 
Lasfer 2000). We hence understand institutional owners, such as investment and 
pension funds, to be arm’s-length rather than relational blockholders. 
 We reason that relational blockholders operationalized in this way are not 
only more effective blockholders, but are also better able to deal with labor institutions 
in the European context, for three reasons. Due to their multiple involvement in the 
firms they own, first, relational owners will typically be able to generate better flows of 
information from the firm than arm’s-length owners (Ayres and Cramton 1993). This 
informational advantage emerges as a by-product of their ongoing transactions with 
the firm (Hansmann 1996), and will not only benefit their monitoring efforts, but also 
facilitate their ability to strike mutually beneficial deals with organized labor. The 
more enduring involvement of relational blockholders in the firm, second, will allow 
them to develop specific knowledge and capabilities (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000) that 
will not only enable them to deal more effectively with organized labor at the level of 
the firm, but will also help them to cope with the specific challenges of the institutional 
environment in which the firm is located (Oliver 1991, Peng et al. 2005).  
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Finally, the more enduring and stronger commitment of relational investors to 
the firm will help to remedy assurance problems that may stand in the way of striking 
mutually beneficial deals between blockholders and organized labor, because the 
viability of these mostly implicit contracts (Baker et al. 2002, Zingales 2000) is to an 
important degree contingent on the identity (Van Oosterhout et al. 2006) and stability 
of relational ownership of the firm (Dixit 2004, Gilson 2007). We therefore hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3a: In European countries, relational blockholders 
will be more effective blockholders than arm’s-length 
blockholders.  
 
Hypothesis 3b: In European countries, relational blockholders 
will be better able to deal with both the positive and 
negative effects of labor institutions than arm’s-length 
blockholders.  
3.3 Methods  
3.3.1 Sample and coding 
We used five complementary search strategies to retrieve as many high-quality studies 
reporting on the focal relationship as possible (White 1994). First, we read several 
review articles (Becht et al. 2005, Connelly et al. 2010, Gadhoum et al. 2005, and 
Holderness 2003). Second, we explored five electronic databases: (1) ABI/INFORM 
Global, (2) EconLit, (3) Google Scholar, (4) JSTOR, and (5) SSRN, using the search 
terms like: ‘blockholder’, ‘equity’, ‘inside ownership’, ‘institutional ownership’, 
‘ownership’, ‘ownership concentration’, and ‘shareholders’. Third, we conducted a 
manual search of 25 journals in the fields of accounting, economics, finance, and 
management.10 Fourth, after collecting an initial set of studies, we used a ‘snowballing’ 
technique that involved backward-tracing all references reported in the articles and 
forward-tracing all articles that cited the original articles using Google Scholar and ISI 
Web of Knowledge. Fifth, we corresponded with 106 researchers who had written 
articles on the focal relationship in which effect size information was not reported, 
asking them for a table with Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients. This 
                                                             
10 The complete list of journals is available from the authors upon request. 
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yielded a final sample of 866 effect sizes derived from 162 primary studies, consisting 
of 105 journal articles, 54 working papers, and 3 PhD theses (See Appendix B).  
 We subsequently read all articles in the final set and developed a coding 
protocol (Cortina 2003, Lipsey and Wilson 2001) for extracting data on all relevant 
variables. To test Hypotheses 1 and 3a we collected information on the bivariate 
correlation coefficients and multivariate t-statistics for the focal relationship, sample 
sizes, and the degrees of freedom of sampled regression analyses. We differentiated 
(when possible) between ‘relational’, ‘non-relational’, and ‘government’ owners, and 
between ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ owners. To test Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 3b we 
collected additional covariates from several secondary sources. One author coded all 
effect sizes. To assess agreement in extracting information from primary studies, 
another author coded a sub-sample of 153 randomly selected effect sizes. We then 
computed a chance agreement-corrected measure of inter-rater reliability (i.e. Cohen’s 
kappa coefficient; Cohen 1960) of 0.97, signifying very high inter-rater reliability.  
3.3.2 HOMA procedure 
To test Hypotheses 1 and 3a we used HOMA (Hedges and Olkin 1985). In line with 
current conventions, we use random effects HOMA to combine study estimates 
(Geyskens et al. 2009). Random effects HOMA corrects individual study estimates for 
sampling error plus a value that represents other sources of variability, which are 
assumed to be randomly distributed (Kisamore and Brannick 2008, Raudenbush and 
Bryk 2002). Random effects models outperform the once-popular fixed effects models 
when the effect size distribution is heterogeneous, as it is in our case, because they 
produce more conservative estimates (Lipsey and Wilson 2001). 
The effect size statistics we used for HOMA are the Pearson product-moment 
correlation r and the partial correlation coefficient rxy.z. r is commonly used in meta-
analysis, because it is an easily interpretable and scale-free measure of linear 
association. When studies reported different effect size statistics, such as Cohen’s 
standardized means difference measure d, we converted them back into an r value 
using the appropriate formulas (Lipsey and Wilson 2001). r provides appropriate effect 
size information when the direction of causality of the underlying relationship has 
been established by prior research. However, for our focal relationship it is necessary 
to also establish the direction of causality, as the discussion as to whether ownership 
structure is endogenous upon firm performance or alternatively an exogenous 
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predictor of it, is presently far from resolved (Demsetz and Villalonga 2001, 
Holderness 2003).  
We therefore also use a different type of effect size, rxy.z, to check whether 
ownership (x) indeed causes firm performance (y) exogenously when controlling for a 
vector of control variables (z) containing instruments correcting for endogeneity11 and 
variables capturing firm characteristics (Sánchez-Ballesta and García-Meca 2007). In 
addition to its ability to provide an endogeneity-corrected reassessment of the overall 
mean effect size, rxy.z-based HOMA is also attractive because of its potential for 
exploring non-linear effects, such as when squared and cubed terms of ownership 
variables are used as predictors of firm performance. We compute rxy.z on the basis of 
the t-statistics and degrees of freedom reported in primary studies (Greene 2008).12 
rxy.z-based mean effect sizes were then computed using HOMA procedures identical to 
those used for r-based means. To minimize skewness in the effect size distribution, 
which violates the HOMA assumption of normally distributed effects, we applied 
Fisher’s (1928) Zr transformation to both the r- and rxy.z-based distributions (Hedges 
and Olkin 1985, Silver and Dunlap 1987).13 To account for sample size-related 
differences in precision across effect sizes, we weigh each effect size by its inverse 
variance weight w (Hedges and Olkin 1985).14 Using these weights, we calculate the 
mean effect size, its standard error, and the corresponding confidence interval.15  
                                                             
11 In econometrics, the problem of endogeneity occurs when the independent variable is correlated 
with the error term in a regression model, or when the dependent variable (i.e. the firm performance 
measure) simultaneously affects the independent variable (i.e. the degree of ownership concentration) 
(Bhagat and Jefferis 2002). There are several accepted methods of controlling for endogeneity. 
Endogeneity-conscious researchers usually use a fixed or random effects panel data model, and 
calculate instrumental variables using two- or three-stages least squares (2/3SLS) or the generalized 
method of moments (GMM) (Sánchez-Ballesta and García-Meca 2007). 
12 The formula used to calculate partial correlations is:  
√(t2/ (t2+df)) 
where t is the t-statistic and df is degrees of freedom. Note that this will always produce a positive 
number, so it is necessary to convert it to a negative number if the regression coefficient is negative (see 
Greene 2008, chapter 3). T-values result from the scaling of primary coefficients by their respective 
standard errors. They thus are by definition standardized and defined on a dimensionless scale. 
13 Fisher’s Zr transformed correlations are calculated as follows: ¹¸
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Tvˆ is the random effects variance component. 
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An important question in meta-analysis is how to deal with studies containing 
multiple measurements of the focal effect (Geyskens et al. 2009). In our study, multiple 
measurements of the focal relationship are often reported due to different 
operationalizations of ownership and firm performance. The issue at stake is the trade-
off between stochastic independence of the various effect sizes in the analysis on the 
one hand, and the use of all available information on the other. A Monte Carlo 
simulation by Bijmolt and Pieters (2001) shows that procedures using the complete set 
of measurements outperform those representing each study by only a single value in 
areas like parameter significance testing and parameter estimation accuracy. We 
therefore include all available measurements in our study. 
3.3.3 MARA procedure 
We use MARA (Stanley and Jarrell 2005) to test Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 3b. MARA is a 
special type of weighted least squares (WLS) regression analysis, designed specifically 
to assess the relationship between effect size and moderator variables in order to 
model previously unexplored heterogeneity in the effect size distribution (Lipsey and 
Wilson 2001). We use weighted regression to account for differences in precision 
across effect sizes. Again, the preferred weighting variable is w (Hedges 1982, Hedges 
and Olkin 1985). In line with current conventions (Geyskens et al. 2009), we estimate 
the regression parameters with mixed effects models in which variability in the effect 
size distribution is attributed to systematic between-study differences and subject-level 
sampling error (as in fixed effects models) as well as to a remaining unmeasured or 
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even immeasurable random component (as in random effects models; Lipsey and 
Wilson 2001).  
 To test Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 3b, we include three country-level variables 
that subtly capture different mechanisms or sources of institutional complementarity 
through which labor institutions affect the effectiveness of blockholding in a country. 
We rely, first, on measurements developed and tested by Botero and colleagues (2004) 
in their study on labor regulation. Following Atanassov and Kim (2009), we 
distinguish the ‘employment laws index’ (source: Botero et al. 2004), which measures the 
economic protection of individual workers in a given jurisdiction by capturing the 
incremental cost to employers of deviating from a hypothetical contract in which job 
conditions are fully specified and workers cannot be fired, on the one hand, from the 
‘collective relations laws index’ (source: Botero et al. 2004), which captures the degree in 
which labor regulation protects and facilitates collective labor relations to form and be 
maintained, on the other, because these two measures subtly capture different 
mechanisms through which labor institutions may influence blockholder effectiveness, 
as specified in the development of hypotheses 2 a and 2b. Next to these proxies for 
labor ‘law on the books’, second, we also include the degree of ‘union density’ in a 
country (source: OECD labor force statistics) which measures the actual degree in 
which workers are collectively represented by labor unions. To test Hypothesis 3b, we 
included dummy variables capturing whether blockholders were ‘relational owners’, 
‘non-relational owners’, ‘government owners’, or ‘other’ (reference category). As 
Hypothesis 3b stipulates an interaction effect between relational owners and the 
strength of labor institutions, we also included three product terms linking relational 
owners and labor variables: (1) ‘employment laws index’ * ‘relational owners’, (2) ‘collective 
relations laws index’ * ‘relational owners’, (3) ‘union density’ * ‘relational owners’. Prior to 
multiplication, we grand-mean centered the institutional variables to facilitate 
subsequent interpretation of their main effects and avoid multicollinearity 
(Raudenbush and Bryk 2002: 31ff). 
 To control for the possible moderating effect of methodological artifacts on the 
focal relationship, we controlled for five methodological factors. To assess whether the 
associational strength of the focal relationship has changed over time, we included the 
‘publication year’ of each study. To test whether our results were affected by the ‘file 
drawer problem’ (Rosenthal 1979), the inflationary effect on the meta-analytic mean of 
studies finding null-effects being barred from publication, we entered a dummy 
variable capturing whether our effect sizes derived from a ‘published study’ or an 
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‘unpublished study’ (reference category). We included a dummy variable capturing 
whether effect sizes were harvested from a study using a ‘panel design’ or a ‘cross-
sectional design’ (reference category) to control for the effect of research design factors. 
To control for a possible moderating effect of the chosen operationalization of the 
dependent variable on our focal relationship, we included a dummy variable 
capturing whether a given effect size involved a ‘market measure’ or an ‘accounting 
measure’ (reference category) of firm performance. Finally, to control for different 
levels of reviewers’ scrutiny across journals of differential prestige, we included the 
five-year SSCI ‘impact factor’ score of the journal from which an effect size was 
harvested, assigning a zero value to sources not included in the SSCI. 
 We also control for the possible moderating effect of several substantive 
factors that are likely to moderate the focal relationship. We control for the commonly 
hypothesized effect that ‘foreign owners’ outperform ‘domestic owners’ (Douma et al. 
2006) with the help of a dummy variable, using ‘mixed owners’ as a reference category. 
We use ‘labor cost’ (source: Eurostat) to control for exogenous differences in wage 
levels between countries (Lazonick 1981). We include the national ‘unemployment rate’ 
(source: OECD labor force statistics) for the years covered by each underlying primary 
study in our meta-analyses in order to control for the country level scarcity-based 
bargaining power of labor. We use the ‘rule of law index’ (source: World Bank) to 
capture international differences in legislative and court effectiveness (Kaufmann et al. 
2009). To control for the profitability-dampening effect of large owners diverting 
corporate wealth into their private coffers through self-dealing transactions, we 
include the ‘anti-self-dealing index’ (Djankov et al. 2008, Heugens et al. 2009). To control 
for geographic and cultural differences between continental European countries and 
the UK (which is typically seen as a dispersed ownership regime), we selected the UK 
as reference country and include the variables ‘cultural distance to UK’ (Kogut and 
Singh 1988) and ‘geographic distance to UK’ (source: Raymond 1998) in our analyses. To 
control for the effect of national affluence on blockholder effectiveness we include 
‘GDP per capita’ (source: World Development Indicators). To hold constant the 
availability of equity financing through public financial markets, we include national 
‘stock market capitalization’ levels (source: World Development Indicators). All variables 
included in this study are succinctly defined in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Description of Variables 
Variables Description 
Ownership The most generic category of concentrated ownership on which data 
can be obtained. It encompasses inside owners as well as controlling or 
non-controlling outside blockholders who, depending on the 
disclosure laws of any particular jurisdiction, own 3 percent or more of 
the company’s shares (see for instance Ruigrok et al. 2006). 
Ownership 
concentration 
A more specific measure of concentrated ownership, which is 
differentially defined across research studies. First, it may be 
operationalized as ‘largest owner’, representing a measure of the 
degree to which ownership in the firm is concentrated in the hands of 
a single investor. Second, it may be operationalized as ‘ultimate 
owner’, which identifies any party who enjoys outright control over 
the firm. Common cut-off points for determining ultimate ownership 
are the 10 and 20 percent levels of ownership (Faccio and Lang 2002). 
Third, it may be operationalized as a continuous measure of the 
degree to which ownership is concentrated in the hands of the largest 
owners, such as the largest three or five shareholders, with a 
Herfindahl or Entropy measure (see for instance Gedajlovic and 
Shapiro 1998). 
Relational owners A variable which assumes a positive value (either ‘1’ in case of 
dummy operationalizations or a percentage in case the degree of 
ownership concentration is known) when the owner is relational 
investor (e.g. business partners, family firms, or firms that are a 
member in the same business group (see for instance Gedajlovic et al. 
2005). 
Non-relational 
owners 
A variable which assumes a positive value (either ‘1’ in case of 
dummy operationalizations or a percentage in case the degree of 
ownership concentration is known) when the owner is non-relational 
investor (e.g. public or company pension funds, mutual funds, 
insurance services or other (see for instance Faccio and Lasfer 2000). 
Government owners A variable which assumes a positive value (either ‘1’ in case of 
dummy operationalizations or a percentage in case the degree of 
ownership concentration is known) when the owner is a government 
party (see for instance Thomsen and Pedersen 2000). 
Domestic owners A variable which assumes a positive value (either ‘1’ in case of 
dummy operationalizations or a percentage in case the degree of 
ownership concentration is known) when the owner is a domestic 
party (e.g. domestic firm, financial institution, business group, or 
other (see for instance Grosfeld and Hashi 2007).  
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Foreign owners A variable which assumes a positive value (either ‘1’ in case of 
dummy operationalizations or a percentage in case the degree of 
ownership concentration is known) when the owner is a foreign party 
(e.g. foreign firm, foreign financial institution, or other (see for 
instance Grosfeld and Hashi 2007). 
Publication year For journal articles: year in which the article first appeared in print. 
For working papers: year in which the paper was first included in a 
publicly accessible working paper series. 
Published A dummy variable measuring whether a specific study was published 
in a scholarly journal (1) or not (0). 
Panel design A dummy variable measuring whether the data included in a specific 
study was based on a cross-sectional (0) or a longitudinal (1) 
observation plan. 
Market performance Any indicator of the financial performance of the firm that is 
expressed in the form of a market-based measure of firm value (stock 
returns, market-to-book ratio, and Tobin’s Q). 
Accounting 
performance 
Any indicator of the financial performance of the firm that is 
expressed in the form of an accounting-based measure of firm profits.  
Impact factor A variable measuring the average number of citations of articles in a 
given journal, derived from articles that were published during the 
two preceding years. 
Labor cost A variables which measures the average labor cost in country, 
calculated as the total labor costs divided by the corresponding 
number of hours worked (source: Eurostat). 
Rule of law index A variable which measures the extent to which agents have confidence 
in and abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions of the 
incidence of violent and non-violent crime, the effectiveness and 
predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts 
(source: Kaufmann et al. 2009). 
Anti-self-dealing 
index 
A variable which measures the extent to which national jurisdictions 
offer minority shareholders protection against expropriation by 
controlling shareholders, expressed in the form of a zero (low 
protection) to one (high protection) index. The index includes ex-ante 
and ex-post controls around self-dealing transactions (source: Djankov 
et al. 2008). 
Cultural distance to 
the UK 
Cultural distance to the host country from the UK was measured with 
Kogut and Singh's (1988) index. This index is an aggregate of the four 
dimensions of culture outlined in Hofstede (1980): (1) power distance 
index, (2) individualism, (3) masculinity and (4) uncertainty avoidance 
index. 
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3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Overall blockholder effectiveness in Europe  
Table 3 reports the overall results concerning blockholder effectiveness in Europe as 
well as the more specific results for Hypothesis 1. In addition to the meta-analytic 
mean, we report: the number of samples (k), total sample size (N), the standard error of 
the mean effect size (SE), the 95% confidence interval around the meta-analytic mean, 
and the Hedges and Olkin (1985) chi-square test for heterogeneity (Q). The results in 
the left-hand panel show that firms with a more concentrated ownership structure are 
on par with more dispersedly owned firms in terms of their profitability. The r–based 
Geographic distance 
to the UK 
A variable which measures the distance to the host country from the 
UK. The formula calculates distances between two countries which are 
defined by geographical coordinates in terms of latitude and 
longitude (source: Raymond 1998).  
GDP per capita Natural log of per capita gross domestic product in US dollars (source: 
World Development Indicators). 
Stock market 
capitalization 
The ratio of stock market capitalization to gross domestic product 
(source: WDI at: http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/). 
Unemployment rate Average unemployment rate as a percentage of the total labor force 
(source: OECD Labour Force Statistics). 
Employment laws 
index 
Measures the protection of labor and employment laws as the average 
of: (1) alternative employment contracts; (2) cost of increasing hours 
worked; (3) cost of firing workers; and (4) dismissal procedures 
(source: Botero et al. 2004). 
Collective relations 
laws index 
Measures the statutory protection and power of unions as the average 
of the following seven dummy variables which equal one: (1) if 
employees have the right to unionize; (2) if employees have the right 
to collective bargaining; (3) if employees have the legal duty to 
bargain with unions; (4) if collective contracts are extended to third 
parties by law; (5) if the law allows closed shops; (6) if workers, or 
unions, or both have a right to appoint members to the boards of 
directors; and (7) if workers’ councils are mandated by law (source: 
Botero et al. 2004). 
Union density Measures the membership of trade unions, calculated as the number 
currently enrolled as members as a proportion of all those employees 
potentially eligible to be members (source: OECD Labour Force 
Statistics). 
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meta-analytic mean correlation between ownership and performance is 0.00, based on 
748,569 firm-year observations. Because the confidence interval includes zero, the focal 
effect is insignificant. The results reported in the right-hand panel of Table 3 show very 
similar results. The rxy.z-based mean is 0.02, based on 158,310 firm-year observations, 
and the confidence interval does not include zero. Although this denotes a statistically 
significant relationship between blockholding and firm performance, the profitability 
difference between concentrated and dispersedly owned firms is hardly practically 
significant (cf. Combs et al. 2010).  
Table 3 also shows that the retrieved mean effect is not moderated by the 
chosen operationalization of the dependent variable, as the difference between market- 
and accounting-based measures of performance for both the r-based and rxy.z-based 
results is negligible. Likewise, the results in Table 3 are robust across the cruder but 
more inclusive ‘ownership’ and more specific but more exclusive ‘ownership 
concentration’ operationalizations of the independent variable, measured as the 
fraction of a firm’s total equity that is concentrated in the hands of a select few owners. 
Furthermore, since the meta-analytic mean of the subset of rxy.z-based results with an 
endogeneity instrument in the z-vector is comparable to the overall r- and rxy.z-based 
mean, our findings appear not to be affected by the possible endogeneity of ownership 
structure on firm performance (Demsetz and Villalonga 2001). Finally, both effect size 
distributions are highly heterogeneous (r-based Q = 7,094.32; p < 0.001; rxy.z-based Q = 
1,306.16; p < 0.001), suggesting the presence of owner identity-based and institutions-
based moderating effects. 16 
3.4.2 Curvilinear effects 
The results in Table 3 for linear, squared, and cubed effects confirm Hypothesis 1. The 
linear term is positive and significant at 0.05, the squared term is negative and 
significant at -0.04, and the cubed term is positive and significant at 0.04. These results 
confirm the existence of a curvilinear, inverted U-shaped relationship between 
blockholding and firm performance. Blockholding has a positive effect on firm 
performance when blocks are sufficiently large such that blockholding owners have 
both the incentives and the capabilities to be actively involved in the firms they own, 
                                                             
16 The Q test is computed by summing the squared deviations of each study’s effect estimate from the 
overall meta-analytic mean effect size estimate. In this exercise, each study is weighted by its w. The Q 
test assumes homogeneity, following a Chi-square distribution with k – 1 degrees of freedom (k = the 
number of studies). When Q is significant, as it is in our case, the assumption of homogeneity is 
rejected. 
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but where they lack the control over the firm to do as they please (Heugens et al. 2009, 
Morck et al. 1988).  
The effect becomes negative, however, when their ownership stake becomes 
sufficiently large to fully control the firm, such that controlling blockholders can 
expropriate minority shareholders through self-dealing transactions like tunneling and 
propping (Bae et al. 2002, Johnson et al. 2000). Yet when their ownership stake nears 
full ownership, there are hardly any minority shareholders left to expropriate and the 
effect on firm performance becomes positive again (Heugens et al. 2009). The effect is 
independent of the chosen operationalization of ownership, as the inverted U-shaped 
pattern we report is similar for ownership and ownership concentration.  
3.4.3 The costs and benefits of blockholding: The effect of labor institutions 
Table 4 reports the MARA results for Hypotheses 2a and 2b. Model 1 includes the 
methodological and substantive control variables, whereas Model 2 reports all control 
variables as well as the hypothesized main effects on blockholder effectiveness of the 
variables capturing the strength of labor institutions and the relational, non-relational, 
and government owner type variables. Together, the control variables explain about 5 
percent of the variance in the effect size distribution (Model 1). Including the 
hypothesized main effects raises the explanatory power of the model to 22 percent 
(Model 2), suggesting that the institutional and owner type variables play an 
important role in explaining blockholder effectiveness in Europe.  
The results for the employment laws index (Botero et al. 2004), which captures 
the extent to which individual employees are protected against unilateral contractual 
rearrangements and dismissals, support Hypothesis 2a (p < 0.10). Yet interestingly, the 
other two variables included to capture the strength of labor institutions—i.e. the 
collective relations laws index (p < 0.10) and union density in a country (p < 0.05)—
positively rather than negatively moderate blockholder effectiveness, implying that 
Hypothesis 2a must be rejected. A more fine-grained interpretation of these results 
neutralizes these conflicting conclusions, however. As explained while developing 
Hypothesis 2a, labor institutions can affect the effectiveness of blockholders in 
securing their residual claim on corporate earnings through two different mechanisms.  
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First, they can empower collective labor interest to claim a bigger piece of the 
corporate pie. Second, they can constrain the options available to blockholders to 
adjust the scale of operations to optimal levels, which is what happens when 
employment protection laws entrench the interests of individual employees. Only the 
latter explanation is consistent with our findings. Thus Hypothesis 2a is supported 
only insofar as labor institutions constrain the options available to blockholders to 
pursue value-enhancing changes in the firms they own (Atanassov and Kim 2009).  
At the same time, the positive moderating effects of the collective relations 
laws index (p < 0.10) and the union density in a country (p < 0.05) support Hypothesis 
2b, which specified that blockholding and strong labor institutions are complementary 
in the European context because they enable strategic coordination between 
blockholders and employee interests that may ultimately benefit both (Aguilera et al. 
2008, Amable 2000, Hall and Gingerich 2009, Hopner 2005). Again, the negative 
moderating effect of the employment protection index (p < 0.10) suggests that different 
kinds of labor institutions function differentially in this regard, and that there is a 
subtle story to tell about the sources of complementarity between labor institutions 
and blockholding.  
First, the positive moderating effects of the collective relations laws index and 
the union density in a country suggest that the degree in which collective labor 
relations are developed in a country can be seen to either reduce the transactions costs 
that burden strategic coordination between capital and labor interests through the 
centralization and consolidation of these interests, or increase the scope of exchange by 
opening up the possibility to strike collective deals with labor interests.  
Yet, second, the negative moderating effect of the employment protection 
index pretty much excludes that such strategic coordination is facilitated by providing 
assurance in regard to specific human capital investments, possibly because the 
assurance provided by general employment protection laws does not distinguish those 
employees for which specific human capital investments will be value-increasing from 
those for which this is not the case. We therefore find support for Hypothesis 2b only 
insofar as labor institutions either reduce bargaining-related transaction costs of 
strategic coordination, or increase the odds of attaining mutually beneficial 
agreements by increasing the scope of exchange, but not for protecting workers’ 
dedicated investments in human capital (Gospel and Pendleton 2005, Moskow 1971, 
Rajan and Zingales 1998). 
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Table 4: Results of Mixed Effects WLS Regressiona 
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Publication year 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Published study 0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) 
Panel design 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 
Market measure -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) 
Impact factor -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) 
Foreign owners 0.06 (0.02)*** 0.07 (0.03)*** 0.06 (0.02)*** 
Domestic owners 0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) 
Labor cost 0.00 (0.00) -0.05 (0.05) -0.04 (0.05) 
Unemployment rate 0.08 (0.03)** 0.07 (0.03)** 0.08 (0.03)** 
Rule of law index  0.00 (0.03) 0.07 (0.07) 0.15 (0.16) 
Anti-self-dealing index 0.00 (0.06) 0.09 (0.27) -0.17 (0.26) 
Cultural distance to UK -0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Geographic distance to UK 0.00 (0.00) -0.0003 (0.00)** -0.0002 (0.00)** 
GDP per capita -0.11 (0.08) -0.32 (0.14)** -0.97 (0.55)* 
Stock market capitalization -0.00 (0.00)  0.002 (0.00)** 0.003 (0.00)*** 
    
Hypothesized mean effects    
Employment laws index  -0.50 (0.29)* -0.90 (0.30)*** 
Collective relations laws index  0.31 (0.18)* 0.42 (0.18)** 
Union density  0.06 (0.02)** 0.06 (0.02)** 
Relational owners  0.03 (0.01)*** 0.02 (0.01)** 
Government owners  -0.02 (0.03) -0.02 (0.04) 
Non-relational owners  -0.01 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) 
    
Hypothesized interaction effects    
Employment laws index * Relational 
owners 
  0.38 (0.20)** 
Collective relations laws index * 
Relational owners 
  -0.16 (0.20) 
Union density * Relational owners   0.01 (0.00)*** 
    
R2 0.05 0.22 0.26 
K 614 614 614 
 QModel (p) 28.36 (0.19) 140.95 (0.00) 189.62 (0.00) 
QResidual (p) 492.84 (0.89) 503.06 (0.94) 546.32 (0.96) 
V .00872 .00818 0.0062 
a Unstandardized regression coefficients are presented for study moderators and substantive 
moderators with standard errors in parentheses. k is the total number of effect sizes; Q is the 
homogeneity statistic with its probability in parentheses; v is the random effects variance 
component.  *    p < 0.1, **  p < 0.05, *** p< 0.01 
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3.4.4 Relational owners 
Tables 4 and 5 contain the results pertaining to Hypotheses 3a and 3b. Hypothesis 3a is 
confirmed by the results in Table 5. Relational blockholders, who are durably and 
multiply tied to the firms they own, are better able to realize firm value than arm’s-
length blockholders, whose involvement is more fleeting (Ayres and Cramton 1993, 
Bhagat et al. 2004). Firms with relational blockholders (slightly) outperform the 
benchmark (r-based mean = 0.01; rxy.z-based mean = 0.04), while firms with non-
relational, arm’s-length blockholders are either are at, or underperform this 
benchmark (r-based mean = -0.03; rxy.z-based mean = 0.00 (n.s.)). Government 
blockholders are unmasked as a different kind of blockholder altogether, as the 
regulatory and policy goals they pursue through their ownership ties hurt firms’ 
profitability (Thomsen and Pedersen 2000; r-based mean = -0.03; rxy.z-based mean = -
0.06). Finally, Model 3 of Table 4 shows the results for Hypothesis 3b. Compared to 
Model 2, Model 3 adds three interaction variables, which were constructed by 
computing the product terms of the ‘relational owners’ dummy and the three 
institutional variables we introduced in model 2.  
The interaction variables improves the fit of the model from 0.22 to 0.26, and 
the results support Hypothesis 3b that overall, relational blockholders are better able 
to cope with labor institutions in Europe than arm’s-length blockholders. First, 
relational blockholders prove better able to deal with strongly developed employment 
protection laws (p < 0.05), possibly because they learn to cope more effectively with 
these institutional constraints as a result of their longer term commitment to the firm 
and its host country. Similarly, second, relational blockholders are also better able to 
deal with a more collectively organized work force, as the interaction between union 
density and the relational owner dummy is positive and significant (p < 0.01). 
Apparently, relational ownership increases the chance of realizing mutually beneficial 
strategic coordination with organized labor interests. However, finally, no significant 
effect was found for the interaction between relational ownership and the collective 
relations laws index. 
3.4.5 Robustness checks and control variables 
In order to evaluate the overall robustness of our findings, we perform several 
methodological and substantive robustness checks. We start with the former.  
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Methodological robustness checks. Because we have performed an exhaustive search, and 
have been cautious on the side of inclusion, we have included both published and 
unpublished primary studies that may be of very different academic quality. We 
conduct several checks to control for these possible quality differences. We run 
separate r-based HOMAs for our focal relationship for sub samples derived from: 
published articles (k = 421), peer reviewed publications (k = 402), journals included in 
the ISI Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) in 2008 (k = 252), journals continuously 
included in SSCI from 2004 – 2008 (k = 229), journals with an SSCI impact factor 
greater than > 1.0 (k = 211), and the 10 journals in our dataset with the highest five-
year SSCI impact factors (k = 97) (Carney et al. 2010). The mean correlations for all 
these sub samples are insignificant and between -0.00 and 0.01, consistent with the 
overall mean correlation for our focal relationship that we report in Table 3.  
Additionally, we include the publication outlet’s five-year ISI impact factor in 
the multivariate MARAs (see Table 4) and find no significant moderating effect for the 
SSCI impact factor. Together, these tests suggest that publication outlet quality does 
not affect our focal relationship. Table 4 also reports the results for other 
methodological control variables and shows that our results are unaffected by these 
factors, as neither publication year, published study status, panel design, nor the use of 
market-based performance measures, meaningfully moderates the focal relationship. 
Substantive robustness checks. We also carry out several substantive robustness 
checks and find some significant results. First, in order to account for the fact that the 
UK is somewhat over represented in our sample, and is also seen in the literature as an 
example of the dispersedly owned corporate governance system rather than the 
control-based European corporate governance model, we create two variables to 
measure and control for the cultural and geographic distance to the UK in the MARA 
analysis (see Table 4). We find that the geographic distance to the UK variable is 
significant and negative, suggesting that blockholders add more value in Nordic, 
Central, and Western Europe than in Eastern and Southern Europe. In order to assess 
whether UK data points bias our research findings, second, we run a separate HOMA 
and MARA analyses without UK data points,17 and find that the exclusion of the UK 
data does not significantly change our main results.  
Third, we test whether the link between blockholding and firm performance is 
different during an economic crisis by splitting up the sample of all effect sizes in a sub 
sample covering crisis years and one covering normal years. In spite the small number 
                                                             
17 The HOMA and MARA results are available from the authors upon request. 
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of observations in the former, we find that concentrated firms significantly outperform 
their dispersedly held counterparts under adverse economic conditions (mean = .06; k 
= 14; N = 2,332). A z-test (Feingold 1992) confirms the significance differences of 
blockholder effectiveness during different economic times (z = 2.89; p < 0.01). This 
finding suggests that that the risk-averse strategies that highly concentrated firms 
adopt in order to offset the increased risk exposure of their blockholding owners have 
a positive rather than negative pay out when the going gets tough.18 
The negative significant effect for GDP per capita in the MARA, fourth, 
suggests that blockholders make a bigger difference in less affluent societies, possibly 
because they can fill institutional voids in areas like technology acquisition and human 
capital development (Carney et al. 2010). Fifth, the positive significant effect for stock 
market capitalization in model 2 and 3 of Table 4 suggests that blockholders are better 
able to perform their monitoring task when deep equity markets allow them to 
smoothly adjust their ownership stake to, the monitoring needs of the firms they own 
(Demsetz and Villalonga 2001). Sixth, the general level of unemployment in a country 
positively moderates blockholder effectiveness, which suggests that blockholders have 
a better bargaining position vis-à-vis collective labor when employment opportunities 
are scarce. In line with prior research, seventh, we find that foreign owners outperform 
domestic owners in the European context (Douma et al. 2006, Gedajlovic et al. 2005). 
Finally, no significant moderating effects were detected for the labor cost, rule of law 
index, anti-self-dealing index, and cultural distance variables. 
3.5 Discussion 
Using a variety of advanced meta-analytic methods on a sample of 748,569 firm-year 
observations derived from 162 studies covering 23 European countries, this study 
provides an analysis of the costs and benefits of blockholding in a region of the world 
in which it is a dominant yet discretionary corporate governance strategy for 
shareholders of publicly listed firms. As demonstrated by the development and 
corroboration of Hypothesis 1, the relationship between blockholding and firm 
performance has an inverted U-shape form in the European context, suggesting that 
the balance of costs and benefits of blockholding plays out differentially at different 
levels of ownership concentration. 
 
                                                             
18 We thank an anonymous reviewer for calling our attention to this issue. 
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Because this finding reflects decades of research, it is best taken as a stylized 
fact about blockholding in Europe, albeit one that is in need of further clarification. In 
developing Hypothesis 1, we conjectured that some of the most important benefits of 
blockholding are likely to be realized already at relatively low levels of concentration, 
while certain costs are more likely to increase with block size. The latter was argued to 
be the case with the costs to firms that arise from strategic responses to the higher risk 
exposure and lower liquidity of blockholding ownership, while the costs to firms 
associated with possible private benefits of control for blockholders are likely to be 
highest at intermediate levels of ownership concentration due to the fact that there will 
be fewer minority shareholders to expropriate the more blockholding approaches full 
ownership of the firm (Heugens et al. 2009). Although our findings are consistent with 
this explanation, the data we use in our study do not allow us to empirically test these 
more fine-grained conjectures. An important part of the task of further unpacking the 
firm-level costs and benefits of blockholding therefore remains for future research.  
Yet at the same time, our study does provide three important contributions to 
the literature that each enhances our understanding of how certain costs and benefits 
of blockholding that hitherto have hardly been empirically researched, affect its 
effectiveness in the European context. These contributions consecutively involve: (1) 
the role of the institutional factors that distinguish European countries from the rest of 
the world in explaining blockholder effectiveness in Europe, (2) the question whether 
the benefits of blockholding in European countries derive from competition or 
complementarity with collective labor interests, and (3) the question of how different 
kinds of labor institutions interact with firm-level owner type contingencies in 
explaining blockholder effectiveness.   
3.5.1 Towards an institutions-based view of blockholding 
By showing that the effectiveness of the firm level corporate governance strategy of 
blockholding is to a significant extent contingent on country level institutional 
features, our study contributes, first, to the emerging institution-based view in 
comparative corporate governance (Carney et al. 2010, Engelen and Van Essen 2010, 
Fiss 2008, Peng and Khoury 2008, Peng et al. 2008, 2009), which seeks to explain firm 
level corporate governance strategies and their performance effects from the 
institutional features of the countries in which firms are located. More specifically, our 
findings not only show that the strength of labor institutions that distinguish 
European countries from the rest of the world significantly influence the effectiveness 
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of blockholding, but also that there is a fine-grained story to tell about the mechanisms 
through which different kinds of labor institutions affect the effectiveness of this 
corporate governance strategy for shareholders.  
 First, the empirical evidence mounted in this paper provides solid indications 
that employment protection laws entrench the interests of employees vis-à-vis 
shareholders in the competitive processes through which corporate earnings are 
distributed over corporate constituencies. We have explained that employment 
protection laws have this effect because they limit the options available to 
blockholders to adjust the scale of operations of the firms they own to optimal levels. 
More specifically, employment protection laws do not only limit the possibilities for 
shareholders to restructure and downsize their firms when confronted with 
considerable falls in demand for a firm’s products or services (Atanassov and Kim 
2009), but also hold back firms to grow to optimal size when demand and revenues 
pick up again in anticipation of this downward inflexibility (Besley and Burgess 2006).  
One explanation for the overall negative effect of employment protection laws 
on blockholder effectiveness is that the negative effects of employee entrenchment 
simply outweigh any positive effect that employment protection laws may have in 
securing optimal levels of firm-specific investments in human capital. A 
supplementary but perhaps alternative explanation could be that employment 
protection laws are unable to underwrite implicit contracts in regard to firm-specific 
investments in human capital at all, because they apply to all firms and employees 
alike and are thereby unable to differentiate between firms and employees for which 
investments in firm-specific human capital will be value enhancing from those for 
which this will not be the case (Micco and Pagés 2004). Because our data do not allow 
us to unpack the negative effect of employment protection laws on blockholder 
effectiveness we report, future research should attempt to tease out the different causal 
pathways through which employment protection laws affect blockholder effectiveness. 
 In addition to the negative effect that employment protection laws have on the 
effectiveness of the corporate governance strategy of blockholding, this paper also 
provides robust empirical evidence that the part of labor law that facilitates collective 
labor relations to form and be maintained, as well as the union density in a country, 
have a positive effect on blockholder effectiveness. As both collective labor relations 
law and union density capture the degree in which the articulation and representation 
of employee interests are centralized and consolidated within a country, this finding 
suggests that this centralization and consolidation of labor interests enables mutually 
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beneficial strategic coordination between blockholders and employees, either by 
reducing the transaction costs that otherwise dispersed capital and labor interests 
would face in coordinating with each other, or by increasing the scope of exchange by 
including collective labor agreements in the set of possible mutually beneficial 
agreements. Future empirical research will have to further tease out which source of 
institutional complementarity best explains the positive effect of strong collective labor 
relations on blockholder effectiveness, however. 
3.5.2 Competition and complementarity in European corporate governance  
There also remains an important theoretical issue in respect to the interpretation of our 
findings, however. Thus far, we have interpreted our finding that strong collective 
labor relations positively affect blockholder effectiveness as evidence that the 
centralization and consolidation of labor interests enables mutually beneficial strategic 
coordination between blockholders and employees. This interpretation is consistent 
with the core tenets of the variety of capitalisms literature, in which the notion of 
institutional complementarity plays a central role (Hall and Soskice 2001).  
Yet in spite of the fact that this finding can be seen to empirically fuel this 
emerging perspective in comparative corporate governance, it does not exclude an 
alternative explanation that blockholding simply matters more where collective labor 
is strong, because under these conditions its function as a countervailing power 
against strong collective labor relations becomes relatively more important. This 
alternative interpretation derives from the theoretical view of corporate governance 
according to which corporate constituencies competitively seek to appropriate 
corporate earnings (e.g. Roe 2003, Zingales 1998) and raises the question of how these 
alternative interpretations, and the different theoretical views they involve, can be 
reconciled. 
 In our view, the concept of institutional complementarity can perform a 
bridging role between these two the theoretical frameworks and the alternative 
interpretations that they suggest. Remember that institutional—or organizational—
features are complementary when their combined presence increases the positive 
welfare implications of each feature (Aoki 2001, Milgrom and Roberts 1995). It is 
important to note that institutional complementarities may not just result from 
strategic coordination between corporate constituencies, but that this is just one source 
of complementarity. Another source of institutional complementarity can be seen to 
exist in the checks and balances that have emerged within different corporate 
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governance configurations in order to constrain corporate constituencies in their 
competitive pursuit for corporate earnings (Gilson 2001). In the latter view, 
blockholding complements strong collective labor relations precisely because these 
two features of a corporate governance configuration constitute countervailing powers 
in the competitive processes through which corporate earnings are appropriated by 
different claimants (Roe 2003).  
 Although our research is inconclusive with respect to these two different 
sources of complementarity between blockholding and collective labor relations, it 
does show that the currently dominant agency-theoretical understanding of 
blockholding will need to be complemented with more comprehensive and arguably 
alternative theoretical perspectives. At the very least, agency theory’s somewhat 
narrow focus on the relationship between shareholders and managers will need to be 
broadened to include the competitive behaviors of all corporate constituencies in the 
quest for corporate earnings (Rajan and Zingales 1998, Zingales 1998, 2000). There 
already exists a wealth of predominantly North American research on how managers 
pursue their claims on corporate earnings through their compensation packages 
(Devers et al. 2007). Our findings show that blockholders and organized labor merit 
similar research attention, at least in the European context. More generally, our study 
highlights the importance of employees (Blair 1995) and organized labor (Roe 2003) in 
European corporate governance, which currently receives little attention in research 
(Aguilera and Jackson 2003). 
  More fundamentally, our findings suggest that corporate governance is not 
merely about the competitive quest for corporate earnings, but also about strategic 
coordination and cooperation between corporate constituencies that may ultimately 
benefit all. Our findings suggest, more specifically, that our understanding of 
blockholding in Europe may increase more when we shift attention from the question 
whether there are complementarities between blockholding and labor institutions, to 
the more fine–grained question from which sources these complementarities arise. It 
seems only common sense to include both the competition and the complementarity 
theoretical perspectives on corporate governance in this quest to further unveil the 
sources of complementarity between blockholding and labor institutions. By showing 
the direct relevance of these two comprehensive theoretical frameworks for our 
research questions, our study contributes to the comparative corporate governance 
literature that to date remains predominantly premised on the somewhat narrow 
perspective provided by agency theory. 
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3.5.3 Towards an organizational approach to comparative corporate governance 
Finally, our paper contributes to the development of a distinctively organizational 
approach to comparative corporate governance which seeks to explain corporate 
governance practices and their outcomes from both firm- and country-level 
contingencies, as well as the interactions between them (Aguilera et al. 2008). Over and 
above the contributions we have already discussed above, and which focused 
predominantly on the effects of country-level institutional variables on blockholder 
effectiveness, we contribute to this emerging perspective in comparative corporate 
governance by highlighting the influence of the firm-level contingency of blockholder 
type. 
First, our research shows that relational blockholders are generally more 
effectively involved in the firms they own than arm’s-length blockholders, indicating 
that the scope, duration, and dedication of relational owner involvement in European 
publicly listed firms has performance enhancing effects. This finding raises questions 
in regard to the concrete channels and mechanisms through which relational 
blockholders are able to create value for the firms they own (Black et al. 2008). More 
specifically, questions remain as to how and to what extent either informational 
advantages, knowledge and capability building, or the assurance provided by 
relational owners in regard to implicit contracts with parties both inside and outside 
the firm (Gilson 2007), can explain the performance enhancing effect of relational 
ownership. As the development of a full-fledged theory of owner types is beyond the 
scope of this paper, future research will have to unveil the ways in which different 
types of blockholders add value to the firms they own. 
Second, however, our paper already reveals one concrete causal pathway 
through which relational ownership matters, as relational owners are better able than 
arm’s-length owners to cope with the negative influence of employment protection 
laws and the positive effect of union density on the effectiveness of their blockholder 
involvement in the firms they own. Presumably, the scope, duration, and dedication of 
relational owner involvement in European publicly listed allows these firms to 
develop capabilities that enable them to cope better than arm’s-length owners with the 
specific institutional challenges that European countries provide for blockholding 
owners. Future research is necessary, however, to unveil how relational owners 
develop and use this capability to deal with institutional influences on blockholder 
involvement in European publicly listed firms. 
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Chapter 4. Underpricing of IPOs: Firm-, issue- 
and country-specific characteristics19 
 
ABSTRACT 
Using a large firm-level dataset of 2,920 IPOs from 21 countries we examine the impact 
of country-level institutional characteristics on the underpricing of IPOs. Through 
hierarchical linear modeling we are able to control for firm-specific and issue-specific 
characteristics and test whether country-specific institutional characteristics add 
explanatory power to explain the level of underpricing. Our results show that about 
ten percent of the variation in the level of underpricing is between countries. The 
quality of a country’s legal framework, as measured by its level of investor protection, 
the overall quality of its legal system and its level of legal enforcement, reduces the 
level of underpricing significantly. 
4.1 Introduction 
When companies go public, a well documented phenomenon is the underpricing of 
the initial public offering (IPO). On average, shares seem to be offered at a price lower 
than the market price. Underpricing is usually estimated as the percentage difference 
between the price at which the shares were sold to investors during the offering period 
and the price at which the shares trade afterwards in the secondary market. 
Underpricing of IPOs has been empirically researched for more than forty countries 
and the results indicate that underpricing of IPOs occurs worldwide. From the US to 
South Korea, from Norway to New Zealand, almost all empirical studies document 
underpricing of IPOs. 
Empirical studies, however, show large differences in the level of 
underpricing between countries. In France, for example, researchers have calculated 
an average initial return of 3 to 14 percent, while this is 11 to 30 percent in Australia, 30 
to 47 percent in Taiwan, 48 to 64 percent in Greece, 74 to 78.5 percent in Brazil and 127 
to 950 percent in China. In this article we examine whether there is a relationship 
                                                             
19 Published article by Engelen, P-J., & Van Essen, M. 2010, Journal of Banking and Finance, 34, 1958-1969.
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between a country’s legal framework and the level of underpricing of IPOs, over and 
above traditional firm-level and issue-specific characteristics.  
Focusing on shareholder and creditor rights, the studies of La Porta et al. 
(1997, 1998 and 2002) show that a country’s legal framework explains differences in the 
development of financial markets and the decisions of companies and investors. A 
good legal environment expands the ability of companies to raise external finance 
through either debt or equity (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). In general common law 
countries exhibit a higher degree of investor protection and have more developed 
financial markets compared to, for example, French civil law countries, which have the 
lowest quality of investor protection rules. The civil law systems of Scandinavian and 
German origin occupy a middle position. Mahoney (2001) shows that common law 
systems produce faster economic growth than civil law systems through greater 
security of property and contract rights.  
The law and finance literature shows furthermore that cross-country 
differences in the legal framework affect ownership structure (La Porta et al., 2002), 
ownership effectiveness (Heugens et al., 2009), capital structure (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 1998), asset structure (Claessens and Laeven, 2003), dividend policy (La 
Porta et al., 2000a), corporate governance (La Porta et al., 2000b; Mitton, 2002), and 
corporate valuation (La Porta et al., 2002). Overall, this strand of literature shows that 
the legal framework has important economic consequences. La Porta et al. (1997) show 
that the number of IPOs is positively related with investor rights, the legal origin, and 
the law and order tradition of a country. Although their empirical evidence shows that 
higher levels of legal protection are associated with more IPOs, they do not investigate 
whether the level of IPO underpricing varies with the level of legal protection across 
countries.  
In this article we analyze the relationship between underpricing and a 
country’s legal framework. We examine whether countries with a more developed 
legal framework have less underpricing than those with a less developed legal 
framework. More specifically we conjecture that there are two ways in which the 
quality of legal protection offered by a country will affect IPO underpricing. First, a 
weaker legal system can increase the ex ante uncertainty about the firm value over and 
above firm-level risk factors, such as, for example, the strategic issue whether the firm 
has high investments in research and development. Second, weaker legal institutions 
also increase the ex ante uncertainty of the distribution of (realized) firm value among 
different corporate constituents. In countries with better legal protection managers or 
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controlling shareholders have fewer opportunities to transfer profits or assets out of 
the firm at the expense of minority shareholders. We contend that protection against 
these expropriation issues also reduces the ex ante uncertainty about the return on 
investment in IPOs.  
We aim to contribute to the existing literature in three ways. First, to our 
knowledge, this is the one of the very first comparative studies in the empirical law 
and finance literature that focuses on the impact of the legal and institutional context 
on IPO underpricing. By using hierarchical linear modeling, second, we are able to 
simultaneously model company-specific, issue-specific and country-specific variables 
in a large firm-level dataset. More specifically, third, we answer the question of how 
much explanatory power country-level institutional factors have in explaining IPO 
underpricing.  To test our hypothesis, we compile and analyze a large database 
consisting of 2,920 IPOs from 21 countries having different institutional and legal 
frameworks and belonging to different legal families, covering the period of 2000-2005. 
We find, first, that country-specific characteristics explain about ten percent of the 
variation in the level of underpricing. We find, second, that firms going public in a 
country with a more developed legal system, as measured by: 1) the country’s level of 
investor protection, 2) the quality of legal system, and 3) the level of legal enforcement, 
on average, leave less money on the table in their IPO. 
This article is organized as follows. Section two briefly reviews the theoretical 
literature on underpricing of IPOs, and also summarizes the main firm-specific and 
issue-specific characteristics of an IPO which empirical research has found to be crucial 
factors explaining IPO underpricing. This section introduces the country-specific 
characteristics that may add additional explanatory power for underpricing of IPOs. 
Section three presents the data and the hierarchical linear modeling approach that we 
use. Section four presents the empirical results, while section five discusses alternative 
explanations for the relationship between the legal framework and IPO underpricing. 
Section six summarizes and concludes. 
4.2 Underpricing of IPOs 
Different researchers have advanced different models trying to explain the 
underpricing of IPOs.20 The winner’s curse model of Rock (1986) assumes 
                                                             
20 It is outside the confines of this article to provide a complete overview of all theories. Comprehensive 
theory and literature reviews are provided by Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (1996) and Ljungqvist (2007). 
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underpricing to be necessary because of asymmetric information between investors. 
Some investors have better information available about the value of the firm than 
others. The uninformed investors buy new shares of every IPO, while the informed 
investors only subscribe to shares of attractive IPOs. As the number of shares issued 
by a firm is limited, attractive shares will be oversubscribed. Therefore, uninformed 
investors will receive the full supply of unattractive IPOs and only a part of the 
attractive IPOs.21 In this way uninformed investors get an expected return below the 
average underpricing, or even a negative return (Ritter and Welch, 2002). With 
negative expected returns, uninformed investors would not bid for any IPO allocation 
anymore. Rock assumes that the IPO market needs the demand of the uninformed 
investors, as the demand of informed investors alone is insufficient for its existence. 
Uninformed investors only invest in IPOs when they expect a positive return (or at 
least break even), so underpricing is needed on average (Ljungqvist, 2007).22  
Beatty and Ritter (1986) extend this model by showing that the level of 
underpricing increases with the degree of ex ante uncertainty about the value of the 
firm. This implication is tested empirically, and the results confirm this relationship 
(Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Welbourne and Cyr, 1999). Firms with more uncertainty about 
growth opportunities, for example, on average have higher levels of underpricing than 
other firms (Ritter, 1984). It is now widely accepted in the literature that ex ante 
uncertainty is at the heart of the IPO process and that higher uncertainty leads to 
higher underpricing (Ljungqvist, 2007). A similar conclusion is reached by so-called 
principal/agent IPO models which focus on the asymmetric information between 
underwriters and issuers (Baron and Holmström, 1980; Baron, 1982). Higher ex ante 
uncertainty about the value of the firm leads to more informational asymmetry 
between underwriters and issuers, which in turn leads to more underpricing. 
Although the Rock model assumes a fixed pricing offer with pro-rata 
allocation rules, the model predicts lower underpricing if information is distributed 
more homogeneously across investors (Michaely and Shaw, 1994). One solution is to 
switch to a different introduction method than fixed price offers. There exist different 
                                                             
21 Leite (2007) demonstrates that the strict separation between informed and uninformed investors is 
not required. If there are plenty of heterogeneously informed investors, the winner’s curse occurs when 
the least informed investor willing to participate in the offering (the marginal investor) is allocated a 
disproportionately high fraction of overpriced issues relative to the rest of the participating investors 
who all are better-informed than the marginal investor. 
22 While issuing firms therefore collectively benefit from IPOs to be underpriced on average, individual 
firms would benefit from underpricing their offer as little as possible. This free-riding behavior is 
limited by underwriting banks. These repeat players need underpricing for the existence of the IPO 
market in the long-run (Ljungqvist, 2007). 
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methods to go public. The most commonly used introduction methods are fixed price 
offers, book building, auctions, and hybrid offers. Fixed price offers set the offer price 
after which investors can submit their orders at the predetermined price. Book 
building is an introduction method whereby investors submit non-binding orders and 
underwriters use these indications to set the offer price. In an auction, investors submit 
binding orders (a certain number of shares at a certain offer price) after which an 
auction pricing mechanism assign the shares. Finally, hybrid offerings are a 
combination of the three types. 
Book building, which allows underwriters full discretion over the allocation of 
shares, can be a good mechanism for investors to reveal their information through 
their indications of interest. Under certain conditions, this method can reduce the 
information asymmetry and thus leads to lower underpricing (Benveniste and Spindt, 
1989). Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) formalize this within the context of the winner’s 
curse model and show that a pure book building method leads to less informational 
asymmetry, reduces the winner’s curse, and consequently leads to lower underpricing.  
However, the quality of the book building mechanism is crucial. In many 
European and Asian countries, restrictions on the use of the book building mechanism 
reduce the effectiveness of the information revelation leading again to higher 
underpricing. Examining 65 countries, Ljungqvist, Jenkinson, and Wilhelm (2003) 
show that book building by non-U.S. underwriters for investors at their domestic 
market provides no pricing advantage compared to fixed price offerings. 
4.2.1 Traditional firm-specific and issue-specific risk factors 
This section summarizes the main firm-specific and issue-specific risk factors that are 
reported in the rich empirical IPO literature to be most important in explaining the 
level of underpricing. Since we want to measure the impact of country-specific 
variables on the level of underpricing, these firm-specific and issue-specific parameters 
are included as control variables in the empirical section of this article. First, we 
include several firm-specific characteristics such as the firm age, the price earnings 
ratio, the industry, and the fact whether the IPO is venture capital-backed or not. 
Second, we include issue-specific variables. We control for the introduction method of 
the offering in lowering the ex ante uncertainty. Finally, the year of introduction is 
included. The impact of these variables on the level of underpricing is briefly 
explained below. 
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Firm age is a firm-specific control variable that measures the difference 
between the foundation year of the firm and the year of introduction. Ritter (1984) 
argues that there is a positive relationship between the level of underpricing and the ex 
ante uncertainty about the value of the firm. Older firms have a longer history and 
have more information available to the public. They have a longer track record of 
published financial data and are more likely to be screened by financial intermediaries 
and financial press.23 Overall, older firms create less ex ante uncertainty about firm 
value and the level of underpricing will therefore be lower for older firms. This is 
empirically confirmed by Su and Fleisher (1999), Loughran and Ritter (2004), and 
Chahine (2008), who all find a negative relationship between firm age and the level of 
underpricing.  
Price earnings ratio is the second firm-specific control variable and is expressed 
as earnings per share. Firms with a lot of growth opportunities have a higher price 
earnings ratio which causes more risk and uncertainty for investors about the true 
value of the firm (Chen et al., 2004). It can therefore be expected that firms with higher 
price earnings ratios on average have higher levels of underpricing. Engelen (2003) 
and Hauser et al. (2006) confirm this positive relationship empirically. 
The level of ex ante uncertainty of high-tech firms will generally be higher than 
for non-high-tech firms. The IPOs of technological firms therefore tend to be more 
underpriced than of firms operating in other sectors (Ritter, 1984). Roosenboom and 
Schramade (2006) control for this impact by using a technology dummy and 
Benveniste et al. (2003) use industry dummies.  
The involvement of a venture capitalist can reduce the ex ante uncertainty of 
investors about the value of the firm. Venture capitalists provide both knowledge and 
resources to the firm, and typically also perform a thorough and extensive due 
diligence before they invest in a firm. Afterwards, they monitor the firm on a day to 
day basis, assist management, and often occupy a seat in the board of directors 
(Suchard, 2009). Overall, empirical researchers expect that firms with a venture 
capitalist as an early investor are less underpriced (Megginson and Weiss, 1991). 
Recent studies which include this parameter are Guo et al. (2006), Dolvin and Jordan 
(2008) and Arthurs et al. (2008), all of which show mixed results. 
                                                             
23 The organizational literature as well observes that business risk seems to decline with firm age. This 
is referred to as the “liability of newness” which implies that newer firms face a greater risk of failure 
(Freeman et al., 1983). 
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As an issue-specific control variable, dummies are typically used to capture 
differences among book building, fixed price offer, auction, and hybrid offer. Although the 
functioning of the different introduction methods in the reduction of information 
asymmetry through information revelation is hotly debated in the literature (Bennouri 
and Falconieri, 2008; Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet, 2002), the empirical results provide 
no unambiguous answer. The majority view, however, seems to indicate that book 
building is more efficient than fixed price offers (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989; Ritter, 
1998), while auctions seem to be more efficient than book building (Derrien and 
Womack, 2002; Kaneko and Pettway, 2003).  
Finally, empirical studies show that the level of underpricing fluctuates across 
different years (Ibbotson and Jaffe, 1975). To control for this we include a dummy 
variable year of introduction. One explanation for the yearly fluctuations may be the fact 
that there are “hot” and “cold” IPO markets (Ibbotson et al., 2001). In a hot IPO 
market, the average level of underpricing is large and the amount of firms going 
public increases. Afterwards there is a high rate of firms going public, but the level of 
underpricing decreases. The following cold period starts with fewer firms going public 
and very low underpricing or even overpricing. There is strong empirical evidence for 
this recurrent pattern, but theoretically, the existence of this pattern has not yet seen 
sufficiently explained (Ibbotson and Ritter, 1995).  
Table 1 gives an overview of the firm- and issue-specific variables included in 
21 empirical studies on underpricing. As this article focuses on the role of country-
level institutional variables, the table covers a wide range of countries.24  
  
                                                             
24 Legend of table 1: y means parameters included in the empirical study. Nature refers to the nature 
of the offer (primary versus secondary offering), age refers to the company age and measure the 
number of year between its establishment and the IPO, VC indicates whether a dummy was included 
for venture capital backed IPOs, Techno indicates whether a dummy for technology firms is included, 
Method indicates whether dummies for the introduction methods are included, Year indicates 
whether dummies for the years of introduction are included, P/E refers to the price earnings ratio, 
Offer size refers to the total market capitalization of the offered shares, Rep indicates whether 
measures for underwriter reputation are included in the empirical study.  
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The most frequently used variables in the empirical literature include: the nature of the 
offer, the company’s age, whether the IPO is venture capital backed or not, 
technological firms, introduction method, the year of introduction, the price earnings 
ratio, the offer size, and the underwriter reputation. As can be seen from the table, no 
empirical study includes all variables mentioned. The number of included variables in 
each study ranges from two to seven. In our empirical study we include seven firm-
specific and issue-specific variables. We include the nature of the offer, the company’s 
age, venture capital backing, technological firms, introduction method, the year of 
introduction, and the price earnings ratio. The offer size and the underwriter 
reputation are not included due to lacking data for the majority of countries.   
 
4.2.2 Country-specific risk factors 
At the heart of every IPO process are informational issues between the different actors, 
which potentially lead to IPO underpricing (Ljungqvist, 2007).25 The uncertainties 
surrounding the IPO will display themselves at different levels. The current literature 
on IPO underpricing focuses mostly on firm-specific and issue-specific characteristics 
that influence the ex ante uncertainty about the value of the firm. Yet this focus has 
resulted in a relative neglect of country-specific characteristics, such as the institutional 
framework for business that a country provides (North, 1991; Peng, 2009). This section 
will focus on the influence of country-level institutional variables on the ex ante 
uncertainty about the value of the firm over and above the traditional drivers.  
Douglas North defines institutions as “the rule of the game in a society or, 
more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (1990: 
6). A jurisdiction-level institutional framework consists of both formal (laws and 
regulation) and informal (norms and culture) institutions. The institutional context 
critically affects the formation, compliance, and enforcement of laws, that are 
necessary to sustain efficient business practices (Van Essen et al., 2009). By 
constraining the range of acceptable behaviors both formal and informal institutions 
facilitate the process of economic specialization and wealth creation (Peng, 2009). In 
general, the key role of institutions is to reduce uncertainty by creating a stable 
foundation in which subsequent human interactions can be grounded (North, 1994).  
                                                             
25 CFOs consider the compensation of investors for taking risk to be the most important function of 
underpricing (Brau and Fawcett, 2006).  
 94 
 
The law and finance literature has already demonstrated the importance of 
formal institutions for corporate finance (La Porta et al, 1997). Therefore we specifically 
focus on the formal institutional factors that reduce ex ante uncertainty at the time a 
firm goes public for the first time. In line with asymmetric information models, which 
demonstrate a positive relation between ex ante uncertainty and underpricing, a 
similar relation can be expected between the development of the institutional 
framework and the level of underpricing. The legal framework can influence the ex 
ante uncertainty about the value of the firm in two separate but related ways.   
First, the legal framework can increase the ex ante uncertainty about firm 
value in more or less the same way as ex ante firm-specific risk at the time of the IPO. 
One example of a firm-specific risk factor involves the high-tech intensity of the firm 
that was discussed above. Claessens and Laeven (2003), for instance, show that firms 
operating in a legal environment with poor protection of intellectual property rights 
underinvest in intangible assets, leading to lower firm growth and lower firm value. In 
general, lower levels of legal protection for investors will create more uncertainty with 
respect to post IPO strategies and managerial decisions that may negatively affect firm 
value. This higher ex ante uncertainty concerning firm valuation hence leads to more 
underpriced IPOs. It is important to note that this uncertainty affects the firm over and 
above other firm-level risk factors already discussed. It is well-documented, for 
example, that high-tech firms are more underpriced due to higher ex ante uncertainty 
about future income streams. Just looking at firm-level risk factors, therefore, two 
identical high-tech firms will be underpriced at same level. Yet, a high-tech firm 
operating in a less developed legal framework (e.g. poor protection of intellectual 
property rights) will be more underpriced than an otherwise identical high-tech firm 
operating in a well-developed legal framework because of the increased ex ante 
uncertainty due to country-level risk factors. 
A second way in which legal institutions may increase the ex ante uncertainty 
pertains to the future distribution of realized firm value among different corporate 
constituents. In a country with a weaker legal framework, managers or controlling 
shareholders have more opportunities to transfer profits or assets out of the firm at the 
expense of the minority shareholders. This increased probability of ex post 
expropriation by management or controlling shareholders increases the ex ante 
uncertainty at the time of IPO.26 Johnson et al. (2000) show how “tunneling” or the 
                                                             
26 Of course we acknowledge that the prospect of being expropriated will also effect ex ante estimations 
of the value of investments, but we wish to emphasize that value destroying managerial choices and 
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transfer of assets and profits out of the firm for the private benefit of managers or 
controlling shareholders takes place at the expense of minority shareholders. This can 
happen, among others, in the form of transfer pricing, asset stripping, and investor 
dilution (Berkman et al., 2009; Cheung et al., 2009). Especially in French civil law 
countries, such as France and Italy, much of the tunneling is even legal, contrary to 
common law countries. This is mainly because in French civil law countries such 
transactions are assessed by courts in light of their conformity with statutes, and not 
on the basis of their general fairness to minority shareholders such as in common law 
countries (Johnson et al., 2000b). Therefore, in countries with weaker legal protection, 
investors will be more uncertain about realizing a return on their investment (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997).27 This increases the ex ante uncertainty about the value of their 
investment. To induce investors to subscribe to the offer and not being expropriated ex 
post, IPOs need to be more underpriced on average. The higher the expropriation risk, 
the more the offer needs to be underpriced to compensate for this ex ante uncertainty. 
Underpricing can thus be seen as a premium paid to investors for insuring them 
against the adverse outcome of expropriation. In that case underpricing will increase 
in the ex ante uncertainty about realizing minority shareholders’ return on investment. 
Therefore we expect IPOs of firms operating in a country with better legal protection 
and enforcement to have, on average, a lower level of underpricing. 
We find both theoretical and empirical support for the relationship between a 
country’s legal framework and IPO underpricing through the mechanism of ex ante 
uncertainty. Although no paper explicitly models the above relationship, Giannetti 
and Simonov (2006) empirically demonstrate that minority and other investors who 
generally enjoy only security benefits are reluctant to invest in companies with weak 
investor protection. Himmelberg et al. (2004) show that weaker legal protection leads 
to higher risk premiums and thus higher cost of capital. This is in line with the general 
equilibrium model developed in Albuquerque and Wang (2008), who focus on the 
effects of conflicts of interest between controlling shareholders and outside 
shareholders. Under weak legal protection rules the variance of output increases and 
the equilibrium equity premium increases proportionally. The model predicts the 
                                                                                                                                                          
value expropriation by managers or controlling shareholders constitute different ‘channels’ through 
which lower legal protection will create uncertainty at the time a firm is offered to the market for the 
first time. 
27 In the absence of any legal protection, there would be no uncertainty, making the returns to minority 
shareholders predictable low (in fact zero). Although one could argue that it would lead to less 
underpricing because less risky, in reality it would more likely imply the collapse or even the non-
existence of any IPO market. This is also in line with the findings of Giannetti and Simonov (2006). 
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equity risk premium to be higher in countries with weaker legal protection because of 
increased expropriation by controlling shareholders. Effective legal institutions may 
reduce the risk premium demanded by outside investors.  
Recent empirical research also supports the mechanism of ex ante uncertainty. 
Chiou et al. (2010) examine 4,916 stocks from 37 countries and find that stronger 
investor protection leads to a decrease in investment risk. A higher overall quality of 
the legal system and a better legal protection of investor’s rights are associated with 
lower asset volatility and lower systematic risk, as well as with a higher risk-adjusted 
return as measured by the Sharpe and Treynor index. Weaker legal investor protection 
rules are thus associated with a higher stock risk. Chung et al. (2007) find that closed-
end country funds in countries with lower investor protection have higher systematic 
risk. A shortcoming of both studies is the use of realized stock returns; therefore Hail 
and Leuz (2006) use four proxies for ex ante uncertainty. Controlling for traditional risk 
factors, they find that more effective securities regulation as well as a higher overall 
quality of the legal system leads to lower ex ante uncertainty. The above theoretical 
models and empirical results show that weaker legal protection leads to higher ex ante 
uncertainty, which in its turn leads to higher underpricing according to the model of 
Beatty and Ritter (1986).  
4.3 Data and Methods  
4.3.1 Sample and data collection 
We manually collect a dataset covering IPOs from 21 different countries during the 
period running from January 2000 until December 2005. Our sample consists of 2,920 
firms who conducted an IPO on the stock markets of the following countries: 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Firm- and issue-specific data 
are gathered directly from the prospectuses and firm websites. In addition such digital 
information sources as Global Financing Database of the Securities Data Company (SDC) 
and DataStream are used. Country-specific data on investor protection, the quality of 
the general legal framework, the quality of legal enforcement and origin of the legal 
system are obtained from La Porta et al. (1998), Kaufmann (2004), Kaufmann et al. 
(2005), and Djankov et al. (2008). 
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4.3.2 Measure of underpricing 
Consistent with the standard methodology, we calculate the underpricing as the 
percentage change from the offer price to the closing price in the secondary market 
((closing price – offer price)/ offer price)*100%. In case of a one-day return, corrections 
for market movements have no significant impact since the first day IPO return is very 
large compared to the average market return. For instance, Beatty and Ritter (1986) 
report an average initial return of 14.1 percent, while the average daily market return 
was less than 0.1 percent.28 Table 2 shows the number of IPOs and average 
underpricing in each country. The results indicate that underpricing of IPOs is a 
worldwide phenomenon (except in Israel). Nevertheless, the data show enormous 
differences in the level of underpricing. For example, the overpricing in Israel is 3.67 
percent, while the underpricing in Spain is more than 40 percent. The overall average 
underpricing across all 2920 firms over the 21 countries for the time period 2000-2005 
amounts to 24.97%.  
Table 2: Number of IPOs and Average Underpricing in Each Country 
  
                                                             
28 Adjustments for market movements in the initial one-day return calculations do not result in any 
significant changes. Results are available from the authors upon request. 
Countries Number of IPOs Average Underpricing Std Dev 
Argentina 4 2.11 1.75 
Australia 437 18.04 63.04 
Austria 10 16.15 35.29 
Belgium 18 6.25 11.26 
Brazil 10 14.68 15.12 
Finland 15 25.98 64.05 
France 171 13.12 37.64 
Germany 132 37.20 71.95 
Greece 124 34.97 76.87 
Israel 74 -3.76 18.30 
Italy 54 12.12 32.78 
Japan 609 43.95 49.23 
Mexico 4 2.20 2.17 
Netherlands 5 32.46 71.93 
New Zealand 28 14.43 48.14 
Portugal 3 17.98 6.52 
Spain 7 43.75 82.12 
Sweden 25 8.58 27.52 
Switzerland 48 15.67 45.80 
United Kingdom 471 20.16 53.06 
United States 671 21.14 49.42 
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4.3.3 Country-, issue- and firm-specific characteristics 
Country-Specific Characteristics. Since the seminal articles of La Porta et al. 
(1997, 1998) there has been an increased interest in the finance literature for differences 
in the legal system and its influence on corporate financial decisions. To investigate 
cross-country differences, typical law and finance studies use several proxies to 
measure the quality of a countries legal framework: (1) a proxy measuring (minority) 
investor protection, (2) a proxy measuring the general quality of the legal system (law 
in the books), (3) a proxy measuring judicial efficiency (law in practice), and (4) a 
proxy measuring the origin of the legal system.  
We use the variable Anti self dealing to measure the protection of minority 
shareholders and focus on how outside investors are protected against expropriation 
by insiders. This set of specific legal provisions against self-dealing is quite diverse, 
and ranges from private enforcement features, such as disclosure and approval of 
related party transactions by disinterested shareholders, on the one hand, to public 
interventions such as criminal fines and prison terms on the other (Djankov et al., 
2008). To measure the overall quality of legal background institutions in the various 
jurisdictions in our sample, we use the ‘Rule of law’ and ‘Corruption’ measures of 
Kaufmann et al. (2005). The Rule of law variable measures the extent to which agents 
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, while Corruption measures the 
exercise of public power for private gain (Kaufmann et al., 2005). In general, a weak 
legal system (law in the books) can be substituted by a strong and effective legal 
enforcement (La Porta et al., 1998). Effective courts and legal enforcement can 
therefore also protect investors against managers and controlling shareholders.  
The Public enforcement index is included in the analyses to measure the quality 
and effectiveness of legal enforcement. This index focuses on different dimensions of 
public enforcement. We include the legal origin of a country. The binary variables 
Common legal origin, French legal origin, German legal origin, and Scandinavian legal origin 
identify the legal origins of the company law or commercial code of each country. 
These are important variables to find some residual difference between countries 
(Gugler et al., 2004). Alternatively, we also use the classification of origin and 
transplant countries of Pistor et al. (2003). Origin countries are countries that 
developed their legal system largely internally, while transplant countries inherit their 
legal system largely from other countries. Table 3 presents definitions, sources, and 
basic statistics of all country-specific variables. 
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Firm- and Issue-Specific Characteristics. To assess the impact of the legal 
framework on the level of underpricing of IPOs, we include different firm- and issue-
specific control variables to specify the model correctly. The descriptive statistics and 
definitions of the firm-specific and issue-specific variables are reported in Table 4.  
To control for ex ante uncertainty at the firm level, we include the firm age, 
measured as the number of years since the founding of the company, the price 
earnings ratio and a dummy variable to indicate whether it is a high-tech firm. We 
include a dummy variable which equals one if a firm has a venture capitalist as 
shareholder at the moment of IPO, because previous research suggested that the 
monitoring and advice of venture capitalist reduce the level of underpricing 
(Megginson and Weiss, 1991).  
Issue-specific data include the introduction method and the nature of offer 
(See section 2.1 for more information). Finally, we include dummies for the years of 
introduction to correct for time-varying levels of underpricing since the level of 
underpricing fluctuates over time. In the year 2000 the average level of underpricing 
came to 36 percent, while in the following years the level of underpricing fluctuates 
between 17 to 22 percent. This is in line with other empirical research indicating a hot 
IPO market in 2000. Loughran and Ritter (2004) show that during the internet bubbles 
in the years of 1999-2000 the underpricing increased to more than 65 percent in the 
United States and reverting thereafter to 12 percent in the period 2001-2003. 
4.3.4 Hierarchical linear modeling 
The data are analyzed using Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM; 
Raudenbush and Bryck, 2002). We use HLM because we have hierarchically structured 
data, where IPOs are nested within countries. This means that IPOs within a country 
will be more alike, on average, than IPOs from different countries, because they share 
the same legal rules for example. One of the standard assumptions of most statistical 
techniques is the assumption of independence of observations. If this assumption is 
violated, and in hierarchical structured data this is almost always the case, OLS obtains 
standard errors that are too small for the parameters estimates (Hox, 2002). The 
advantage of HLM is that HLM explicitly recognizes and corrects for this once it is 
present in the data. Our dataset contains a hierarchical structure with two levels; each 
of which level is represented by its own regression equation.  
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The level 1 model predictors are firm-specific and issue-specific variables, while the 
level 2 model predictors are the country-specific variables. The slopes and intercept at 
the level 1 model are allowed to differ between countries, something which is not the 
case for ordinary linear regression.  
 
In more analytical terms level 1 model is expressed as: 
ijijjjij eXY  110 EE                  [1] 
and the level 2 model as: 
jj Z101000 JJE   [2] 
jj Z111101 JJE                   [3] 
where ijY  is level of underpricing, X are firm-specific and issue-specific variables and 
Z are the country-specific variables. With HLM we can run a one-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) to measure how much of the variance of the level of underpricing 
is explained by country-specific characteristics versus firm-specific and issue-specific 
characteristics. We executed the different analyses using the HLM 6 software package 
(Raudenbush et al., 2004). 
4.4 Empirical Results   
We start our empirical results with a simple random ANOVA model (HLM null 
model) to calculate the corrected overall average, to determine intra-class correlation 
and the importance of multi-level modeling. Next, we turn to the HLM full model to 
test our hypothesis. All models use the robust standard errors generated by HLM 
software package, as these relax the assumptions of the variance-covariance matrix 
(Hox, 2002). 
4.4.1 HLM null model 
Table 5 shows the results of the one-way ANOVA with random effects. The corrected 
overall average underpricing is 20.28 percent.29 We first test formally whether there is 
significant variation between countries in the level of underpricing. If not, the 
assumption of independence of observations is not violated. The results support our 
                                                             
29 See Raudenbush and Bryck (2002: 41) for more details on the calculation. 
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choice to use HLM, as there exists a significant variation among countries (variance 
component = 280.33, df = 20, p value = 0.000). About 10% of the variance in underpricing 
is between countries. 
Table 5: Results from the One-Way ANOVA Model 
4.4.2  HLM full model 
Before we test our hypothesis, as a robustness check we analyze the sign and the 
power of our control variables in relationship to the level of underpricing (see Level 1 
predictors in Tables 6 and 7). This allows us to assess the quality of the data and to test 
whether the outcomes support the theoretical expectations and empirical observations 
from prior studies.  
We start the analysis with only firm-specific and issue-specific variables 
before adding country-specific variables, as shown in Model 1 of Table 6. The Year of 
introduction is a dummy variable for the years 2000 to 2005. The year 2000 is highly 
significant at the one percent level. This is in line with prior studies such as Loughran 
and Ritter (2004) that showed a hot IPO market in 2000 for the U.S. Although the years 
2001 to 2003 have a large negative coefficient, they are insignificant at the five percent 
level.  
As expected, the sign of the dummy variable High-tech firm is positive and 
significant (p<0.01). Firms operating in the high-tech market are approximately 22 
percent more underpriced than other firms. The variable Firm age has a negative 
significant influence (p<0.05) on the level of underpricing. Both observations are also 
reported in the existing literature (see Section 2.1). The variable Price earnings ratio is 
Fixed Effect Coefficient se  
Average Underpricing, 00J  20.28 3.18  
    
Random Effect Variance component df p value 
Level 2 effect, ju0  280.33 20 0.000 
Level 1 effect, ije  2830.22   
Interclass correlation 10%   
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insignificant at the conventional levels of significance.30 A similar conclusion holds for 
the dummy variable Venture capitalist. 
The IPO method Book building and Tender/auction have a negative influence on 
the level of underpricing (although not significant). We will see that these results 
become significant when we include variables that measure investor protection across 
countries. Overall, most of the control variables are significant and have the signs we 
expect from the theoretical and empirical literature. In the next paragraph we test our 
hypotheses, as can be seen in the Level 2 predictors in Tables 6 and 7. 
Minority protection. We use the Anti self dealing index of the Djankov et al. 
(2008) to measure the protection of minority shareholders (see Model 2 of Table 6). We 
expect a negative relationship between the level of investor protection and 
underpricing of IPOs. The anti self dealing index is significant at five percent level and 
shows that IPOs of firms in a country offering better minority protection are less 
underpriced than IPOs of comparable firms in a country with less protection of 
minority shareholders. As predicted in the theoretical part, higher investor protection 
decreases the ex ante uncertainty for investors and decreases the underpricing of IPOs. 
Higher levels of investor protection do not only lead to more companies going public 
(La Porta et al., 1997), but apparently also lead to lower underpricing. It allows issuers 
to leave less money on the table during the IPO process and decreases the cost of 
capital within a given jurisdiction. This finding is in line with the law and finance 
literature. The firm- and issue-specific variables Year 2000, High-tech firm, Firm age, 
Venture capitalist, Tender/auction method, and Book building method are significant at the 
conventional levels. The latter results are in line with prior IPO underpricing 
research.31 Our study confirms the results of Hopp and Dreher (2007) who find “that 
the protection of shareholders affects the perceived risk of investing” (2007: 30). More 
effective investor protection therefore results in lower IPO underpricing. Their study 
differs from ours in using aggregate country-level data, whereas our study allows for a 
more precise measurement using a firm-level data set.   
                                                             
30 Since this variable is insignificant, we leave it out of the remainder of the regressions since including 
it implies a strong reduction of more than 600 observations (see Table 4). Including it yields similar 
results, which are available from the authors upon request. 
31 We use two control variables to check if any differences in economic development across the nations 
in our sample influence our results: (1) gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, and (2) stock-market 
capitalization as a fraction of GDP. Including it yields similar results, which are available from the 
authors upon request. 
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 Table 6: Results of HLM Analyses 
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. + p< 0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
Var.comp. = variance component 
Dependent Variable :                Level of underpricing of IPOs in period 2000-2005 
 Model 
(1) 
Model 
(2) 
Model 
(3) 
Fixed Effect Coefficient se Coefficient se Coefficient se 
Level 1 predictors       
Year 2000 10.77** 4.07 9.32** 4.12 11.26** 4.02 
Year 2001 -5.83 4.69 -3.82 4.81 -3.87 -4.72 
Year 2002 -10.36+ 5.28 -8.21 5.46 -8.36 -5.33 
Year 2003 -5.63 5.12 -2.71 5.32 -3.01 -5.09 
Year 2004 1.53 4.00 3.58 4.13 2.63 3.99 
Dummy High-Tech 21.79** 2.98 22.46** 3.07 22.22** 3.01 
Age -0.13* 0.05 -.18* 0.05 -.18** -0.05 
Price Earnings Ratio 0.00 0.82     
Nature of the Offer 9.85* 4.50 4.87 4.45 3.70 4.25 
Dummy Venture 
Capitalist 
 
1.69 
 
4.16 
 
-7.71+ 
 
4.06 
 
-8.61* 3.89 
Book Building 
Method 
-14.23 9.18 -8.316** 2.26 -13.78** 
-3.59 
Tender/Auction 
Method 
-11.60 14.08 -27.93** 9.34 -28.48** 
-8.79 
Hybrid Method 6.28 10.50 -9.32 7.57 -3.32 -6.13 
Intercept 22.28 4.98 16.10 6.58 13.59 5.09 
R2 within countries 0.18  0.19  0.19  
Level 2 predictors       
Anti Self dealing 
index 
  -22.11* 10.99   
Rule of Law     -8.027+ 4.80 
R2 between countries 0.08  0.36  0.30  
Random Effect 
Variance 
component 
p-
value 
Variance 
component 
p-
value 
Variance 
component 
p-value 
Level 2 effect, ju0  257.60 0.00 179.41 .04 196.23 .03 
Level 1 effect, ije  2360.60  2292.48  2292.48  
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Our data set thus offers the possibility to control for firm-specific and issue-
specific characteristics. Interestingly, both their country-level data set and our firm-
level data set provide evidence in the same direction. Our results are also in line with 
Daouk et al. (2006), who use the average percentage of underpricing at the country-
level as a proxy for pricing efficiency and find that improvements in capital market 
regulations are associated with less underpricing.  
Legal system. The quality of the legal system is another proxy to measure 
legal protection. We use the Rule of law and Corruption variables to measure the quality 
of the general legal system. Both variables come from the dataset of Kaufmann et al. 
(2005). The rule of law measures the extent to which investors have confidence in a 
country’s legal system. Model 3 in Table 6 shows that rule of law is significant at the 
10% level, while Model 4 in Table 7 shows that the corruption variable is highly 
significant at the 1% level. The variables Year 2000, High-tech firm, Firm age, Venture 
capitalist (only in Model 3), Book building method, and Tender/auction method are 
significant in both regressions. The HLM model shows that countries with a better 
legal system, as proxied by the rule of law and the level of corruption, have less 
underpriced IPOs. The results are again similar to Hopp and Dreher (2007) who 
conclude that an effective legal system reduces the perceived risk of investing and 
hence decreases the level of underpricing. This means that issuers in countries with a 
better legal system have lower costs to go public compared to issuers operating in a 
country with a weak legal system. 
Legal enforcement. The third proxy to measure legal protection is the quality 
and effectiveness of a country’s legal enforcement. We use the variable Public 
enforcement index to measure the quality of enforcement in a country. Model 5 in Table 
7 clearly shows a negative relationship between the level of underpricing and legal 
enforcement (p<0.01). IPOs in a country with better legal enforcement are less 
underpriced than in a country with poor legal enforcement. Again, the same firm-
specific and issue-specific variables are still significant. The level of underpricing 
decreases with stronger legal enforcement, which is inline with our theoretical 
expectations. With strong law enforcement minority shareholders have more options 
to successfully appeal to a court lowering the ex ante risk of being expropriated by 
management or controlling shareholders. This leads to lower underpricing at the time 
of offer. 
Legal origin. The legal origin is the last proxy to measure legal protection. 
First, we use the variables Legal family to measure a country’s legal protection. La Porta 
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et al. (1998) show that common law countries offer, on average, a better legal 
protection than countries belonging to the German legal family and the Scandinavian 
legal family, which in turn offer better legal protection than French civil law countries. 
The common law and the French civil law countries are at the extremes both for the 
law in the books (legal rules) and the law in practice (enforcement), while the two 
other legal families are in between. One can therefore expect IPOs to be the least 
underpriced in common law countries and the most in French civil law countries. Only 
the variable German legal family is positively related to the level of underpricing (see 
Model 6 in Table 7). Compared to common law countries, IPOs in countries belonging 
to the German legal family are more underpriced (p<0.01). IPOs of firm located in a 
country belonging to the French civil law legal family and the Scandinavian legal 
family are statistically not different from common law countries. Contrary to our 
expectations, there seems to be no unambiguous negative relationship between 
belonging to a certain legal family and the level of underpricing. It appears as the 
variation in the level of legal protection and enforcement is more subtle than can be 
captured by just the difference of belonging to a certain legal family. Berkowitz et al. 
(2003) argue that “the way in which a country received its formal law is a much more 
important determinant of the current effectiveness of its legal institutions than the 
particular legal family that is adopted” (2003: 167).  
As an alternative we therefore use the classification of origin versus transplant 
countries of Pistor et al. (2003). Origin countries are countries that developed their 
legal system largely internally, while transplant countries inherit their legal system 
largely from other countries. We examine whether IPOs in a country that developed its 
legal system internally (origin country) is less underpriced than IPOs in a country that 
received its legal system from foreign sources (transplant country). Model 7 in Table 7 
shows that IPOs in a transplant country are more underpriced than IPOs in an origin 
country (p<0.05). Since origin countries are supposed to have a higher legal innovative 
capacity (Pistor et al., 2003), our results show that countries with a more adequate legal 
framework have less underpriced IPOs. Model 6 and 7 again confirm the significance 
of the usual suspects. The firm-specific and issue-specific variables Year 2000, High-tech 
firm, Firm age, Nature of the offer, Book building method, and Tender/auction method are 
significant at the conventional levels. 
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4.5 Discussion  
In the previous section we demonstrated the existence of a negative relation between 
the quality of a country’s legal framework and IPO underpricing, controlling for 
traditional firm-specific and issue-specific characteristics. Earlier we explained this 
relationship through the mechanism of ex ante uncertainty. Our more fine-grained 
firm-level dataset corroborates the coarser results from a prior country-level study by 
Hopp and Dreher (2007). Although it appears plausible that the legal system and ex 
ante uncertainty are related in this way, and that institutional country-level risk factors 
drive underpricing, one can argue that alternative mechanisms could explain the 
relationship between the country’s legal framework and IPO underpricing as well. In 
this section we discuss these alternative mechanisms and the possible limitation of our 
interpretation and results. 
Spinning is the first alternative interpretation of the observed negative 
relationship within the Rock-framework. It could be that underwriters may be more 
inclined to give favorable allocations of shares to preferred investors (friends, family, 
executives, etc.) and unfavorable allocations to non-favored non-connected investors. 
The latter would require higher underpricing to participate in the IPO market. The 
outcome of this process is not due to ex-ante uncertainty, but due to discretionary 
allocation of shares by underwriters. For the alternative interpretation to be in line 
with our empirical results, we would have to assume that countries with an 
institutional framework offering little control over the allocation of shares during the 
IPO process are the same as countries that exhibit a weak legal protection of minority 
shareholders. Although we cannot exclude this alternative hypothesis, we do not 
immediately see why both groups of countries are the same. For instance, during the 
late nineties and early two thousands spinning was a widespread practice in the U.S., 
despite having one of the strongest investor protection rules at the same time (Liu and 
Ritter, 2009). Spinning occurs as the favorable allocation of shares to friends and family 
(Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003) or to top executives of the issuing firm or the general 
partners of the participating venture capital firm (Loughran and Ritter, 2002, 2004). 
Key decision-makers in the IPO process pick underwriters with a reputation for 
underpricing since they receive side-payments on personal brokerage accounts.32 We 
                                                             
32 For real-life examples we refer the interested reader to the press references in Loughran and Ritter 
(2004). In 2003 the New York Public Prosecutor’s Office reached a settlement with ten investment 
banks to follow a ‘no spinning rule’ (Loughran and Ritter, 2004). 
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have no data on the occurrence of spinning practices and supervisory control on this 
misconduct in other countries to test the role of spinning around the world.33  
A second mechanism which potentially could explain a relationship between 
the legal system and IPO underpricing is the managerial control theory of Brennan 
and Franks (1997). They see underpricing as mechanism through which management 
retains control of the company after going public. The excess demand for shares 
caused by underpricing the offer enables managers to allocate small stakes of shares to 
many small investors. In this way, they claim that the probability of external 
monitoring by outside investors is reduced. Boulton et al. (2007) use this mechanism to 
predict a positive relationship between the legal system and IPO underpricing. It is 
argued that managers in countries with better investor protection have fewer 
possibilities to capture the private benefits of control compared to countries with weak 
investor protection. In a strong legal environment managers therefore use 
underpricing to maintain control.  
Although our data do not allow us to formally test this mechanism, it is 
difficult to see why this mechanism would provide a good explanation for the 
relationship between legal framework and underpricing. First, other substitute 
mechanisms for retaining control such as takeover defenses, non-voting stocks and 
alike are more effective since underpricing cannot prevent outside investors from 
accumulating larger stakes of shares once trading begins in the aftermarket 
(Ljungqvist, 2007). Second, it seems as if this mechanism might offer a reasonable 
explanation for underpricing in the UK and US, but not in many Continental European 
and Asian countries as existing shareholders in those countries often retain the 
majority of the shares after going public, hence they do not need to underprice the 
offer to retain control over the company. In that case this mechanism does not provide 
any explanation for the relationship between legal framework and underpricing. 
Finally, our firm-level data set does not support this mechanism since we observe a 
negative relationship between the country’s legal system and IPO underpricing, which 
contradicts the positive relationship predicted through this mechanism. Moreover, the 
methodology in Boulton et al. (2007) cannot capture hierarchically structured data, in 
which IPOs are nested within countries. In section 3.4 we argued the case that testing 
this relationship requires the use of HLM instead of OLS regressions. 
                                                             
33 We thank the reviewer for pointing out this alternative interpretation. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
Although empirical studies on underpricing of IPOs show enormous differences 
between countries, the literature largely neglects the role of country-specific 
characteristics such as the country’s legal and institutional framework. This study 
analyzes the relationship between the level of underpricing and legal protection. Based 
on theory we expect countries with stronger legal protection to have on average a 
lower level of underpricing. This expectation is in line with Beatty and Ritter’s (1986) 
conclusion of a positive relationship between the level of underpricing and the ex ante 
uncertainty about the value of the firm. In countries with weaker legal protection 
investors are more uncertain about realizing the required rate of return on their 
investment. 
Using a large firm-level dataset of 2,920 IPOs covering a wide range of 21 
countries having different institutional and legal frameworks, we confirm our 
hypothesis. We find, first, that country-specific characteristics explain about ten 
percent of the variation in the level of underpricing. By using the hierarchical linear 
modeling approach we are able to control for firm-specific and issue-specific 
characteristics that influence the level of underpricing and find that country-specific 
characteristics add explanatory power to the level of underpricing. Second, firms 
going public in a country with a more developed legal framework, as measured by the 
country’s level of investor protection, the quality of its legal system, and the level of 
legal enforcement, reduce the level of underpricing significantly. 
The economic significance for firms operating in a poor legal environment is 
important. In case of underpricing, money is obviously “left on the table”, since 
investors would have been willing to buy the same securities at a higher price 
(Loughran and Ritter, 2002). When the level of underpricing is larger, firms receive less 
money for selling securities to the market, raising the cost of capital of those firms. One 
of the economic consequences of issuing shares at a discount (through the 
underpricing of the IPO) is that fewer firms will consider an IPO as the cost to go 
public increases. Since country-specific characteristics explain an additional ten 
percent of the variation in the level of underpricing of an IPO, this has real economic 
consequences. Issuers in countries with a weaker legal system have on average a 
higher level of underpricing, and consequently face a higher cost of capital, which is a 
disadvantage for domestic firms compared to their international competitors.  
Our study complements research by Ljunqvist et al. (2003), who find that 
bookbuilding in countries outside the US only reduces the level of underpricing when 
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used in combination with US banks and targeted at US investors. Our study shows the 
importance of legal framework on the level of underpricing. Combining these two 
results shows that countries with a poor legal environment more frequently use US 
banks and US investors.34 These findings are related to the literature on cross-listings, 
showing that issuers can independently improve their level of investor protection by a 
listing on a foreign stock exchange with higher standards of investor protection (Reese 
and Weisbach, 2002; Roosenboom and van Dijk, 2009). Although it appears that 
companies operating in a poor legal environment can bond themselves to higher 
standards through a cross-listing (Black, 2001), it is doubtful that they can fully 
compensate for the lack of an adequate legal framework at the country-level. 
Examining corporate governance rankings for 495 firms across 25 emerging markets 
Klapper and Love (2004) find that “although we do find that firms can independently 
improve their investor protection and minority shareholder rights to a certain degree, 
this adjustment mechanism is a second best solution and does not fully substitute for 
the absence of a good legal infrastructure.” Moreover, smaller firms often do not have 
the alternative to go for a cross-listing or a foreign listing. Put differently, the first best 
solution for lowering the cost of capital is still the improvement of the country-level 
legal and institutional framework. Countries that want to offer their domestic firms 
cheaper access to external equity should therefore focus on reforming their legal 
system. 
Since our empirical results show that issuers in countries with a better legal 
system have lower costs to go public compared to issuers operating in a country with a 
weak legal system, further insights into the specific role of the legal and institutional 
framework are crucial in offering companies cheaper access to equity finance. The 
future research agenda should focus on at least three areas. First, a further 
decomposition of each legal and institutional parameter can provide more detailed 
insights into which specific aspects of the formal institutional framework matter the 
most to lower the cost of capital to firms. Second, while the law and finance literature 
analyzes cross-sectional variation in underpricing due to differences in the legal 
framework, future research should look into the evolution of the institutional 
framework through time and its impact on IPO underpricing. Chambers and Dimson 
(2009) examine IPO underpricing over the period from 1917 until 2007. Expanding this 
study to a larger sample of jurisdictions could provide further insights in the evolving 
                                                             
34 The bivariate correlation between anti self dealing index and US investors is -0.45 and between anti 
self dealing index and US banks -0.41. Similar results for rule of law index.  
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role of institutions on underpricing. Third, the law and finance literature mainly 
focuses on formal institutions and their impact on corporate finance. Chambers and 
Dimson (2009) suggest that the level of trust among investors, issuers, and sponsors 
plays a crucial role on the level of IPO underpricing over time in the United Kingdom. 
In period where they expect greater levels of trust, they find lower underpricing. 
Future research should therefore also look into informal institutions and their impact 
on underpricing, next to formal institutions. 
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Chapter 5. An institutions-based view of 
executive compensation: A multilevel meta-
analytic test35 
 
ABSTRACT 
Our study confirms the widely held theoretical expectation that executive 
compensation is positively associated with firm performance. Yet it also reveals 
considerable cross-country variability in this relationship, which we trace to formal 
institutions like the rule of law and investor protection provisions and to informal 
institutions like concentrated ownership patterns and codes of good corporate 
governance. A core finding of this study is that formal and informal institutions are 
complementary, as the focal relationship becomes stronger when concentrated owners 
have access to well-functioning courts, and when informal norms of good governance 
are buttressed by formal shareholder protection laws. 
5.1 Introduction 
Over the past two decades, public and academic interest in executive compensation 
has burgeoned in the wake of rapidly increasing compensation levels (Bebchuk & 
Grinstein, 2005; Murphy & Zábojník, 2004), new or new-in-context types of 
compensation (Buck, Liu, & Skovoroda, 2008; Fiss & Zajac, 2004), incidents involving 
gross executive overcompensation (Bebchuk & Fried, 2006; Wade, O’Reilly, & Pollock, 
2006; Yermack, 2006), and the catalytic role executive incentive contracts have 
allegedly played in the 2008-2009 global financial crisis (Bebchuk & Spamann, 2010; 
Bhagat & Romano, 2009). Much of the discussion focuses on the question of whether 
executives’ compensation packages can be justified in terms of their contribution to 
corporate financial performance (Devers, Cannella, Reilly, & Yoder, 2007; Gomez-
Mejia & Wiseman, 1997). Although some scholars have made highly invasive 
suggestions to limit executive compensation through caps, taxation, and 
proportionality measures (cf. Bhagat & Romano, 2009; Core & Guay, 2010), the 
                                                             
35 Paper by Van Essen, M., Heugens, P. P. M. A. R., van Oosterhout, H. & Otten, J. Paper is under 
review by Journal of International Business Studies (revise and resubmit, 2nd round). 
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dominant view in the literature remains that executives are “worth every nickel they 
get” as long as they are able to increase shareholders’ wealth (Murphy, 1986).  
According to the influential agency-theoretical view (Jensen & Murphy, 2010), 
an important function of executive compensation is to align the interests of executives 
with those of shareholders through the use of incentive plans that tie a considerable 
portion of executives’ remuneration to firm financial performance. This bonding of 
interests incentivizes executives to make value-enhancing decisions, which benefit 
shareholders and executives alike. Although the performance implications of executive 
compensation are central to the current debate, the bulk of empirical research has 
focused on the reverse relationship, as executive compensation can only perform its 
bonding role well when it is sufficiently sensitive to changes in firm performance. A 
stylized fact that has emerged from the numerous empirical studies that have been 
conducted on this topic in the U.S. context is that there is a modest but significant 
positive association between corporate financial performance and executive 
compensation (Tosi, Werner, Katz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2000). Through the present meta-
analytic study, which synthesizes observations from 29 countries around the world, 
we generalize this stylized fact across international contexts. More specifically, we find 
that the bivariate meta analytic mean correlation (ρ) for this relationship is 0.12 and 
significant. On the whole, this finding suggests that executives around the world are 
(modestly) incentivized to act in the interest of shareholders (Jensen & Murphy, 2010). 
 Yet what is obfuscated by this estimate of the mean ρ is that its strength differs 
substantially from case to case. Compensation scholars have mostly focused on the 
influence of firm-level moderators on the performance sensitivity of executive 
compensation, especially those suggested by agency theory and the corporate 
governance literature more generally (Devers et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 
1997). Studies exploring agency moderators scrutinize whether the focal relationship 
becomes stronger when the level of compensation executives receive is tied more 
closely to their attainment of financial and organizational goals (Jensen & Murphy, 
1990; Leone, Wu, & Zimmerman, 2006; Zajac & Westphal, 1995). Furthermore, studies 
focusing on broader corporate governance factors explore whether the focal 
relationship weakens in the presence of deficiencies in a firm’s governance setup, such 
as CEO duality and staggered or insider-dominated boards (Conyon & Peck, 1998; 
Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999; Murphy & Zábojník, 2004).  
In light of the currently available evidence, however, many observers have 
concluded that the field is rapidly reaching the limits of what can be explained in 
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terms of firm performance – executive compensation variability with the help of firm-
level corporate governance moderators (Barkema & Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Bebchuk & 
Fried, 2003). As the present study shows, the overall influence of such governance 
factors on the focal relationship is rather modest. After controlling for firm-level 
moderators through a partial correlation-based test (Doucouliagos & Ulubasoglu, 
2008), the mean ρ remains positive and significant at 0.08 (k = 2,415; N = 4,107,639), 
implying that the overall effect of the most commonly studied corporate governance 
variables on the strength of the firm performance – executive compensation 
association is unlikely to exceed 0.04 (i.e., the difference between the partial and 
bivariate mean correlations). A continued search for the effect of firm-level moderators 
distracts researchers’ attention from other but no less important influences on the focal 
relationship, especially those deriving from country-level institutions (Bruce, Buck, & 
Main, 2005; Fiss, 2008; Peng & Khoury, 2008; Sun, Zhao, & Yang, 2010). 
 A meta-analytic hierarchical linear modeling (HiLMMA; Raudenbush & Bryk, 
2002) test employed on all currently available evidence reveals that 25 percent of all 
variance in the firm performance – executive compensation relationship is attributable 
to country-level factors. For example, the focal relationship is comparatively weak in 
countries like the Netherlands (-0.06), Pakistan (-0.01), and the Philippines (0.02), about 
average in China (0.07), Japan (0.07), and the UK (0.07), and relatively strong in 
Finland (0.16), Germany (0.16), and New Zealand (0.16). Our aim in the present paper 
is to trace this cross-national variability to underlying institutional differences. Recent 
theorizing in the international business field (Bruce et al., 2005; Fiss, 2008; Peng & 
Khoury, 2008) has suggested the partitioning of country-level institutional influences 
into those deriving from formal institutions (e.g., the court system and corporate law) 
and from informal institutions (e.g., national culture and informal corporate 
governance norms). We theorize and test the influence of such formal and informal 
institutions on the focal relationship, and also take the interaction between both types 
of institutions into account. 
 The contributions of this study are threefold. First, it offers the most 
comprehensive synthesis of the executive compensation literature to date, updating 
the only previously published meta-analysis of the same relationship (Tosi et al., 2000) 
by adding another decade of research to the observation window and increasing the 
number of included studies from 42 to 332. Second, our study adds to the emerging 
tradition of assessing cumulative evidence in macro research (Combs, Ketchen, Crook, 
& Roth, 2010) through a pair of methodological extensions. It controls for the influence 
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of firm-level moderators on the focal relationship through the use of partial 
correlation-based effect sizes (Doucouliagos & Ulubaşoğlu, 2008; Stanley, 2005), and it 
accounts for the fact that observations from multiple national contexts cannot be 
regarded as a sample from a singular population through the application of 
hierarchical linear modeling techniques (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Snijders & Bosker, 
1999). Third, our study is the first to apply the emerging institutions-based view of 
international business strategy (Carney, Gedajlovic, Heugens, Van Essen, & van 
Oosterhout, 2010; Fiss, 2008; Heugens, Van Essen, & van Oosterhout, 2009; Peng, Sun, 
Pinkham, & Chen, 2009) to the phenomenon of executive compensation. It thereby 
extends this view’s empirical domain, while buttressing the executive compensation 
literature by providing it with novel theoretical underpinnings. More specifically, this 
study demonstrates that the association between firm performance and executive 
compensation is not universal, but that it is conditioned by formal and informal 
country-level institutions, as well as by interactions between these factors. 
5.2 Theory and Hypotheses 
5.2.1 Optimal contracting theory 
The classical framework for analyzing the firm performance – executive compensation 
relationship is provided by optimal contracting theory (Conyon & Murphy, 2000; 
Jensen & Murphy, 1990). In this economic view of executive compensation, the 
compensation-setting process is assumed to be a (quasi) arm’s length bargaining 
process between the executives of the firm on the one hand, and the Board of Directors 
(BoD) on the other (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003, 2004). The core prediction of this theory is 
that, due to disciplining potential of market forces (Gillan, 2006) operating in the 
market for corporate control (Hubbard & Palia, 1995), product markets (Aggarwal & 
Samwick, 1999), and the executive labor market (Ezzamel & Watson, 1998), this 
negotiation process will ultimately yield a performance-based contract. In such 
contracts, executive remuneration is made (partially) contingent on their achievement 
of financial and organizational goals set by the BoD (Aggarwal & Samwick, 1999).  
Because of the contingency structure of performance-based executive 
compensation contracts, executives are incentivized to forego self-serving goals like 
empire building (Williamson, 1964), unrelated diversification (Amihud & Lev, 1981), 
and hoarding excess free cash flow (Jensen, 1986), in order to focus on the realization 
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of value-enhancing strategic and operational objectives (Jensen, 2001). An optimal 
executive compensation contract is therefore geared towards a positive relationship 
between performance and compensation, such that changes in (relative) corporate 
performance will lead to adaptations to executive compensation in the same direction 
(Hall & Liebman, 1998; Jensen & Murphy, 1990). 
In spite of its popularity and theoretical elegance, there are problems 
associated with the optimal contracting lens, especially when it is used for studying 
the focal relationship in an international context. Since the vast majority of executive 
compensation studies rely on data derived from the U.S. context (in fact, 57 percent of 
all firm-year observations in our meta-analysis are drawn from U.S. samples), certain 
stylized facts about the U.S. economy and financial system have hidden from purview 
the fact that optimal contracting models incorporate a set of assumptions which do not 
necessarily hold in the international setting.  
First, the optimal contracting lens assumes that the contracting process is 
conditioned by market forces (Gillan, 2006) operative in the market for corporate 
control (Hubbard & Palia, 1995), product and service markets (Aggarwal & Samwick, 
1999), and the executive labor market (Ezzamel & Watson, 1998). Yet if these forces are 
not well-developed in a given national context, such that markets insufficiently 
discipline self-serving behaviors in executives, the predicted performance sensitivity of 
executive compensation may not obtain.  
Second, optimal contracting theory assumes the presence of well-functioning 
formal institutions for the effectuation of contracts (cf. Djankov, La Porta, López-de-
Silanes, & Shleifer, 2008; La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2002), Thus, 
when strong formal institutions are underdeveloped in a given context, the focal 
relationship may weaken because even well-designed contracts are vulnerable to ex-
post haggling and defection in the absence of well-functioning enforcement 
mechanisms.  
Third, optimal contracting theory downplays the role of informal institutions 
in effectuating a tighter performance – compensation link (Peng & Khoury, 2008; Peng 
et al., 2009). Due to its traditional focus on the formal legal underpinnings of executive 
contracts, it might underestimate the associational strength of the focal relationship in 
contexts where informal institutions dominate formal ones.  
Finally, the optimal contracting lens only considers two parties who 
participate in the compensation setting process: executives and the BoD. However, 
several other parties are documented to influence the sensitivity of executive 
 120 
 
compensation to firm performance, including employees (Cowherd & Levine, 1992), 
blockholders (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1995) and creditors (Mintz, 2005). In contexts 
other than the U.S., which are often typified by more organized labor, controlling 
owners, and more pronounced creditor-financing, a stronger focal relationship may 
obtain in spite of weak BoD.  
In light of these reservations, we expect that the optimal contracting lens, 
alone or in combination with agency or corporate governance theory, will not suffice 
to model cross-national variability in the relationship between firm performance and 
executive compensation. As a complementary view we therefore offer a 
conceptualization that is more sensitive to influence of institutional forces, and that is 
firmly grounded in the emerging institutions-based view of international business 
strategy (Carney et al., 2010; Fiss, 2008; Heugens et al., 2009; Meyer & Peng, 2005; 
Peng, 2002, 2003; Peng & Khoury, 2008; Teegen, Doh, & Vachani, 2004). Following 
North, we broadly define institutions as “humanly devised constraints that structure 
human interaction” (North, 1990: 3). More specifically, these overarching ‘rules of the 
game’ can be broken down into formal and informal institutions (Greif, 2006; North, 
1990). We conjecture that formal and informal institutions matter for the link between 
firm financial performance and executive compensation, as prior research has already 
demonstrated their importance for important organizational issues like foreign entry 
strategy (Delios & Henisz, 2003), business group effectiveness (Carney et al., 2010), 
diversification decisions (Peng, Lee, & Wang, 2005), initial public offering 
underpricing (Engelen & Van Essen, 2010), and foreign direct investment strategies 
(Globerman & Shapiro, 2003).  
5.2.2 Formal institutions 
Formal institutions are deliberately devised constraints to human action, usually 
created and actively maintained by the state, which function by sanctioning individual 
or corporate action through attaching rewards or punishments to alternative courses of 
behavior (Goodin, 1996). As such, formal institutions provide an incentive structure 
within which “managers and firms rationally pursue their interests and make choices” 
(Peng & Khoury, 2008: 260). Formal institutions intervene in most aspects of life in 
modern societies, and influence behavior literally from cradle to grave. The formal 
institutions that matter most to the firm performance – executive compensation 
relationship both involve (a) those that intervene in it directly by protecting the 
interests of corporate financiers, and (b) those that influence it indirectly by exposing 
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executives to alternate sources of performance and compliance pressure. We discuss 
both kinds of formal institutions here.  
A first set of formal institutions intervenes in the compensation setting 
process directly by protecting the interests of investors at the expense of the power of 
and the behavioral options open to executives (Klapper & Love, 2004; La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000b, 2002; Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003). The 
specific problem they address is that executives, whom are powerful insiders who 
enjoy both informational and decision-making advantages over relative outsiders like 
independent board members and minority shareholders (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; Leuz 
et al., 2003), are often able to divert substantial amounts of corporate wealth to 
themselves (Hart, 1995; Zingales, 1994) through self-benefiting and outsider-
disadvantaging actions like tunneling, empire building, and the consumption of 
perquisites (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 
2000; Yermack, 2006).  
Although jurisdictions differ in terms of the specific formal institutions they 
offer to curb such forms of managerial opportunism, these generally consist of three 
sets of rules. A first set involves the extent to which insiders are obliged to inform the 
public about self-benefiting transactions in which they are involved, for example 
through disclosure to the BoD or through external review by an independent auditor 
(Klapper & Love, 2004; Leuz et al., 2003). A second set concerns the degree to which 
insiders can be held accountable when their self-benefiting transactions hurt the 
interests of outsiders. It entails rights through which outsiders, like minority 
shareholders, can force executives to disgorge the profits deriving from self-serving 
transactions (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2006). The third set of rules 
captures the ease with which outsiders can engage in lawsuits against self-dealing 
insiders, regulating issues such as their access to relevant documents and the standard 
of proof for civil suits (Djankov et al., 2008). We expect the relationship between 
corporate performance and executive compensation to be stronger when these three 
rule sets are better developed, because they make it harder for executives to engage in 
outsider-disadvantaging behaviors. See Hypothesis 1.  
A second set of formal institutions is comparatively broad and generic, and 
concerns the overall development of a given jurisdiction’s legal system (Kaufmann, 
Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2009) and the effectiveness of its court system (Djankov, La Porta, 
López-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 2003) more specifically. Judicial development and court 
effectiveness intervene in the compensation determination process only indirectly, as 
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they constrain executives’ room to maneuver through the threat of legal action that 
parties like investor watchdog organizations (Rao & Sivakumar, 1999), institutional 
investors (David, Kochhar, & Levitas, 1998), blockholders (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 
1995), creditors (Mintz, 2005), and employees (Cowherd & Levine, 1992) can instigate 
against overly greedy executives (Cowherd & Levine, 1992; Lel & Miller, 2008; Mintz, 
2005). More generally, the risk of legal action that a well-functioning legal system may 
provide gives investor watchdog organizations, institutional investors, and 
blockholders leverage to initiate changes like installing independent compensation 
committees, increasing the proportion of long-term incentives, lowering overall 
compensation levels, and effectuating executive turnover (David et al., 1998; Defond & 
Hung, 2004). We therefore expect the focal relationship to be positively moderated by 
differences in judicial development and court effectiveness across jurisdictions. See 
Hypothesis 1: 
Hypothesis 1: The better developed the formal institutions in a 
given jurisdiction, the stronger the relationship 
between corporate performance and executive 
compensation. 
 
5.2.3 Informal institutions 
Informal institutions tend to emerge spontaneously in response to repeatedly 
encountered social or economic problems (such as executive overcompensation), are 
maintained through continuous reenactment in behavior rather than through formal 
rules or decrees, and are largely self-enforcing because the long-term value of 
complying with their prescriptions is ultimately larger than the short-run gain from 
breach for all parties participating in them (Klein 1985; Stiglitz, 2000; Sugden, 1989). 
Like formal institutions, informal institutions affect the payoffs executives face for 
alternative courses of action, but there are also important differences between the two 
institutional types.  
First, even though informal institutions are instrumental to the efficient 
allocation of material resources like financial, organizational, and human capital 
(Granovetter, 1985), they derive their regulatory potential largely from the 
manipulation of immaterial resources like reputation, legitimacy, and status 
(Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Klein, 1985). Second, whereas formal institutions tend 
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to rely on third-party enforcement mechanisms like courts or arbitrage bodies (Dyer & 
Singh, 1998), informal institutions make agreements self-enforcing by making explicit 
‘bright-line rules’ defining proper behavior (Black & Kraakman, 1996), which cannot 
be breached by executives without surrendering substantial “brand name capital” 
(Klein, 1985: 595), such as their personal reputation in the executive labor market. 
Several informal institutions have the potential to affect the firm performance – 
executive compensation relationship. These include: (a) ‘soft legislation’ provided by 
codes of good corporate governance (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2002; Denis & McConnell, 2003), and (b) ownership concentration, which has 
been found to function as a substitute governance mechanism when formal 
institutions protecting investors’ interests are underdeveloped (Heugens et al., 2009; 
Peng & Yiang, 2010).  
Although corporate governance codes may contain explicit and detailed 
norms and standards next to so-called ‘best practice’ recommendations (Aguilera & 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Heugens & Otten, 2007), they constitute an informal institution 
nevertheless. Similar to ‘soft law’ in general (Abbott & Snidal, 2000), they are often 
drafted by committees or working groups that have no formal legislative powers. 
Instead, these codes make explicit pre-existing normative expectations, even if these 
are not universally complied with. Furthermore, codes are almost never actively 
enforced, which is left to the media (Dyck & Zingales, 2002), investor watchdog 
organizations (Rao, Morrill, & Zald, 2000), reputation mechanisms (Dixit, 2004), and 
the market forces triggered by them (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2002). Even though these forces 
are informal and spontaneous, they still can secure a high level of compliance (Pellens, 
Hillebrandt, & Ulmer, 2001).  
Common to most codes is a call for structural reforms of the BoD, such as 
greater representation by outside directors, separation of the CEO and Chair roles, and 
the prevention of ‘staggered’ boards (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Denis & 
McConnell, 2003). Yet codes vary in terms of the mechanisms they propose to prevent 
executive overcompensation and to link compensation more tightly to corporate 
performance. Some codes provide elaborate and specific guidelines, whereas others 
provide very few of these or suggest only open-ended principles. In spite of this 
variation, most codes invoke a ‘comply or explain’ principle, which stipulates that 
even though compliance with code provisions on executive compensation is voluntary, 
non-compliance must be publicly explained and justified. Thus, when executives 
negotiate a contract that violates the remuneration principles of the local code of good 
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corporate governance, or when board members act as less vigilant monitors than what 
is expected of them by the code, they have to justify these actions publicly (Wade, 
Porac, & Pollock, 1997). In sum, we expect that the focal relationship will be positively 
moderated by the level of development of informal institutions like codes of good 
governance. See Hypothesis 2. 
Ownership concentration is commonly seen as an informal reaction to 
problems concerning managerial opportunism and executive overcompensation in 
jurisdictions which offer limited legal protection to minority investors (Denis & 
McConnell, 2003; Heugens et al., 2009; Peng & Yiang, 2010). In jurisdictions in which 
the formal institutions defending investors’ interests are well-developed, corporate 
owners might lack the incentive to effectively monitor executive behavior. Under these 
conditions, owners can afford to limit themselves to small ownership stakes in 
multiple individual companies in pursuit of optimally diversified investment 
portfolios, and leave the task of monitoring managers to courts, markets, and civil 
society (Gillan, 2006; Walsh & Seward, 1990).  
Yet in jurisdictions where such formal institutions are underdeveloped, 
owners must step in to monitor and discipline managers when they seek to 
appropriate corporate wealth and make their compensation less contingent upon their 
marginal contribution to shareholder value (Gomez-Mejia, Larazza-Kintana, & Makri, 
2003; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). This requires more concentrated ownership, however, 
because only large owners have both the motive and the means to effectively 
participate in corporate governance through direct access to management and the use 
of concentrated voting rights (David, Hitt, & Liang, 2007). Concentrated ownership is 
also a clear example of an informal institution: it emerges through spontaneous self-
organization (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001), manifests itself in unique and otherwise 
unobservable behaviors like the monitoring of managers by shareholders (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1986), and is wholly self-enforcing because of the economic value of 
concentrated corporate control (Dyck & Zingales, 2004). Because it represents a 
powerful disciplinary force with the potential to curb managerial opportunism, we 
expect the focal relationship to be moderated positively by the level of ownership 
concentration in a given jurisdiction. See Hypothesis 2: 
Hypothesis 2: The better developed the informal institutions in 
a given jurisdiction, the stronger the relationship 
between corporate performance and executive 
compensation. 
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5.2.4 Interactions between formal and informal institutions 
All countries host both formal and informal institutions, but their development does 
not always go hand-in-hand. Some societies have strongly developed formal 
institutions, but face deteriorating informal institutions (Paxton, 1999; Putnam, 1995). 
Other nations have a thriving system of informal institutions, but are confronted with 
ailing formal ones (Fukuyama, 2001; Woolcock, 1998). These casual observations raise 
the question of how formal and informal institutions are related, and how they jointly 
affect the firm performance – executive compensation relationship. Two competing 
views exist on this topic.  
The first view is that formal and informal institutions are substitutes,36 in the 
sense that they can independently bolster the focal relationship, but are rarely 
simultaneously effective in promoting desirable forms of behavior. This is because 
formal and informal institutions may create conflicting expectations with those whose 
actions they seek to guide and constrain. This may result in a lack of normative 
guidance (Martin, Cullen, Johnson, & Parboteeah, 2007), in which strategic and 
opportunistic behaviors may flourish. Conflicting normative expectations are 
especially likely to occur between formal and informal institutions, because the latter 
are predicated on relational exchange models in which the identity of exchange 
partners matters, whereas the former aim to support more anonymous forms of 
exchange that avoid precisely the relational ties and social mechanisms that make 
relational exchange models work (Dixit, 2004; Gilson, 2007). Second, there are 
irrecoverable costs and inefficiencies associated with having parallel institutional 
structures (Peng et al., 2009; Stiglitz, 2000).  
Several researchers have observed that in the early stages of their 
development, many societies thrive on the development of informal institutions like 
social capital, networks, aggregations of reputations, and organizational capital (Greif, 
2005; Stiglitz, 2000). In the words of Peng and Khoury: “when formal constraints are 
absent or incomplete, informal constraints intervene to mitigate uncertainty and 
provide a guide to managers” (2008: 261). As societies develop, however, these 
informal institutions tend to become replaced with more formal institutions that 
facilitate anonymous forms of market exchange, such as specialized courts, corporate 
law, and representative forms of governance (Glaeser, La Porta, López-de-Silanes, & 
                                                             
36 Peng and Khoury call them “compensatory structures” (2008: 261). 
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Shleifer, 2004; Stiglitz, 2000). Commonly, this process leads to a decline in the overall 
level of development and usage of informal institutions (Paxton, 1999; Putnam, 1995).  
In countries in which formal and informal institutions jointly flourish, both 
institutional types can begin to work at cross-purposes through the creation of 
institutional contradictions, regulative redundancies, and rising costs of compliance 
(Black & Kraakman, 1996). It is commonly accepted that factors that can potentially 
weaken the performance – compensation association (such as moral hazard, executive 
entrenchment, and incentive problems), can be addressed successfully either by formal 
or informal institutions (Glaeser et al., 2004; Greif, 2006; Stiglitz, 2000). However, the 
continued simultaneous development of both institutional types may over time 
negatively affect the ability of a given society’s institutions to address these factors, 
and thus weaken the focal relationship. This will especially be the case when 
competing and redundant institutional structures offer executives conflicting forms of 
‘institutional guidance’ (Peng & Khoury, 2008; Peng et al., 2009), which creates room 
for strategic and opportunistic executive behaviors. See Hypothesis 3a: 
Hypothesis 3a: The effectiveness of formal institutions in terms 
of establishing a stronger relationship between 
corporate performance and executive compensation 
will decrease in the presence of well-developed 
informal institutions, and vice versa. 
 
The second view holds that formal and informal institutions are complementary, in that 
the development of one type improves the effectiveness of the other (and vice versa), 
and that this joint development is conducive to economic development in general and 
to curbing the problems of executive opportunism and overcompensation more 
specifically (Aoki, 2001; Knack & Keefer, 1997). More concisely put: “One set of 
institutions is said to be complementary to another when its presence raises the returns 
available from the other” (Hall & Gingerich, 2009: 450). Several scholars have pointed 
out that especially the effectiveness of formal institutions critically depends on the 
development of informal institutions (Aoki, 2001; Hall & Soskice, 2001). In the words 
of North: “While the formal rules can be changed overnight, the informal rules change 
only gradually. Since it is the [informal] norms that provide the essential ‘legitimacy’ 
to any set of formal rules, revolutionary change is never as revolutionary as its 
supporters desire” (1995: 25). However, comparative studies have also shown that 
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informal institutions require formal institutions to flourish, and that trust, civic norms, 
and social capital are stronger in countries with better developed economic 
institutions, legal structures, and representative forms of governance (Hall & 
Gingerich, 2009; Knack & Keefer, 1997).  
The institutional complementarities thesis can similarly be applied to our focal 
relationship. A legal system can more effectively provide formal judicial remedies 
against undesirable forms of executive self-dealing when the informal norms provided 
by corporate governance codes make explicit clear standards of behavior that 
aggrieved parties and judges can refer to in litigation and jurisprudence. Similarly, 
informal institutions such as ownership concentration become more effective when 
blockholders can enforce their interests through a well-functioning legal system. In 
sum, the combined and balanced development of both formal and informal 
institutions will strengthen the focal relationship in ways that are unattainable by 
means of a more specialized development of either institutional type. See Hypothesis 
3b: 
Hypothesis 3b: The effectiveness of formal institutions in terms 
of establishing a stronger relationship between 
corporate performance and executive compensation 
will increase in the presence of well-developed 
informal institutions, and vice versa. 
5.3 Methods  
5.3.1 Sample and coding 
To identify the maximum number of international studies on the relationship between 
firm performance and executive compensation, we used five complementary search 
strategies. First, we read several review articles (e.g. Barkema & Gomez-Mejia, 1998; 
Core, Guay & Larcker, 2003; Devers et al., 2007; Murphy, 1999; Werner & Ward, 2004) 
and one prior meta-analysis (Tosi et al., 2000). Second, we examined five electronic 
databases: (1) ABI/INFORM Global, (2) EconLit, (3) Google Scholar, (4) JSTOR, and (5) 
SSRN, using the following search terms: ‘compensation’, ‘incentives’, ‘pay’, 
‘remuneration’, ‘salary’, and ‘stock option’. Third, we manually searched 25 journals in 
the fields of accounting, economics, finance, and management. Illustrative examples 
include: Academy of Management Journal; Administrative Science Quarterly; Journal of 
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Accounting Research; Journal of Finance; Journal of Financial Economics; Journal of 
International Business Studies; and Strategic Management Journal. Fourth, we used a two-
way ‘snowballing’ technique that involved backward-tracing all references reported in 
previously identified articles and forward-tracing all articles that cited these articles 
using Google Scholar and ISI Web of Knowledge. Fifth, we corresponded with 82 
authors that had written papers on executive compensation with missing effect size 
information, asking them for a correlation table, regression output, and any studies we 
could not retrieve by other means. These efforts yielded a final sample of 332 primary 
studies, consisting of 246 published and 86 unpublished studies. See Appendix C for 
bibliographical details.  
 We proceeded to read all retrieved articles and we developed a coding 
protocol (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001) for extracting data on relevant variables. We 
collected information on effect sizes and sample sizes. We differentiated between two 
types of firm financial performance: ‘accounting performance’ and ‘market 
performance’; between two frequently used measures of overall executive 
remuneration: ‘total cash’ and ‘total pay’; and between three identities of 
compensation recipients: ‘CEO’, ‘other executives’, and ‘mixed executives and other 
senior corporate officials’. To test our hypotheses, we collected additional covariates 
capturing formal and informal institutional development from secondary sources. One 
author coded all effect sizes. To assess agreement in extracting information from 
primary studies, another author independently coded a sub-sample of 153 randomly 
selected effect sizes. We then computed a chance agreement-corrected measure of 
inter-rater reliability (Cohen’s kappa coefficient; Cohen, 1960). The kappa value we 
obtained was 0.94, signifying a high degree of inter-rater reliability.  
5.3.2 HOMA procedure 
We used Hedges and Olkin-type meta-analysis (HOMA; Hedges & Olkin, 1985) to 
capture the associational strength of the focal relationship around the world. HOMA 
refers to a set of statistical procedures for calculating the meta-analytic mean 
correlation between two variables as well as the corresponding confidence interval 
(Hedges & Olkin, 1985; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). The data used in HOMA are effect 
sizes capturing the associational strength of the focal relationship in a given sample, 
such as the partial correlation coefficient rxy.z or Pearson product-moment correlation r. 
In this study we rely on both rxy.z and r. When studies reported different effect size 
statistics, such as Cohen’s standardized means difference measure d, we converted 
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them back to r and rxy.z values using the appropriate formulas (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). 
We predominantly rely on rxy.z, because in many of the fields contributing to the 
literature on executive compensation (such as finance and accounting), reporting r is 
not customary. When r was missing we could usually still compute rxy.z ourselves, 
based on the t-statistics and degrees of freedom reported in primary studies (Greene, 
2008).37 An additional benefit of using rxy.z is that it allows for a test of causality by 
controlling for endogeneity and firm characteristics.38 In our case, rxy.z captures the 
association between firm performance (X) and executive compensation (Y), given a set 
of n control variables (Z). The z-vector in executive remuneration studies typically 
contains variables like firm size, firm risk, and some CEO characteristics (Devers et al., 
2007).  
 An important question in HOMA is how to deal with studies that contain 
multiple measurements of the focal effect (Bijmolt & Pieters, 2001). Focal effect 
multiplicity may occur when results are reported for different simultaneous 
operationalizations of firm performance (e.g., accounting profits and market 
valuation), executive compensation (e.g., total cash and total compensation), or 
recipient identity (e.g., CEO and other executives). The issue at stake here is the trade-
off between stochastic independence of effect sizes and the use of all available 
information. A Monte Carlo simulation by Bijmolt and Pieters (2001) shows that 
procedures using the complete set of measurements outperform those representing 
each study by only a single value (such as a single best indicator or a composite 
measure) in areas like parameter significance testing and parameter estimation 
accuracy. We therefore included all available effect sizes in our study. 
Since HOMA procedures assume that effect sizes are normally distributed, we 
used Fisher’s (1928) Zr-transformation to correct for skewness in the effect size 
                                                             
37 Partial correlations are computed as follows: √(t2/ (t2+df)), where t is the t-statistic and df is degrees 
of freedom. Note that this will always produce a positive number, so it is necessary to convert it to a 
negative number if the regression coefficient is negative (see: Greene, 2008: Chapter 3). t-values result 
from the scaling of primary coefficients by their respective standard errors. They are by definition 
standardized and defined on a dimensionless scale. 
38 In econometrics, the problem of endogeneity occurs when the independent variable is correlated 
with the error term in a regression model, or when the dependent variable (i.e., the executive 
compensation measure) simultaneously affects the independent variable (i.e., firm performance) 
(Bhagat & Jefferis, 2002). There are several accepted methods of controlling for endogeneity. 
Endogeneity-conscious researchers usually use a fixed or random effects panel data model, and 
calculate instrumental variables using two- or three-stages least squares (2/3SLS) or the generalized 
method of moments (GMM) (Sánchez-Ballesta & García-Meca, 2007). 
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distribution (Hedges & Olkin, 1985).39 In line with current conventions, we used 
random-effects HOMA for combining study estimates (Geyskens, Krishnan, 
Steenkamp, & Cunha, 2009; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). To estimate the mean effect 
size appropriately, differences in precision across effect sizes have to be accounted for, 
so we weighted effect sizes by their inverse variance weight w (Hedges & Olkin, 1985): 
the inverse of their squared standard error.40 We also used these weights to calculate 
the standard error of the mean effect size and its confidence interval.41  
5.3.3 HiLMMA procedure 
The structure of the dataset we have compiled to test our hypotheses is essentially 
hierarchical: individual estimates of the focal effect are nested in national jurisdictions 
(conventionally labeled ‘level 1’ and ‘level 2’ respectively; cf. Raudenbush & Bryk, 
2002). To assess whether primary study results are consistent across jurisdictions, and 
if not, whether study result variability can be ascribed to institutional effects, it is most 
appropriate to use estimation methods based on the hierarchical linear model, referred 
                                                             
39 Fisher’s Zr transformed correlations are calculated as follows: ¹¸
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to here as meta-analytic hierarchical linear modeling (HiLMMA; Hox, 2002; 
Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Snijders & Bosker, 1999). 
We use HiLMMA to distinguish between two components of variation in the 
retrieved effect size distribution. The first component arises from sampling error at the 
level of the individual effect estimates. If these estimates are based on relatively large 
samples (n > 30; cf. Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002: 207), the sampling distribution will 
approximate normality and have a known sample size-related variance. In HiLMMA, 
the meta-analyst is thus presented with a series of independent effect size estimates 
with a known variance at level 1, equaling the inverse variance weight w (Hedges, 
1982; Hedges & Olkin, 1985).42 A second variance component represents systematic 
inconsistencies in the effect size distribution, which can be attributed in subsequent 
HiLMMA model specifications to variables measured at both levels 1 and 2.  
We use restricted maximum likelihood (RML) estimation to assess the 
relationship between effect size and predictor variables, as suggested by Bijmolt and 
Pieters (2001) on the basis of a Monte Carlo simulation study. RML is to be favored 
over full maximum likelihood (FML) estimation, as FML tends to yield biased 
parameter estimates because it treats regression coefficients as fixed but unknown 
quantities when the variance components are estimated, but it does not account for the 
degrees of freedom lost by estimating these fixed effects (Hox, 2002). RML, in contrast, 
estimates the variance components after removing the fixed effects from the model, 
which produces parameter estimates with less bias (Hox, 2002).  
While our hypotheses do not play out at level 1, we still incorporate several 
control variables at this level, predominantly methodological moderators of the focal 
effect. As our hypotheses concern the harmonizing effect on compensation structures 
of the formal and informal institutions in each national context (as well as the 
interactions between them), we will model institutional variables as our primary level 
2 predictors, complemented by predominantly substantive control variables. The 
primary advantage of using HiLMMA instead of more conventional meta-analytic 
regression analysis (or MARA; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001) is that it explicitly recognizes 
and corrects for the hierarchical structure of meta-analytic data, and can precisely 
compute the explanatory power of level 2 institutional factors with respect to 
individual estimates of the focal effect (Hox, 2002). In more formal terms our level 1 
model is expressed as: 
                                                             
42 Raudenbush and Bryk therefore label HiLMMA as a “level-1 variance-known (or V-known) 
application” (2002: 207). 
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ijijjjij eXY  110 EE  
the level 2 model as: 
jjj uZ 0101000  JJE  
101 JE  j  
and the integrated model as: 
 
where: 
ijY  = effect size i nested in jurisdiction j; 
β = level 1 parameter estimate; 
X = level 1 predictor variable; 
e = level 1 error term; 
γ = level 2 parameter estimate; 
Z = level 2 predictor variable; 
u = level 2 error term. 
 
Variables. To test Hypothesis 1, we used two level 2 formal institutional 
variables. The investor protection index measures the extent to which the formal 
institutions in a jurisdiction protect minority shareholders against misuse of corporate 
assets by executives and large owners (Djankov et al., 2008; Klapper & Love, 2004; 
source: www.doingbusiness.org). The rule of law index captures the extent to which 
people have confidence in and abide by the formal rules of society (source: Kaufmann 
et al., 2009). To test Hypothesis 2, we used two level 2 informal institutional variables. 
We created a soft law index ourselves on the basis of a content analysis of the codes of 
good governance (codes retrieved from: www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php) of all 29 
countries in our dataset. The index ranges from 0 to 15 and is formed by adding 1 for 
each of 15 preselected measures43 the code proposes to attenuate executive 
                                                             
43 A point is added to a given country’s score on our soft law index when its code of good governance 
calls for: (1) separation of the CEO and Chair functions; (2) majority of independent directors on the 
BoD; (3) majority of non-executive directors on the BoD; (4) performance evaluations of executives by 
an independent committee and/or externals; (5) disclosure of the firm’s executive remuneration policy; 
(6) an independent nominating committee; (7) an independent remuneration committee; (8) disclosure 
of the rules of operation of the remuneration committee; (9) disclosure of the total compensation 
received by each executive; (10) a direct link between firm performance criteria and executive 
compensation; (11) proportionality between the fixed and variable components of executive 
compensation; (12) disclosure of the principles of the retirement plan for executives; (13) disclosure of 
the principles for setting the exit bonus in case of premature contract termination; (14) disclosure of 
jijjijij ueZXY 010111000  JJJ
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compensation levels or increase the elasticity of the firm performance – executive 
compensation association. Ownership concentration entails the degree to which firm 
ownership is concentrated in the hands of large owners, measured as the fraction of all 
firms in a given jurisdiction with large blockholders in their ownership structure 
(source: authors, 2010).  
To test Hypotheses 3a and 3b, we included two product terms linking formal 
to informal institutions: (1) investor protection index × soft law index, and (2) rule of 
law index × ownership concentration. Prior to multiplication, we grand-mean centered 
the institutional variables to facilitate subsequent interpretation of their product terms 
and avoid multicollinearity (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002: 31ff). 
 To ensure the robustness of our results against other jurisdiction-level 
influences, we included several level 2 control variables. As executive compensation is 
known to be influenced by national culture (Pennings, 1993; Tosi & Greckhamer, 2004), 
we control for power distance, individualism, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance 
(source: www.geert-hofstede.com). Furthermore, because executive compensation 
levels and structures are known to change when firms use compensation consultants 
(Baker, Jensen, & Murphy, 1988; Conyon, Peck, & Sadler, 2009), we controlled for pay 
consultants by dividing the total number of offices operated by the four major 
compensation consultancy firms (Hay Group, Hewitt, Mercer, and Towers Perrin in a 
given jurisdiction by the natural log of its per capita gross domestic product. To correct 
for the effect of affluence on compensation, we also control for the natural log of per 
capita gross domestic product itself. 
 To control for the influence of methodological and measurement artifacts on 
effect sizes, we included several level 1 control variables. To test for the “file drawer 
problem” (Rosenthal, 1979), we included a dummy variable denoting whether a study 
was published (1) or not (0). To control for the possibility that the focal relationship is 
weakening over time (Gregg, Machin, & Szymanski, 1993), we added the median year 
of the sample window. We included each publication outlet’s five-year ISI impact 
factor to control for publication outlet status effects. To assess whether publication 
traditions vary across academic fields, we included separate dummy variables to 
identify effect sizes as stemming from an accounting journal, economics journal, 
finance journal, management journal, or otherwise. To correct for data collection 
design, we included a dummy variable indicating whether a given effect size was 
                                                                                                                                                          
stock options granted to executives; (15) a minimum exercise window of 3 years for stock options. 
Country score data is available from the authors. 
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based on panel (1) or cross-sectional (0) data. We also included a dummy variable 
coded as (1) when an effect size was derived from a study controlling for the possible 
endogeneity of firm performance on executive compensation, and as (0) otherwise. To 
test for the moderating effect of focal variable operationalizations, we added dummy 
variables indicating whether firm performance was measured as accounting (1) or as 
market (0) performance, whether executive compensation was measured as total cash 
(1) or total compensation (0), and whether the compensation was received by the CEO, 
other executives, or mixed executives and other senior corporate officials. We also 
included dummy variables measuring whether the effect size derived from a 
sensitivity analysis measuring the responsiveness of compensation to performance 
changes (1) or otherwise (0) and whether performance variable measurement lagged 
compensation variable measurement (1) or was performed concurrently (0). Finally, to 
control for industry effects, we controlled for the two industries for which sector-
specific results were available: banking and real estate. 
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 HOMA results 
Table 1 shows the rxy.z -based and r-based HOMA results for the focal relationship. 
They reveal a modest but positive and significant association between firm 
performance and executive compensation (rxy.z -based mean ρ = 0.08; r-based mean ρ = 
0.12). The difference between both estimates results from the fact that the rxy.z -based 
mean ρ accounts for the influence of the control variables contained in the z-vector, 
which yields a more precise estimate of the mean effect (Stanley, 2005). Saliently, 
however, the level of heterogeneity in the effect size distribution is considerable (rxy.z 
distribution: Q = 24,515, I2 = 0.90; r distribution: Q = 9,823, I2 = 0.94). Under these 
conditions, the mean ρ is best interpreted as an average rather than a common true 
correlation value (Hedges & Olkin, 1985: 235), implying that further moderator 
analyses are needed. Further inspection of especially the rxy.z–based results shows that 
differential operationalizations of the focal variables are not capable of explaining the 
detected heterogeneity, as neither the chosen performance measure (accounting-based 
= 0.08 vs. market-based = 0.08), recipient identity (CEO =0.08 vs. other executive = 
0.07), nor compensation measure (total cash = 0.09 vs. total pay = 0.07) meaningfully 
moderates the focal relationship. 
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Table 2 shows the country-specific HOMA results for the focal relationship. These and 
all subsequent analyses are rxy.z-based, as a synthesis of these effect sizes offers a more 
precise estimate of the true mean effect size and greater statistical power than one 
based on r (Stanley, 2005). Even casual inspection reveals the presence of jurisdiction-
level moderating effects, as the cross-national differences in the associational strength 
of the focal relationship are substantial. If we take a bandwidth of 0.03 around the 
mean ρ as the margin, we find that 15 out of the 29 countries represented in our sample 
are fairly close to the mean ρ (Australia = 0.06, Canada = 0.05, China = 0.07, Czech 
Republic = 0.06, Denmark = 0.05 (n.s.), Greece = 0.05, India = 0.07, Italy = 0.06, Japan = 
0.07, Norway = 0.05, South Korea = 0.06, Spain = 0.09, Switzerland = 0.11, UK = 0.07, 
U.S. = 0.10). These countries represent a middle group in which executive 
compensation is moderately contingent upon firm performance. Yet the focal 
relationship is weaker and occasionally even negative in a group of 9 other countries 
(Bulgaria = 0.04, Hong Kong = 0.03, Malaysia = 0.00 (n.s.), The Netherlands = -0.06, 
Pakistan = -0.01 (n.s.), The Philippines = 0.02 (n.s.), Russia = 0.04 (n.s.), Sweden = 0.02 
(n.s.), Taiwan = 0.04 (n.s.)). Here, executives are less incentivized to maximize firm 
performance, and enjoy more discretion to engage in self-serving behavior. In a final 
group of 5 countries (Finland = 0.16, Germany = 0.16, Israel = 0.14, New Zealand = 
0.16, Portugal = 0.15), the focal relationship is stronger. In these contexts, executive 
compensation is more closely tied to firm performance. 
5.4.2 HiLMMA results 
Table 3 shows the rxy.z -based HiLMMA results. Model 1 contains only level 1 
predictors. Model 2 displays the results for Hypotheses 1 and 2. It contains level 1 
predictors, as well as the direct effects of all level 2 predictors. Model 3 reports the 
results for Hypotheses 3a and 3b. It is composed of all level 1 and 2 predictors, as well 
as the two interaction terms. The models fit the data well. A one-way random effects 
ANOVA analysis reveals that the intraclass correlation coefficient is 0.25, implying 
that a quarter of the variability in the effect size contribution is between countries and 
three quarters is within countries. Table 3 shows that the chosen level 2 predictors in 
Model 2 explain 45 percent of the between-country variance, and that the explanatory 
power at this level increases to 49 percent when the interaction terms are added to the 
equation in Model 3. The level 1 predictors explain between 35 percent and 37 percent 
of the within-country variance across the three models. 
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Table 2: Country-Specific HOMA Resultsa,b 
 
a k = number of effect sizes; N = total sample size; mean ρ = estimate of population correlation; SEρ = 
standard error of mean ρ; Q = Cochran’s homogeneity test statistic; I2 = scale-free index of 
heterogeneity. 
b Mean effect sizes marked with an asterisk (*) are statistically significant (p <0.05). 
Criteria k N Mean ρ SE Q test I2 
Australia 247 158,381 0.06* 0.01 832* 0.70 
Bulgaria 10 5,243 0.04* 0.01 3 0.00 
Canada 32 47,122 0.05* 0.01 179* 0.83 
China 180 433,402 0.07* 0.00 922* 0.81 
Czech Republic 6 5,988 0.06* 0.02 8 0.38 
Denmark 8 8,948 0.05 0.03 51* 0.86 
Finland 24 8,228 0.16* 0.01 14 0.00 
Germany 24 22,492 0.16* 0.01 40* 0.43 
Greece 44 5,544 0.05* 0.02 80* 0.46 
Hong Kong 52 72,672 0.03* 0.01 171* 0.70 
India 24 24,274 0.07* 0.02 151* 0.85 
Israel 9 6,264 0.14* 0.01 4 0.00 
Italy 27 40,819 0.06* 0.01 60* 0.57 
Japan 104 165,206 0.07* 0.01 638* 0.84 
Malaysia 16 10,119 0.00 0.02 43* 0.65 
Netherlands 29 10,654 -0.06* 0.02 115* 0.76 
New Zealand 37 6,096 0.16* 0.04 291* 0.87 
Norway 19 3,179 0.05* 0.02 12 0.00 
Pakistan 2 1,140 -0.01 0.03 1 0.00 
Philippines 4 1,092 0.02 0.04 5 0.40 
Portugal 8 1,040 0.15* 0.03 8 0.13 
Russia 16 6,782 0.04 0.02 25 0.40 
South Korea 14 7,574 0.06* 0.01 7 0.00 
Spain 43 10,578 0.09* 0.02 154* 0.73 
Sweden 64 18,608 0.02 0.01 108* 0.42 
Switzerland 34 4,191 0.11* 0.04 186* 0.82 
Taiwan 29 18,985 0.04 0.02 100* 0.72 
UK 277 593,633 0.07* 0.00 1,259* 0.78 
U.S. 987 2,351,582 0.10* 0.00 16,738* 0.94 
Mixed 45 57,803 0.02* 0.01 162* 0.73 
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The results in Model 2 confirm Hypothesis 1. The investor protection index 
positively moderates the focal relationship (p < 0.10), implying that executive 
compensation is more closely tied to firm performance in countries where the interests 
of minority shareholders are protected by formal institutions. Likewise, the rule of law 
index strengthens the relationship between performance and compensation (p < 0.05), 
suggesting that executives are more likely to maximize firm value in countries with a 
better developed formal legal system.  
Model 2 results also provide support for Hypothesis 2. Our self-compiled soft 
law index positively moderates the focal relationship (p < 0.10), suggesting that 
executive compensation becomes more contingent on corporate performance in 
contexts with stronger informal norms regulating executive compensation. Also, 
ownership concentration bolsters the association between performance and 
compensation (p < 0.05), meaning that large owners are effective monitors of executive 
conduct.  
Finally, the results in Model 3 confirm Hypothesis 3b, thereby rejecting 
Hypothesis 3a. The product term of the investor protection index and the soft law 
index is positive and significant (p < 0.10), suggesting that formal (minority) 
shareholder protection rules become a more effective deterrent of managerial 
opportunism when they are buttressed by strong informal norms condemning such 
behaviors, and vice versa. Furthermore, the non-significant direct effect of the soft law 
index in Model 3 implies that codes of good governance have no direct effect on the 
performance – compensation association when a country’s score on the investor 
protection index equals the grand mean (cf. Aiken & West, 1991). Similarly, the 
product term of rule of law index and ownership concentration is positive and 
significant (p < 0.01), implying that large owners will be better able to effectuate a 
stronger focal relationship when courts acknowledge and effectuate their voting rights. 
The non-significant direct effects of the rule of law and ownership concentration 
variables in Model 3 indicate that neither variable significantly moderates the focal 
relationship when the value of the other equals the grand mean in a given context (cf. 
Aiken & West, 1991). In short, both formal and informal institutions matter for the 
relationship between firm performance and executive compensation, and the two 
institutional types are to be understood as complements, not as substitutes. 
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5.4.3 Control variable results 
Table 3 also shows the results for our level 1 and level 2 control variables. At level 2, 
the national culture variables confirm that national culture influences the focal 
relationship (Pennings, 1993; Tosi & Greckhamer, 2004), although only the negative 
significant result for individualism is robust. The masculinity and uncertainty 
avoidance variables, which are reported to be less salient for executive compensation 
(Tosi & Greckhamer, 2004), had to be dropped from the analysis in Model 3 due to 
limited degrees of freedom at level 2. The positive significant result for pay consultants 
implies that the use of these intermediaries indeed helps BoDs effectuate performance-
based compensation contracts (Baker et al., 1988; Conyon et al., 2009). The negative 
significant result for natural log of per capita gross domestic product suggests that 
compensation is less performance-dependent in more affluent societies. At level 1, the 
significant positive effect for the published variable indicates that the “file drawer 
problem” (Rosenthal, 1979) is present in the executive compensation field, implying 
that studies identifying greater effects have a better chance at being published. The 
significant negative result for median year of the sample window suggests that the link 
between performance and compensation has weakened over time (Gregg et al., 1993).  
The significant positive result for five-year ISI impact factor indicates that 
confirmatory publication biases are more pronounced in higher status journals. In 
terms of disciplinary biases, focal relationship infirming studies appear to be favored 
amongst economists, whereas focal relationship conforming studies are favored 
amongst management scholars. The methodological panel and endogeneity variables 
did not moderate the focal relationship.  
The HiLMMA results for the accounting, total cash, CEO, and executives 
variables are wholly consistent with those reported in the first panel of Table 1. The 
positive significant result for compensation to performance changes indicates that 
studies using change variables tend to identify stronger focal effects, which may well 
be a statistical artifact (cf. Bergh & Fairbank, 2002). The negative significant result for 
the lagged performance measurement variable suggests that executive compensation 
is more appropriately conceptualized as an ex-post reward than as an ex-ante incentive 
(Jensen & Murphy, 2010). The sector variables show that executive compensation is 
more contingent upon performance in the banking sector than elsewhere. 
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Table 3: HiLMMA Results 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Constant 0.05 (0.01)*** 0.06 (0.01)*** 0.06 (0.01)*** 
Level 1 predictors    
Published 0.04 (0.02)** 0.04 (0.02)** 0.04 (0.02)** 
Median year sample window -0.001 (0.00)*** -0.001 (0.00)*** -0.001 (0.00)*** 
Five-year ISI impact factor 0.004 (0.00)*** 0.004 (0.00)*** 0.004 (0.00)*** 
Accounting journal -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) 
Economics journal  -0.04 (0.01)*** -0.04 (0.01)*** -0.03 (0.01)*** 
Finance journal -0.00 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00)* -0.01 (0.00)* 
Management journal 0.03 (0.01)*** 0.03 (0.01)*** 0.03 (0.01)*** 
Panel design -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
Endogeneity check -0.02 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) 
Accounting performance  -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.01) 
Total cash compensation    0.02 (0.01)** 0.01 (0.00)** 0.02 (0.01)** 
CEO pay identity 0.03 (0.01)*** 0.03 (0.01)*** 0.03 (0.01)*** 
Executive pay identity 0.03 (0.01)*** 0.03 (0.01)*** 0.04 (0.01)*** 
Change variables used 0.02 (0.01)*** 0.02 (0.01)*** 0.02 (0.01)*** 
Lagged  -0.05 (0.01)*** -0.05 (0.01)*** -0.05 (0.01)*** 
Banking 0.05 (0.02)*** 0.05 (0.02)*** 0.05 (0.02)*** 
Real estate 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 
Level 2 predictors    
Investor protection index  0.001 (0.00)* 0.001 (0.00)* 
Rule of law index   0.06 (0.03)** -0.06 (0.06) 
Soft law index  0.004 (0.002)* -0.01 (0.01) 
Ownership concentration  0.18 (0.06)** -0.10 (0.12) 
Power distance  -0.002 (0.00)** -0.00 (0.00) 
Individualism  -0.002 (0.00)** -0.002 (0.00)** 
Masculinity  0.00 (0.00)  
Uncertainty avoidance   -0.00 (0.00)  
Pay consultants  0.56 (0.17)*** 0.38 (0.12)*** 
Natural log of per capita GDP  -0.03 (0.01)** -0.02 (0.01)** 
Investor protection index * soft law index   0.02 (0.01)* 
Rule of law index * ownership 
concentration 
  0.19 (0.06)*** 
Level 1 observations 2,370 2,370 2,370 
Level 2 observations 29  29  29  
Intraclass correlation coefficient .25 .25 .25 
R2 within countries 0.35 0.37 0.37 
R2 between countries 0.00 0.45 0.49 
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5.5 Discussion  
5.5.1 Generalizing the focal relationship 
Our study offers the most comprehensive synthesis of the executive compensation 
literature to date. Based on our analyses of a synthetic dataset comprised of more than 
four million primary observations, we retrieved a positive significant rxy.z -based mean 
ρ of 0.08 for the relationship between firm performance and executive compensation. 
This finding has two implications for future compensation studies. First, we 
recommend compensation scholars to accept a modest positive association between 
firm performance and executive compensation as a stylized fact (Helfat, 2007). This 
implies a reduced emphasis on mustering further empirical evidence in support of the 
focal relationship, except perhaps for less well-researched national contexts. Second, 
the Q (Hedges & Olkin, 1985) and I2 (Higgins, Thompson, Deeks, & Altman, 2003) tests 
for homogeneity (Table 1) both show that the effect size distribution is very 
heterogeneous. As a separate one-way random effects ANOVA analysis (Raudenbush 
& Bryk, 2002) reveals that 25 percent of that heterogeneity is between countries, 
researchers will benefit from refocusing their efforts towards comparative studies 
exploring institutional influences on executive compensation.  
5.5.2 Methodological innovations 
Meta-analyses have long been an accepted research methodology in micro disciplines 
such as organizational behavior, but recently they have also become increasingly 
popular in macro disciplines like strategic management and international business 
(Combs et al., 2010). Macro research has its own distinct challenges, however, which 
call for adaptations in meta-analytic research practices. Our study pioneers two such 
adaptations.  
First, whereas micro research often tends to occur in the controlled 
environment of the laboratory, macro researchers tend to rely on field data. 
Observations made in the field are generally more difficult to compare than those 
harvested from laboratory studies, which obviates the need to control for extraneous 
influences. Our study is one of the first macro research meta-analyses to control for 
extraneous sources of variance through its reliance on rxy.z as its primary source of 
effect size information. Another benefit favoring the use of rxy.z in macro research is 
that this effect size can be computed directly from regression output, which fosters the 
inclusion of studies from macro research fields like economics and accounting in 
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which effect size reporting is not editorially demanded of authors (Combs & Ketchen, 
2003). Furthermore, rxy.z is an unbiased, scale-free, linear estimate of association, 
making it superior to other means of retrieving information on relational strength from 
studies with missing effect size data, such as transformed beta coefficients (Peterson & 
Brown, 2005) or significance tests (Bushman & Wang, 2009). We encourage other 
scholars conducting macro research meta-analyses to follow suit and base their 
analyses on rxy.z. 
Second, strategy and international business scholars often strive to make 
cross-national generalizations, but have to make do with primary observations from a 
limited number of countries, which can lead to misleading results and mistaken 
interpretations (Franke & Richey, 2010). Our study is one of the first to employ 
HiLMMA in macro research meta-analysis. An important advantage of using 
HiLMMA is that it allows researchers to combine multiple single-country studies in a 
single multi-country study, while accounting for the non-independence of effect sizes 
nested in similar jurisdictions. Another important advantage of HiLMMA is that 
researchers can bring new level 2 variables into the analysis (like our institutional 
variables and interaction terms), which capture essential features of the institutional 
context from which effect sizes were drawn but were not part of the original analyses. 
This greatly expands the possibilities for strategy and international business scholars 
to use meta-analysis as a theory-extension research tool, as compared to a method that 
is geared solely towards research synthesis (Eden, 2002). We call upon other macro 
researchers to move beyond conventional meta-analytic syntheses of bivariate 
relationships towards theory-extension studies using multivariate meta-analytic 
techniques. 
5.5.3 Extending the institutions-based view 
The institutions-based view is rapidly emerging as a primary perspective in 
international business strategy (Carney et al., 2010; Fiss, 2008; Heugens et al., 2009; 
Peng et al., 2009). We extend this perspective by applying it to the phenomenon of 
executive compensation and by testing its core prediction that formal as well as 
informal institutions matter to core business processes (Peng & Khoury, 2008; Peng et 
al., 2009). Our results confirm this prediction by showing that both formal institutions 
like the rule of law and shareholder protection provisions and informal institutions 
like ownership concentration and codes of good corporate governance can help 
strengthen the association between firm performance and executive remuneration. 
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Moreover, our findings show that both institutional types are complementary (Hall & 
Gingerich 2009; Hall & Soskice 2001), in the sense that the contribution of formal 
institutions towards a stronger focal relationship is dependent upon the level of 
development of informal institutions, and vice versa (Milgrom & Roberts, 1995). 
Figure 1 offers a way of visualizing the interaction effect. In this three-by-three matrix, 
the X-axis portrays the complementarity between the soft law index and the investor 
protection index.  
Figure 1: Complementarity of Formal and Informal Institutionsa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a Mean ρ = estimate of population correlation; Mean effect sizes marked with an asterisk (*) are 
statistically significant (p <0 .05). 
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have a below-median score on both. Likewise, the Y-axis shows the codependence of 
ownership concentration and the rule of law index. Countries in the top row are 
typified by an above-median score of both, whereas countries with an above-median 
ranking on only one variable are positioned in the middle row, and the bottom row is 
reserved for countries with a below-median score on both. 
This visual presentation confirms the HiLMMA interaction results. The 
association between firm performance and executive compensation is strongest in the 
countries in the two cells closest to the left-upper corner, which enjoy an above-median 
position on three out of four institutional dimensions (mean ρ = 0.12; 0.09). It is 
weakest in the countries occupying the bottom-right cell, which are below-median on 
all dimensions (mean ρ = 0.03). The mean ρ is indeed intermediate in all countries with 
one or two above-median institutional scores (mean ρ = 0.06; 0.06; 0.05).  
These results show that the effectiveness of ownership concentration as a 
means of ensuring higher firm performance – executive compensation sensitivity is 
contingent upon a well-functioning legal system. Large owners can influence and 
discipline executives through their concentrated voting rights, but voting is ineffective 
unless courts are willing to uphold decisions made at shareholders’ meetings (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1997). Indeed, the strength of the focal relationship goes up as we move 
from lower to higher rows. Likewise, our results demonstrate that informal codes of 
good governance help strengthen formal investor protection measures. 
Executive compensation is more closely tied to firm performance when 
relevant informal norms can be used in formal legal action, as compared to the 
situation in which both work alone. Again, the strength of the focal association 
increases as we move from right to left in the figure. In sum, the strength of the focal 
relationship is not so much dependent upon the quality of institutional factors 
individually, but more so on the level of development of the institutional matrix in its 
entirety. Researchers working on future tests of the institutions-based view of 
international business strategy are therefore advised to not only map direct 
institutional effects, but also to trace institutional complementarities though an 
exploration of cross-institutional interactions (Hall & Gingerich, 2009; Hall & Soskice, 
2001). 
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Chapter 6. Business group performance, context, 
and strategy: A meta-analysis44 
 
ABSTRACT 
Research on business groups – legally independent firms tied together in a variety of 
formal and informal ways – is accelerating. Through meta-analytical techniques 
employed on a database of 141 studies covering 28 different countries, we synthesize 
this research and extend it by testing several new hypotheses. We find that affiliation 
diminishes firm performance in general, but also that affiliates are comparatively 
better off in contexts with underdeveloped financial and labor market institutions. We 
also trace the affiliation discount to specific strategic actions taken at the firm and 
group levels. Overall, our results indicate that affiliate performance reflects complex 
processes and motivations.   
6.1 Introduction 
The past decade has witnessed a surge in research regarding the performance of 
business groups (BGs), which Khanna and Rivkin (2001) define as “firms which 
though legally independent, are bound together by a constellation of formal and 
informal ties and are accustomed to taking coordinated action” (p. 47). Three points of 
consensus are apparent in this body of work. First, BGs are ubiquitous in many 
countries with types such as Japanese Keiretsus and Zaibatsu (Gerlach, 1992), South 
Korean Chaebols (Chang, 2003), Latin America’s Grupos Economicos (Strachan, 1976), 
Hong Kong’s Hongs (Wong, 1996), India’s Business Houses (Encarnation, 1989), 
Taiwan’s Guanxiqiye (Numazaki, 1996), Russia’s Oligarchs (Perotti & Gelfer, 2001) and 
China’s Qiye Jituan (Keister, 2000) becoming emblematic of their nation’s enterprise 
systems. 
  A second area of consensus is that BGs are structurally different from 
conglomerate organizations, described by Williamson as H- and M-forms (Williamson, 
1975). While coordination in conglomerates takes place through the unified internal 
control of a portfolio of firms (Davis, Diekman, & Tinsley, 1994), coordination in BGs 
relies on a more complex web of mechanisms, such as multiple and reciprocated 
                                                             
44 Published article by Carney, M., Gedajlovic, E., Heugens, P. P. M. A. R., Van Essen, M. & Van 
Oosterhout, H. Forthcoming in Academy of Management Journal. 
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equity, debt, and commercial ties (Gerlach, 1992) and kinship affiliation between top 
managers (Granovetter, 2005).   
A third widely held position is that BGs owe their predominance in many 
countries to the existence of market failures and poor-quality legal and regulatory 
institutions (Granovetter, 2005). In this view, BG formation has taken place in these 
contexts in order to internalize transactions in the absence of reliable trading partners 
or legal safeguards to guarantee transactions between unaffiliated firms (Khanna & 
Palepu, 1997; Leff, 1978).  
  Despite these points of consensus, disagreement fueled by ambiguous 
research findings is apparent over the general question of whether or not the net 
economic and social effects of BGs are positive (Fisman & Khanna, 2004; Keister, 2000). 
Such disagreement is evident in characterizations of BGs by scholars as either ‘heroes 
or villains’ (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000a), ‘paragons or parasites’ (Khanna & 
Yafeh, 2007), ‘red barons or robbers barons’ (Perotti & Gelfer, 2001), or ‘anachronisms 
or avatars’ (Granovetter, 2005). Specifically, a lack of consensus exists on four key 
issues regarding BG performance and strategies.  
  First, researchers are divided regarding the performance implications of BG 
affiliation (Claessens, Fan, & Lang, 2006; Khanna & Palepu, 2000b). While some 
scholars theorize that the net effect of affiliation on profits is positive, others argue that 
it is negative for some or all firms, and each can point to empirical support for their 
positions. Researchers using exchange theory (Keister, 2001), transaction cost analysis 
(Luo & Chung, 2005; Mahmood & Mitchell, 2004), and the resource-based view (RBV) 
of the firm (Guillén, 2000) find that affiliation enhances performance (Almeida & 
Wolfenzon, 2006; Chang & Hong, 2000). Yet others have found that these potential 
advantages are often not realized due to various offsetting costs of affiliation 
(Claessens et al., 2006; Lee, Peng, & Lee, 2008). A third group of scholars have found 
that the relationship between affiliation and performance is not universal, and that 
some firms within a BG benefit at the expense of others (Bertrand, Mehta, & 
Mullainathan, 2002; Khanna & Yafeh, 2005). The effect of affiliation on performance 
therefore remains an open question. 
  Second, uncertainty also exists regarding the institution-level variables which 
moderate the affiliation–performance relationship. The prevailing viewpoint is that BG 
affiliation benefits firms most in developing contexts characterized by voids in hard 
(i.e. telecommunication and transportation) and soft infrastructure (i.e. legal and 
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financial systems) (Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Fisman & Khanna, 2004), but the evidence 
on this point is inconclusive. In a study of BG affiliation in fourteen emerging 
economies, Khanna and Rivkin (2001) find that affiliation is beneficial in six countries, 
detrimental in three others, and ineffectual in the remaining five. They conclude that 
the performance effects of BG affiliation “resist any simple normative categorization” 
(p. 68) and that a definitive understanding of their effects in various national contexts 
“must await further data collection and empirical inquiry” (p. 68).  
   Third, while many studies have examined the performance consequences of 
affiliation, there is a shortage of research examining the strategies of BG affiliates. As a 
result, there is little evidence on the issues of whether the strategies of affiliate firms 
are different from non-affiliated firms, and if so, whether these distinctive strategies 
affect the relationship between affiliation and financial performance. A clearer 
understanding of affiliate strategic behavior may therefore shed new light on the 
ambiguous findings regarding the profit impact of BG affiliation.  
    Fourth, the evidence concerning BG performance has primarily been drawn 
from studies at the affiliate rather than the group level (but see: Chang & Hong, 2002; 
Luo & Chung, 2005; Mahmood & Mitchell, 2004). This is concerning because some of 
the main theoretical arguments suggesting superior BG performance emphasize their 
aggregate scale and scope efficiencies. For instance, it is widely argued that the 
performance advantages of BGs are a function of their market power and capacity to 
wield political influence (Morck, Wolfenzon, & Yeung, 2005; Claessens, Djankov, & 
Lang, 2000b). Similarly, Khanna and Palepu’s core argument also pertains to the group 
level of analysis, as the success of BGs in emerging markets is attributed to their ability 
to mimic market institutions (Khanna & Palepu, 1999, 2000b). Thus, there appears to 
be a disconnect in the BG literature between theories which emphasize group-level 
phenomena and empirical studies which examine performance at the affiliate level.  
In short, in reviewing the literature we find that there is broad agreement 
among scholars that BGs are a phenomenon of great theoretical and practical import, 
but also important points of contention and ambiguity regarding their financial 
performance and strategies. The purpose of this study is to shed new light on these 
areas of dissensus with the help of several meta-analytic techniques. As noted by Eden 
(2002), meta-analyses are useful in addressing open research questions with data that 
are closer to definitive than those reported in any single primary study. As a point of 
departure, we perform such a research-synthesizing meta-analysis to examine the 
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mixed empirical findings in the BG literature on the performance effects of affiliation. 
However, both Eden (2002) and Combs, Ketchen, Crook, and Roth (2010) point out 
that meta-analyses are also a useful theory-extension tool. We therefore also employ a 
set of more advanced meta-analytic techniques to evaluate several hypotheses that are 
difficult to assess in single-sample primary studies and have thus far eluded empirical 
scrutiny. These theory-extending hypotheses examine both moderating effects of 
institutional variables and mediating effects of affiliate- and group-level strategy 
variables on which the existing BG literature is largely silent.   
6.2 Theory and Hypotheses 
6.2.1 Performance effects of business group affiliation  
To explain their prevalence in different host societies, researchers adopting various 
theoretical perspectives have argued that BG ties have performance-enhancing benefits 
for affiliates (Yiu, Lu, Bruton, & Hoskisson, 2007). Taking up the theme of BGs as a 
response to market failures, Khanna and Palepu (1997) have reasoned that affiliation 
benefits firms because BGs function as efficient internal capital and labor markets and 
as an intermediary organizational form capable of mobilizing valued resources. 
Guillén (2000) argues that the recurring transactions between BG affiliates lead to 
richer flows of information that improve resource allocation and allow affiliates to 
acquire financial resources on favorable terms. Similarly, transaction cost theorists 
argue that scarce skilled labor and managerial talent can be developed and shared 
across affiliate firms more efficiently due to transaction recurrence (Chang & Choi, 
1988; Chang & Hong, 2000).   
Adopting a social network perspective, other scholars have emphasized 
benefits arising from enduring and multiplicitous relations between BG affiliates 
(Gerlach, 1992; Granovetter, 2005). They argue that network embeddedness provides 
firms with rich formal and tacit information about each other, which offers benefits in 
terms of uncertainty reduction, contract enforcement, and opportunity identification 
(Granovetter, 2005). Gerlach (1992) and Keister (1998) reason that BGs reduce 
uncertainty for affiliates through the coordination of investment decisions and by 
providing assurances about the supply of intermediate goods. Weidenbaum and 
Hughes (1996) attribute the success of BGs to their informal contract enforcement 
capacities with regard to credit granting and joint venture participation. Luo and 
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Chung (2005) emphasize that ongoing relations provide a conduit for the 
dissemination of timely information about market and technological developments 
that may form the basis for new business opportunities.   
But other scholars argue that BGs do not exist to improve affiliate profitability 
(Kim, Hoskisson, & Wan, 2004; Morck & Yeung, 2003). Agency theorists see BGs as 
fraught with agency costs (Morck et al., 2005) and as instruments used by wealthy 
families to appropriate private benefits through a variety of tactics. These include 
‘pyramiding’ – the control of many businesses with limited capital investments 
through a set of cascading parent-affiliate relationships (Claessens et al., 2000b) and 
‘tunneling’ – a process where dominant shareholders transfer assets or profits from 
peripheral to core firms in which they hold relatively greater equity ownership 
(Friedman, Johnson, & Mitton, 2003). Others suggest that BGs promote the stability 
rather than the maximization of returns (Gerlach, 1992). In this view, BGs serve as an 
insurance policy that reduces bankruptcy risk for affiliates, but also imposes costs or 
‘taxes’ on members (Ferris, Kim, & Kitsabunnarat, 2003), such as the obligation to prop 
up weaker partners (Morck & Nakamura, 1999). Reflecting this dissensus, we propose 
two competing hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a: Business group affiliation is positively related to 
a firm’s financial performance.  
Hypothesis 1b: Business group affiliation is negatively related 
to a firm’s financial performance.  
  
6.2.2 The moderating role of institutional context  
Broad agreement exists that BGs emerged as a response to underdeveloped 
institutions or ‘institutional voids’ (Khanna & Palepu, 1997) in developing economies, 
and that BG ties are beneficial in societies where such voids continue to exist (Carney 
& Gedajlovic, 2002a). The institutional voids thesis states that BGs internalize activities 
that otherwise fail to materialize due to limitations in a society’s financial, legal, and 
labor market institutions, which jeopardize the exchange of products and services 
between arm’s length transactors (Leff, 1978). In such contexts, BG ties are beneficial 
because they provide a safe haven from institutional voids and offer access to 
resources that are unavailable to unaffiliated firms (Khanna & Palepu, 1997).  
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   While theoretical support for the institutional voids thesis is widespread, less 
agreement exists about the relative importance of different types of voids. While some 
scholars focus primarily on deficiencies in financial systems, others emphasize the 
importance of deficiencies in legal or labor market institutions. Among the former, 
BGs are viewed as relatively efficient internal capital markets (Almeida & Wolfenzon, 
2006) that remedy impediments to economic growth for their affiliates, such as illiquid 
equity markets, limited disclosure, and the absence of market intermediaries (Khanna 
& Palepu, 2000b). This view is supported by studies documenting the reliance of 
affiliates on group-specific financial institutions (Keister, 1998; Weinstein & Yafeh, 
1998) and those exploring how BGs transfer financial resources from cash rich to 
financially constrained affiliates (Lee et al., 2008; Lins & Servaes, 2002).  
     Others have focused on deficiencies in legal institutions, which make formal 
contracts difficult to enforce and the exchange of products and services prone to 
opportunism (Hoskisson, Canella, Tihanyi, & Faraci, 2004). In this view, BGs serve as a 
haven where contracts are more easily enforced and the risk of opportunism is limited. 
Evidence supporting this view comes from researchers describing how transaction 
recurrence among BG affiliates provides rich information flows, reputation effects, and 
informal contract enforcement mechanisms which curb opportunism (Berglöf & 
Perotti, 1994; Guillén, 2000; Khanna & Palepu, 1997).  
   Lastly, another group of scholars highlight the roles played by BGs in societies 
where there are weaknesses in institutions supporting the development of human 
capital such as deficient general, technical, and professional schools, which can lead to 
acute labor shortages (Fisman & Khanna, 2004). In these contexts, BGs may alleviate 
shortages by functioning as internal labor markets, investing in training and 
development (Khanna & Palepu, 2000a; Lincoln & Gerlach, 2004) and dispatching 
scarce talent to needy affiliates (Lincoln & Gerlach, 2004). 
Conceptually, institutional voids are best thought of as moderating variables 
affecting the relationship between affiliation and performance. Institutional voids 
theory (Khanna & Palepu, 1997, 2000a) suggests that financial, legal, and human 
resource voids will not influence all firms equally. Rather, such voids impose a 
stronger negative performance effect on standalone firms due to the various benefits 
affiliates receive, such as the mutual assistance that group members can offer one 
another. The relationship between affiliation and firm performance is therefore 
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expected to become stronger in a positive direction as institutional voids increase in 
magnitude. The following three hypotheses capture these moderation effects:  
Hypothesis 2a: The associational strength of the relationship 
between business group affiliation and financial 
performance is positively moderated by the existence 
of weak financial infrastructure.  
Hypothesis 2b: The associational strength of the relationship 
between business group affiliation and financial 
performance is positively moderated by the existence 
of weak legal institutions.  
Hypothesis 2c: The associational strength of the relationship 
between business group affiliation and financial 
performance is positively moderated by the existence 
of weak labor market institutions.  
6.2.3  The mediating role of organizational strategy  
Whereas many scholars have examined the affiliation-performance relationship, only 
few have looked at the effects of affiliation on firm strategy (e.g. Colpan, 2006; Lamin, 
2006), and none have examined the mediating role that strategy plays in the focal 
relationship. Consequently, the literature is largely silent on the important questions of 
whether BG affiliates make distinctive strategic choices, and if so, whether these 
choices explain performance differences between affiliated and non-affiliated firms. 
Yet affiliates’ strategies are likely to differ from those of standalone firms on at least 
three dimensions: leverage, diversification, and internationalization. We expect these 
strategic choices to reflect a wider set of motives than profit maximization alone, such 
that affiliates may face a performance discount relative to unaffiliated firms. 
    Leverage. Four streams of literature suggest that BG affiliates make greater use 
of debt financing than non-affiliates. First, agency theorists argue that affiliates’ 
majority shareholders prefer to finance operations through debt rather than issuing 
new equity, which dilutes their effective control (Berglöf & Perotti, 1994). Second, the 
internal capital markets thesis suggests that affiliates are more leveraged because they 
have access to sources of debt unavailable to non-affiliates (Keister, 2001). Third, 
norms of mutual assistance that other researchers have described as emblematic of BG 
affiliation may function as an “insurance policy” (Lincoln, Gerlach, & Ahmadjian, 
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1996), lessening bankruptcy risk and promoting leverage. Fourth, the thick web of 
information connecting affiliates facilitates monitoring and the detection of default 
risk, making the intra-group provision of debt less risky for lenders (Gedajlovic & 
Shapiro, 2002). 
 While there are no studies investigating the performance consequences of 
debt-reliant financial strategies in the context of BGs, there may be a bias among BG 
affiliates to invest in too many projects or in projects of the wrong type, as both 
privileged access to debt and the coinsurance effect of affiliation may promote 
unwieldy growth (Whited, 2001). Similarly, both the group norms described by 
sociologists (e.g. Gerlach, 1992) pertaining to the expectation of supporting fellow 
affiliates and the majority shareholder entrenchment effect described by agency 
theorists (Faccio, Young, & Lang, 2001) suggest that debt financing may be used to 
fund projects for reasons other than profit maximization. Higher leverage by BG 
affiliates is therefore expected to lead to lower performance relative to standalone 
firms. 
Diversification. We expect BG affiliates to engage in more unrelated 
diversification than other firms for three reasons. First, agency theorists suggest that 
many investments by BGs and their affiliates are driven more by controlling 
shareholders’ attempts to appropriate wealth through pyramiding and tunneling than 
by the profit potential of these investments (Friedman et al., 2003). Second, the 
availability of financing from a group’s internal capital market insulates the firm from 
external scrutiny and capital market pressures that constrain unrelated diversification 
in public corporations (Almeida & Wolfenzon, 2006; Keister, 2001). Third, sociological 
perspectives suggest that the investment activity of affiliates is driven more by the 
needs of the group than by their own requirements, leading to their involvement in 
activities that unaffiliated firms would not take part in (McGuire & Dow, 2009). Given 
the significant bureaucratic and coordination costs associated with the management of 
diverse operations (Hoskisson, Johnson, Tihanyi, & White, 2005), we expect that these 
tendencies toward unrelated diversification will negatively influence affiliate-level 
financial performance. 
Internationalization. The literature suggests three reasons for a less 
pronounced international orientation amongst BG affiliates relative to non-affiliated 
firms (Colpan, 2006; Lamin, 2006; Hundley & Jacobson, 1998). First, the specialized 
services that BGs provide to remedy the institutional voids of their home countries 
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may be more valuable domestically then abroad. Second, many of the potential 
benefits of affiliation are grounded in the group’s network of social and economic ties 
(Lamin, 2006). As such network benefits are strongest in a firm’s home market, they 
may result in a more domestic orientation among BG affiliates. Third, social norms in 
many BGs dictate that firms should first look amongst other affiliates for possible buy-
and-supply relationships before approaching non-group members, which may 
engender “complacency and a reduced incentive to export” (Hundley & Jacobson, 
1998: 935). 
Even though BG affiliates enjoy advantages in accessible financial resources 
(Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Guillén, 2000), their preferences for domestic projects may 
lead them to pass on international opportunities which are viewed as profitable by 
unaffiliated firms. That is, unconstrained by the social-structural forces and behavioral 
norms associated with group membership, unaffiliated firms can more readily exploit 
international projects, allowing them to more freely tap into new markets and leverage 
their existing capabilities. Conversely, the domestic orientation of BG affiliates may 
lead to performance lagging that of standalone firms. In sum, multiple theoretical 
perspectives suggest that the strategies of BG affiliates will differ from non-affiliates, 
explaining some of the performance differentials between them. These views are 
expressed in the following hypothesis: 
 Hypothesis 3: The relationship between business group 
affiliation and affiliate financial performance is 
mediated by the unique financing, diversification, and 
internationalization strategies of business group 
affiliates.  
 
6.2.4  Group-level performance effects  
Our focus thus far has been on the strategic and performance consequences of group 
membership for BG affiliates rather than on the performance of the group as a whole. 
This affiliate-level focus is dominant in empirical BG work. We reason that the relative 
inattention paid to group-level effects is related to difficulties associated with 
developing a sufficiently large sample of BGs in any single primary study. Such 
pragmatic considerations have led to a disconnect between theoretical work on BGs, 
which focuses on group-level processes such as the ability to amass market power and 
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perform intermediating functions, and empirical work, which examines such processes 
using affiliate-level data. The meta-analytic nature of our study allows us to surmount 
such data availability problems related to the evaluation of group-level processes. BG 
size is widely viewed as an important factor explaining group performance, but 
researchers have offered very different explanations regarding why size matters. In 
our treatment of BG size, we strive for greater precision by explicitly distinguishing 
between the related effects of scale and scope on BG performance. By making this 
distinction, we are able to consider how and why BGs grow and also differentiate 
between various processes linking BG size to performance outcomes. In doing so, we 
account for the possibility that BG scale and BG scope have differing effects on group-
level performance.  
 It is widely believed that BGs of a larger scale enjoy performance enhancing 
advantages relative to smaller groups (Guillén, 2000; Khanna & Yafeh, 2007). There is a 
strong impetus for sales and asset growth in BGs for a number of reasons. First, larger 
BGs can benefit from economies of scale, allowing them to more cost-effectively carry 
out value-creating intermediating functions (Khanna & Palepu, 2000a), such as 
administrative and project management activities (Amsden & Hikino, 1994). Second, 
increased scale may afford BGs reputation-enhancing effects. For instance, Morck, 
Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005) argue that larger BGs may benefit from a reputation for 
fair dealing with business partners, and Khanna and Palepu (2000b) reason that 
reputation effects provide larger BGs with superior access to foreign capital and 
technological resources. Third, increased scale can provide BGs with a variety of 
benefits tied to enhanced market (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007; Mackie, 1992; Yoshihara, 
1988) and political power (Carney, 2004; Claessens et al., 2000a; Dielemans & Sachs, 
2008). For these reasons, we hypothesize that BG scale is positively related to group-
level performance. 
Hypothesis 4a: Business group operational scale is positively 
related to business group financial performance.  
 
While the arguments summarized in relation to Hypothesis 4a suggest there is 
a strong impetus for sales and asset growth in BGs, they do not distinguish between 
the various types of activities that may be pursued to achieve that greater scale. At a 
fundamental level, like executives elsewhere, BG managers face decisions regarding 
whether to grow their operations by increasing their commitment to existing product 
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markets, or by expanding the scope of their activities by entering new lines of 
business. In this respect, the literature suggests that the pull towards increasing size 
through growth in the scope of activities will be especially strong in BGs because of the 
types of leverageable resources they control, as well as the nature of the new business 
opportunities available to them (Guillén, 2000; Khanna & Palepu, 2000b; Kock & 
Guillén, 2001). For example, Chang and Hong (2000) reason that the types of assets 
available to BGs allow them to assemble the resources necessary to take advantage of 
diverse business opportunities and Luo and Chung (2005) similarly contend that 
network embeddedness within BGs provides a conduit for timely information 
exchange, leading to the pursuit of diverse business opportunities.  
 Thus, researchers generally agree that growth in BGs tends to be manifested in 
activities that increase the scope of a group’s operations and several streams of 
research have theorized about the performance effects of such increased scope. 
Hoskisson, Johnson, Tihanyi, and White (2005) contend that broader scope in BGs 
leads to performance-impairing challenges related to bureaucratic and coordination 
costs associated with the management of increasingly complex groups. Others, 
however, see the effects of increased BG scope in a more favorable light and argue that 
it can actually be profit enhancing. In particular, proponents of the institutional voids 
thesis suggest that broader scope allows BGs to perform interstitial functions and 
provide resources and support for their various businesses. Khanna and Palepu (1997), 
for example, argue that greater scope enables BGs to function effectively where reliable 
trading partners are unavailable, as it addresses their need for complimentary 
products and services. The preceding discussion suggests that the impetus for sales 
and asset growth in BGs (cf. Hypothesis 4a) tends to manifest itself in the form of 
performance impacting activities that increase group scope. Consequently, we 
hypothesize that BG scope mediates the relationship between BG scale and BG 
performance.  
Hypothesis 4b: Business group operational scope mediates the 
relationship between business group operational scale 
and business group financial performance.  
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6.3 Methods 
6.3.1 Sample and coding 
To identify relevant studies, we used five complementary search strategies (Heugens, 
Van Essen, & van Oosterhout, 2009). First, we consulted several review articles (e.g. 
Carney, 2008; Khanna & Yafeh, 2007; Yiu et al., 2007). Second, we explored five 
electronic databases: (1) ABI/INFORM Global, (2) EconLit, (3) Google Scholar, (4) 
JSTOR, and (5) SSRN, using the following search terms: “business group,” “business 
houses,” “chaebol,” “grupos economicos,” “guanxiqiye,” “hongs,” “keiretsu,” 
“oligarchs,” “pyramids,” “qiye jituan”, and “zaibatsu”. Third, we manually searched 
25 scholarly journals, including Academy of Management Journal, Journal of Comparative 
Economics, Journal of Corporate Finance, Journal of Finance, Journal of International Business 
Studies, and Strategic Management Journal. Fourth, we explored the reference lists of all 
identified articles and traced all sources citing them using Google Scholar and ISI Web 
of Knowledge. Fifth, we corresponded with 54 authors of BG papers with missing effect 
size information, asking them for a correlation table. These efforts yielded a sample of 
141 primary studies, consisting of 102 published and 39 unpublished studies (see 
Appendix D).  
 We then read all the articles and developed a coding protocol (Lipsey & 
Wilson, 2001) for extracting data on all relevant variables. To test Hypotheses 1a and 
1b, we collected effect size information for the relationship between BG affiliation and 
firm performance, as well as sample size information. To test Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 
2c, we collected covariates from secondary sources. For testing Hypotheses 3, 4a, and 
4b, we collected effect size information for interrelationships between all dependent, 
independent, and control variables in our analyses.  
6.3.2 HOMA procedure 
We used HOMA to test Hypotheses 1a and 1b. HOMA refers to a set of statistical 
procedures for calculating meta-analytic mean correlations and corresponding 
confidence intervals (Hedges & Olkin, 1985; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). HOMA inputs are 
effect sizes capturing the strength of the focal relationship in a given sample, such as 
the Pearson product-moment correlation r or the partial correlation coefficient rxy.z. In 
this study we rely on both r and rxy.z. We use r because it is a widely published effect 
size statistic in management. Yet r is a bivariate measure of association, which ignores 
the effect of other variables that are often used as controls in multivariate 
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investigations of the focal relationship. We therefore also use rxy.z., which can be 
computed directly from regression tables (Doucouliagos & Ulubaşoğlu, 2008). In our 
case, rxy.z captures the association between BG affiliation (X) and affiliate performance 
(Y), given a set of n controlling variables (Z).45 The z-vector typically contains control 
variables like firm size, age, and risk.  
When studies reported effect size statistics other than r or rxy.z, such as Cohen’s 
d, we converted these to an r value (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). When multiple 
measurements of the focal effect were reported, we included them all in our analyses, 
as Monte Carlo simulations show that procedures using the complete set of 
measurements outperform those representing each study by a single value in areas like 
parameter significance testing and parameter estimation accuracy (Bijmolt & Pieters, 
2001). Since HOMA procedures assume that effect sizes are normally distributed, we 
used Fisher’s (1928) Zr-transformation to correct for skewness in the effect size 
distribution (Hedges & Olkin, 1985). In line with current conventions, we used 
random-effects HOMA for combining study estimates (Geyskens, Krishnan, 
Steenkamp, & Cunha, 2009; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). To estimate mean effects 
appropriately, differences in precision across effect sizes have to be accounted for, so 
we weighted them by their inverse variance weight w (Hedges & Olkin, 1985): the 
inverse of their squared standard error.46  
                                                             
45 Partial correlations are computed as follows: √(t2/ (t2+df)), where t is the t-statistic and df is degrees 
of freedom. As this will always produce a positive number, it is necessary to convert it to a negative 
number if the regression coefficient is negative (see: Greene, 2008, Chapter 3). t-values result from the 
scaling of primary coefficients by their respective standard errors. They are by definition standardized 
and defined on a dimensionless scale. 
46 w is calculated as follows: 
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We also used these weights to calculate the standard error of the mean effect 
and its confidence interval.47  
6.3.3 MARA procedure 
To test Hypotheses 2a through 2c we used MARA (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001), a special 
type of weighted least squares (WLS) regression analysis, designed to assess the 
relationship between effect size and moderator variables by modeling heterogeneity in 
the effect size distribution (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). In MARA, effect sizes are weighted 
by w to account for differences in precision (Hedges & Olkin, 1985). MARA is a 
modified type of WLS regression, which prevents statistical analysis programs from 
interpreting these weights as “representing multiple effect sizes rather than weightings 
of single effect sizes” (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001: 122). As scholars are concerned about the 
inaccuracy of fixed-effects models (Geyskens et al., 2009), we use a more conservative 
mixed-effects specification, which attributes effect size variability to systematic 
between-study differences, firm-level sampling error, and an unmeasured random 
component (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). The moderator variables we use capture aspects 
of the institutional context from which effect sizes were drawn as well as 
methodological study characteristics. 
To test the moderating effects of local institutions, we collected data from 
additional sources and employed them in conjunction with those obtained from the 
primary studies. We used two variables to assess the impact of financial infrastructure 
(Hypothesis 2a). The availability of equity capital was measured by dividing each 
country’s total stock market capitalization by its gross domestic product. Ease of 
obtaining debt financing was taken from the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook. 
Three variables were used to capture the effects of legal institutions (Hypothesis 2b). 
To measure the overall quality of legal institutions, we used Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi’s (2005) ‘rule of law’ measure. We assessed the level of legal protection 
against self-dealing with Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer’s (2008) 
                                                             
47 The meta-analytic mean is calculated as follows: ¦
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‘anti-self-dealing index.’ To measure the efficiency of the legal system in resolving 
commercial disputes, we used the Doing Business (World Bank) ‘enforcing contracts’ 
indicator. We utilized four variables to measure the effect of labor market institutions 
(Hypothesis 2c). We used World Development Indicator (World Bank) data to assess the 
general education level. To measure the availability of professionally trained 
managers, we created a new variable by counting the number of the Association to 
Advance Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB) accredited business schools in each 
country (AACSB membership data). To assess the quality of these schools, we 
consulted the Global Competitiveness Report (World Economic Forum). The same report 
also provided a measure capturing overall labor market competitiveness.  
We also employed seven control variables to establish the robustness of our 
hypothesis tests. First, we used a dummy variable capturing whether particular effect 
sizes were derived from published (‘1’) or unpublished (‘0’) studies. Second, a dummy 
variable indicating whether a study utilized cross-sectional (‘1’) or longitudinal (‘0’) 
data was used. Third, to account for differences in journal quality, we controlled for 
impact factor (ISI Web of Knowledgesm) of the publication outlet, assigning a value of ‘0’ 
to unpublished or non-ISI sources and the actual impact factor otherwise. Fourth, to 
control for potential time-dependence (cf. Khanna & Yafeh, 2007), we coded the year of 
data collection for each effect size, taking the median sampling year for longitudinal 
designs. Fifth, to control for voids in physical infrastructure (cf. Fisman & Khanna, 
2004), we compiled a new composite index based on five indicators related to 
‘railroads,’ ‘ports,’ ‘air transport,’ ‘electricity supply,’ and ‘phone lines’ from the Global 
Competitiveness Report. Sixth, to control for the high proportion of Japanese data in the 
primary studies, we used a dummy variable segregating Japanese (‘1’) from other (‘0’) 
effect sizes. Seventh, to control for (partial) overlap in sampling time frames across 
studies, we included dummy variables for each set of studies relying on similar data. 
6.3.4 MASEM procedure 
To test Hypotheses 3, 4a, and 4b, we used MASEM (Cheung & Chan, 2005; 
Viswesvaran & Ones, 1995), which uses a two-stage procedure. First, mean 
correlations between variables of interest are established through separate HOMA 
analyses. Second, structural equations modeling is applied on the matrix of mean 
correlations, using maximum likelihood modeling routines (Cheung & Chan, 2005). 
MASEM has two advantages over other meta-analytic techniques. First, not all 
relationships specified by the theory under investigation need to be included in each 
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primary study, as each cell in the data matrix represents a different subset of all 
included studies (Viswesvaran & Ones, 1995). Second, MASEM can be used to test 
previously untested research hypotheses, especially those such as Hypotheses 3, 4a, 
and 4b, which stipulate mediating relationships connecting two previously unlinked 
literatures (Eden, 2002).  
Testing Hypothesis 3 requires us to assess: (a) the direct effect of BG affiliation 
on firm performance; (b) the effect of affiliation on firms’ revealed strategy choices; 
and (c) the consequences of these choices for firm performance. The included strategic 
choice variables are: leverage (ratio of total debts to total assets), diversification 
(Herfindahl or entropy measure capturing presence in multiple business segments), 
and internationalization (ratio of exports to total sales). We also control for the 
influence of firm size (total assets, sales, or employees) and firm age (years since 
founding) on strategy choices, and of firm risk (volatility of returns) and R&D intensity 
(ratio of R&D expenditures to total sales) on affiliate performance. Due to the potential 
endogeneity of firms’ strategy and affiliation choices on performance (cf. Khanna & 
Palepu, 1997), independent tests of these effects could introduce biased estimates. We 
therefore tested the following system of simultaneous equations: 
 
(1) Diversification = β1 affiliation + β2 size + β3 age + ε 
(2) Internationalization = β4 affiliation + β5 size + β6 age + ε 
(3) Leverage = β7 affiliation + β8 size + β9 age + ε 
(4) Performance = β10 affiliation + β11 risk + β12 research & development + β13 
diversification + β14 internationalization + β15 leverage + ε 
 
Hypotheses 4a and 4b call for a test of: (a) the direct effect of BG scale on BG 
performance; (b) the effect of BG scale on BG scope; and (c) the influence of BG scope 
on BG performance. BG scale is measured as the sum of assets, sales, or employees 
across all affiliates; BG scope as a Herfindahl index or entropy measure capturing BG 
presence in multiple business segments. We also control for the influence of group 
leverage, R&D intensity, and risk on BG performance. Due to the potential 
endogeneity of BG scale and BG scope on BG performance, biased estimates could 
result from independent tests of these effects (Khanna & Palepu, 2000b; Kock & 
Guillén, 2001). We therefore evaluated the following simultaneous equations: 
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(1) Scope = β1 scale + ε 
(2) Performance = β2 scale + β3 scope + β4 leverage + β5 research & development + β6 
risk + ε 
 
Both systems of equations were estimated on firm- and group-level meta-
analytic correlation matrices, using the full information maximum likelihood method 
in LISREL 8.80. To deal with sample size differences across the correlation coefficients 
comprising these matrices, we based our analyses on harmonic mean sample sizes 
(firm level: N = 7,065; group level: N = 16,353). 
6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Firm-level bivariate and partial correlations 
Tables 1 and 2 show that Hypothesis 1a should be rejected in favor of Hypothesis 1b: 
the mean correlation of the focal relationship is -.02 for both the bivariate (k = 284) and 
partial correlation (k = 50) HOMAs. As the confidence intervals do not include zero, 
the effects are significant.  
Three caveats apply, however. First, the control group of unaffiliated firms is 
not identical to the treatment group in terms of either prevalence or size. Across all 
included studies, affiliated firms represent 34 percent of the sample (see Table 3). 
Furthermore, a HOMA on the relationship between BG affiliation and firm size yields 
a strong correlation (.26; k = 164), so we control for size in all firm-level analyses. 
Second, the results in Table 1 suggest that the strength of the focal relationship is 
driven by the chosen performance measure. Affiliation is negatively related to 
accounting performance (-.03; see Table 1), implying that affiliates are less profitable 
than stand-alone firms. On the other hand, tests using market-based measures of 
performance reveal no significant effect (-.01, n.s.). Third, the mean effects we found 
are small by conventional standards (Cohen, 1977), implying that the effect of 
affiliation is modest. Furthermore, the amount of (true) heterogeneity present in both 
effect size distributions is substantial (r-based: Q = 5,805.29; p < .01; I2 = .95; rxy.z-based: 
Q = 252.36; p < .01; I2 = .80). Under these conditions, mean effects are best interpreted 
as an average rather than a common true correlation value (Hedges & Olkin, 1985: 
235), implying that further moderator analyses are warranted. 
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 We also conducted three robustness checks. First, the primary studies in our 
sample derive from journals of varying status. To control for these differences, we ran 
separate r-based HOMAs on effect sizes derived from: published studies (k = 180), 
journals with an editorial team dominated by US- or Western Europe-based scholars (k 
= 173),48 peer reviewed publications (k = 159), journals included in the ISI Social Science 
Citation Index (SSCI) in 2008 (k = 123), journals continuously included in SSCI from 
2004 – 2008 (k = 118), journals with an SSCI impact factor greater than > 1.0 (k = 109), 
and the 10 journals in our dataset with the highest five-year SSCI Impact Factors (k = 
44). All mean correlations are significant and between -.02 and -.03, suggesting that 
publication outlet quality does not moderate the focal relationship. 
Second, some of the samples in our analysis overlap in terms of included 
firms and time periods, which could result in similar correlation structures between 
same-country samples. We used several checks to diagnose the severity of this 
‘drinking from the same well’ problem. In a separate HOMA, we included only the 
largest non-overlapping samples per country (k = 51). At -.04, this result is materially 
similar to the overall mean correlation. We also ran two separate MARAs (see Table 4): 
one with dummy variables for each set of overlapping samples (Model 1), and another 
in which other control variables were also included (Model 2). In both cases, the model 
constant (i.e., the control variable-adjusted mean correlation) was -.03. Two z-tests for 
meta-analytic mean differences (Feingold, 1992) corroborate that the corrected and 
uncorrected mean correlations are not significantly different (see Table 4). In short, the 
‘drinking from the same well’ issue does not appear to affect our results.  
 Third, because BGs are prominent in Asia, we assessed whether the financial 
crisis that struck that continent in 1997-1998 (Mitton, 2002) affected our findings. We 
split our sample into four sub-groups: observations from the pre-crisis period (prior to 
1996); the crisis period (1997 and 1998); the post-crisis period (1999 and after); and the 
‘mixed’ category of observations covering two or more of these periods. Separate r-
based HOMAs show that our findings are robust against the effects of the crisis (pre-
crisis: -.04, k = 105; crisis: -.02 (n.s.), k = 20; post-crisis: -.02, k = 75; mixed: -.02; k = 84). 
 
 
 
                                                             
48 This distinction was suggested by one of our reviewers.  
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Table 1: Firm-Level Correlation-Based HOMA Resultsa,b 
a k = number of effect sizes; N = total sample size; mean ρ = estimate of population correlation; SDρ = 
standard deviation of mean ρ; CImean ρ 95% = 95 percent confidence interval for mean ρ; Q = Cochran’s 
homogeneity test statistic; p = probability of Q; I2 = scale-free index of heterogeneity. 
b Mean effect sizes marked with an asterisk (*) are statistically significant (p < .05). 
 
Table 2: Firm-Level Partial Correlation-Based HOMA Resultsa,b 
a k = number of effect sizes; N = total sample size; mean ρ = estimate of population correlation; SDρ = 
standard deviation of mean ρ; CImean ρ 95% = 95 percent confidence interval for mean ρ; Q = Cochran’s 
homogeneity test statistic; p = probability of Q; I2 = scale-free index of heterogeneity. 
b Mean effect sizes marked with an asterisk (*) are statistically significant (p < .05). 
 
6.4.2 Jurisdiction-level moderating effects 
Table 3 reports country-specific r-based HOMA results.49 The effect of affiliation on 
performance is positive in six countries: Chile, Colombia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Sweden, and Turkey. It is negative in five others: France, Japan, Nigeria, Pakistan, and 
South Korea. No significant affiliation effect exists in seven other countries: Belgium, 
China, India, the Philippines, Russia, Taiwan, and Thailand. We could not estimate a 
separate mean effect for the remaining nine countries, due to a lack of observations. 
Table 4 shows three MARA models. Models 1 and 2 report results for data source 
quality and other controls. Model 3 reports results for Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c. 
Model 3 fits the data well (R2 = .28; Qmodel p < .01). 
The results support Hypothesis 2a. The development of a jurisdiction’s 
financial infrastructure, captured by debt availability and stock market capitalization, 
                                                             
49 One of the countries comprising our sample (Italy) is not included in Table 3, as we retrieved 
correlations between our independent (MASEM) variables for it, but not for the focal relationship. 
Predictor K N Mean SDρ CI 95% Q test I2 
Business group affiliation to 
firm performance 
284 831,807 
 
-0.02* 0.01 -0.04 / -0.01 5,805.29  0.95 
Accounting 
measures 
201 672,765 -0.03* 0.01 -0.04 / -0.02 4,687.64  0.96 
Market measures 83 159,042 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 / 0.01 954.16  0.48 
Predictor K N Mean SDρ CI 95% Q test I2 
Business group affiliation to 
firm performance 
50 52,146 -0.02* 0.01 -0.04 / -0.00 252.36  0.80 
Accounting measures 27 24,143 -0.02 0.02 -0.05 / 0.01 126.24  0.79 
Market measures 23 28,003 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 / 0.02 106.38  0.78 
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negatively moderates the affiliation effect. When external financing is not easily 
available, affiliation becomes relatively more advantageous because a BG’s internal 
capital market can be turned to for financing.  
Hypothesis 2b is rejected. The quality of business-relevant legal institutions, 
as captured by the rule of law, anti-self-dealing, and enforcing contracts variables, 
does not negatively moderate the focal relationship. In contrast, the rule of law index 
positively moderates it, indicating that without access to effective courts the 
performance of BG affiliates suffers. This suggests that inefficient resource allocation 
decisions caused by agency problems like tunneling or propping may more negatively 
impact firm performance in contexts with weak overall legal protection (Bae, Kang, & 
Kim, 2002; Johnson, Boone, Breach, & Friedman, 2000b).  
Hypothesis 2c is supported. The quality of labor market institutions, as 
captured by general education level, and the business school count and quality 
variables, negatively moderates the focal relationship. BG affiliation is more 
advantageous in contexts characterized by labor market voids. No significant effect 
was found for overall labor market competitiveness, however, suggesting that groups 
are better at filling specific rather than generic voids.  
 Table 4 also reports control variable results. Publication status and research 
design did not moderate the focal effect. The significant negative effect for median 
sample year suggests that BG affiliation becomes less beneficial over time (cf. Khanna 
& Palepu, 2000a). Journal impact factor moderated the focal relationship negatively, 
implying a modest publication bias amongst more highly cited journals. Finally, the 
physical infrastructure variables were not significant, implying that BGs are not 
effective at filling ‘harder’ infrastructural voids. Finally, the Japan dummy has a 
significant negative moderating effect.  
6.4.3 Firm-level mediating effects 
Table 5 shows a firm-level meta-analytic correlation matrix. All 36 cells below the 
diagonal contain a separate meta-analysis, indicating both the mean effect and its 
standard deviation (s.d.ρ). Cells above the diagonal report the number of primary 
observations (N) and samples (k) on which the mean effect is based. For entries printed 
in bold, a significant Q-test indicates the presence of moderating variables, suggesting 
that the reported value is an average rather than a common true correlation value 
(Hedges & Olkin, 1985: 235).  
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Table 6 presents firm-level MASEM results. MASEM addresses simultaneity 
issues with respect to affiliation and strategy choices and incorporates control 
variables. As such, it offers a more precise test of Hypothesis 3 than the bivariate 
analyses reported in Table 5. The model fits the data well (χ2 = 760.09; RMSR = .10; GFI 
= .98). Furthermore, all conditions for mediation are met (Baron & Kenny, 1986). First, 
BG affiliation significantly affects all three hypothesized mediators: diversification (β = 
.06), internationalization (β = -.09), and leverage (β = .05). Second, BG affiliation 
significantly affects firm performance in the absence of these mediators (-.02; see Table 
5). Third, two out of three mediators have a significant effect on firm performance: 
diversification (β = -.05), internationalization (β = .01; n.s.), and leverage (β = -.12). 
Fourth, the effect of affiliation on performance shrinks when the mediators are added 
to the model (to β = -.01; n.s). Formal tests (MacKinnon & Dwyer, 1993) confirm that 
mediating variables carry the influence of BG affiliation to firm performance (Sobel 
test: z = 3.77; p < .01; Aroian test: z = 3.75; p < .01; Goodman test: z = 3.80; p < .01). Thus, 
Hypothesis 3 is supported by the data. 
6.4.4 Group-level mediating effects  
Table 7 presents a group-level meta-analytic correlation matrix, consisting of 15 
separate HOMAs. These results confirm Hypothesis 4a: BG scale has a significant 
positive effect on BG performance (.07). Table 8 shows the group-level MASEM results. 
This model fits the data well (χ2 = 172.10; RMSR = .02; GFI = .99), and all remaining 
conditions for mediation are met (Baron & Kenny, 1986). First, BG scale has a 
substantial and significant positive effect on BG scope (β = .47). Second, BG scope has a 
significant unique effect on BG performance (β = -.13). Third, the positive effect of BG 
scale on BG performance increases when BG scope is added to the model (to β = .09). 
Formal tests (MacKinnon & Dwyer, 1993) confirm the mediating role of the BG scope 
variable (Sobel test: z = 15.26; p < .01; Aroian test: z = 15.26; p < .01; Goodman test: z = 
15.27; p < .01), thereby supporting Hypothesis 4b. 
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Table 3: Country-Specific Correlation-Based HOMA Resultsa 
a Mean effect sizes marked with an asterisk (*) are statistically significant (p < .05). 
 
Country % of BGs aff. K N Mean SDρ CI 95% Q test 
Argentina 0.51 1 129 -0.28    
Belgium 0.09 4 20,033 -0.03 0.03 -0.09 / 0.03 59.48 (0.00) 
Brazil 0.48 1 629 0.08    
Bulgaria 0.13 1 114 -0.05    
Chile 0.47 10 9,633 0.07* 0.03 0.02 / 0.12 45.79 (0.00) 
China 0.66 14 8,402 0.01 0.03 -0.03 / 0.07 76.01 (0.00) 
Colombia 0.50 3 1,238 0.05* 0.02 0.00 / 0.09 1.67 (0.43) 
France 0.38 2 3,041 -0.05* 0.02 -0.09 / -0.01 1.16 (0.28) 
Hong Kong 0.20 9 14,488 0.03* 0.01 0.01 / 0.05 12.05 (0.15) 
India 0.43 21 89,380 0.02 0.02 -0.01 / 0.06 434.19 (0.00) 
Indonesia 0.29 3 3,674 0.04* 0.02 0.00 / 0.08 2.63 (0.26) 
Israel 0.33 1 86 -0.01    
Japan 0.41 87 402,257 -0.07* 0.01 -0.09 / -0.06 1,548.03 (0.00) 
Malaysia 0.43 1 121 0.14    
Mexico 0.32 1 344 0.06    
Nigeria  2 186 -0.21* 0.07 -0.36 / -0.07 0.00 (0.99) 
Pakistan 0.52 3 498 -0.23* 0.04 -0.32 / -0.14 0.41 (0.81) 
Peru 0.26 1 99 -0.17    
Philippines 0.37 4 624 0.10 0.06 -0.01 / 0.23 6.38 (0.09) 
Russia 0.29 9 1,409 -0.00 0.04 -0.09 / 0.08 11.08 (0.20) 
Singapore 0.69 1 71 0.23    
South Africa 0.49 1 1,071 -0.02    
South Korea  0.19 56 240,115 -0.02* 0.01 -0.05 / -0.00 1,392.11 (0.00) 
Sweden  4 296 0.17* 0.06 0.05 / 0.28 1.53 (0.67) 
Taiwan 0.48 15 13,599 -0.00 0.03 -0.06 / 0.06 152.67 (0.00) 
Thailand 0.60 3 1,755 -0.02 0.03 -0.08 / 0.03 2.26 (0.32) 
Turkey 0.55 11 2,259 0.06* 0.02 0.02 / 0.10 8.68 (0.56) 
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Table 4: Results of Mixed Effects WLS Regressiona 
a Unstandardized regression coefficients are presented for study moderators and substantive 
moderators with standard errors in parentheses. k is the total number of effect sizes; Q is the 
homogeneity statistic with its probability in parentheses; v is the random effects variance component.   
b These control variables could not be included in Model 2 because of collinearity issues. 
*    p < .1 
**  p < .05 
***  p < .01 
Variable Model  
(1) 
Model  
(2) 
Model 
(3) 
Constant -0.03 (0.01)** -0.03 (0.02)* -0.04 (0.02)** 
    
Financial infrastructure    
Stock market capitalization   -0.06 (0.02)*** 
Debt availability   -0.01 (0.00)** 
    
Legal institutions    
Rule of law   0.06 (0.03)* 
Anti-self dealing index   -0.13 (0.10) 
Enforcing contracts   0.00 (0.00) 
    
Labor market institutions    
General education level   -0.02 (0.01)** 
Business school count   -0.02 (0.01)*** 
Quality of business schools   -0.02 (0.01)* 
Labor market competiveness   0.04 (0.04) 
    
Controls    
Published study  -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
Cross-sectional design  0.02 (0.01)* 0.01 (0.01) 
Median year sampling window  -0.00 (0.00) -0.003 (0.00)** 
Journal impact factor  -0.01 (0.00)* -0.01 (0.00)** 
Physical infrastructure   0.06 (0.05) 
Japan dummyb   -0.10 (0.03)*** 
Same data controlb Yes Yes No 
    
R2 0.34 0.35 0.28 
K 284 284 263 
 QModel (p) 127.50 (0.00) 131.36 (0.00) 103.46 (0.00) 
QResidual (p) 252.03 (0.47) 243.21 (0.56) 264.34 (0.21) 
V 0.005 0.005 0.00434 
z-test -1.28 (p > 0.1) -1.44 (p > 0.1)  
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 Table 5: Firm-Level Meta-Analytic Correlation Matrixa 
a Cells below the diagonal contain mean correlations (mean ρ) and standard deviations (s.d.ρ). Cells 
above the diagonal contain the total number of observations (N) and number of samples (k). Bold font 
indicates a significant χ2 test, suggesting the presence of moderator variables. 
b 1: BG affiliation, 2: Firm age, 3: Firm size, 4: Diversification, 5: Internationalization, 6: Leverage, 7: 
Risk, 8: R&D, 9: Firm performance. 
 
 
Table 6: Firm-Level MASEM Resultsa  
a Significant relationships (p < .05) are printed in bold; t-values are given in parentheses. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1.  13,914 
(6) 
754,005 
(164) 
61,473 
(44) 
79,801 
(30) 
309,545 
(78) 
54,380 
(30) 
173,171 
(39) 
831,807 
(284) 
2.  -0.00 
(0.02) 
 9,058  
(4) 
2,127  
(2) 
6,073  
(2) 
7,044  
(3) 
1,314  
(1) 
13,101  
(5) 
4,658  
(3) 
3.  0.26 
(0.02) 
0.09 
(0.11) 
 14,835 
(15) 
81,534 
(30) 
167,529 
(51) 
38,012 
(15) 
67,308  
(31) 
247,693 
(118) 
4. 0.09 
(0.01) 
-0.13 
(0.20) 
0.13  
(0.06) 
 609  
(4) 
6,792  
(5) 
2,121  
(4) 
7,355  
(4) 
20,317  
(14) 
5. -0.01 
(0.02) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
0.29  
(0.06) 
-0.09 
(0.06) 
 56,956 
(7) 
5,655  
(5) 
29,310  
(18) 
67,080  
(19) 
6. 0.06 
(0.01) 
0.04 
(0.02) 
0.07  
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
 18,828 
(13) 
67,466  
(15) 
192,874  
(65) 
7. -0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.03 -0.19 
(0.05) 
-0.04 
(0.02) 
0.10 
(0.02) 
0.18 
(0.03) 
 10,562  
(5) 
49,860  
(21) 
8. 0.04 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
0.14  
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.17 
(0.03) 
-0.00 
(0.02) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
 57,505  
(23) 
9. -0.02 
(0.01) 
0.05 
(0.06) 
0.07  
(0.01) 
-0.04 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.14 
(0.02) 
-0.14 
(0.04) 
0.05  
(0.02) 
 
Predictors Diversification Internationalization Leverage Performance 
BG affiliation 0.06 (4.70) -0.09 (-7.73) 0.05 (3.72) -0.01 (-1.06) 
Firm size 0.13 (10.55) 0.31 (26.35) 0.05 (4.46)  
Firm age -0.14 (-12.08) 0.03 (2.81) 0.04 (2.94)  
Risk    -0.12 (-10.62) 
R&D    0.06 (4.87) 
Diversification    -0.05 (-3.84) 
Internationalization     0.01 (0.53) 
Leverage    -0.12 (-9.98) 
Harmonic mean N 7,065    
X2 760.09    
GFI 0.98    
RMSR 0.098    
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Table 7: Group-Level Meta-Analytic Correlation Matrixa 
 a Cells below the diagonal contain mean correlations (mean ρ) and standard deviations (s.d.ρ). Cells 
above the diagonal contain the total number of observations (N) and number of samples (k). Bold font 
indicates a significant χ2 test, suggesting the presence of moderator variables. 
 
 
Table 8: Group-Level MASEM Resultsa 
a Significant relationships (p < .05) are printed in bold; t-values are given in parentheses. 
6.5 Discussion and Directions for Future Research 
Scholars alternatively portray BGs as ‘heroes,’ ‘paragons,’ and ‘avatars,’ or as ‘villains,’ 
parasites,’ and ‘anachronisms’ (Claessens et al., 2000a; Khanna & Yafeh, 2007; 
Granovetter, 2005). Our results show that such categorical classifications are 
unwarranted, and that their character is considerably more complex. Specifically, our 
study offers four substantive contributions to the BG literature, each of which nuances 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. BG scale  23,436 (22) 27,124 (3) 42,817 (18) 23,064 (23) 73,326 (71) 
2. BG scope 0.47 (0.05)  31,206 (7) 33,029 (16) 5,672 (24) 38,495 (77) 
3. R&D 0.25 (0.06) 0.04 (0.04)  52,200 (6) 3,086 (1) 37,627 (7) 
4. Leverage -0.07 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) -0.03 (0.01)  12,366 (9) 62,646 (29) 
5. Risk -0.12 (0.02) -0.04 (0.01) -0.04 0.25 (0.04)  38,266 (44) 
6. Performance 0.07 (0.02) -0.08 (0.03) 0.05 (0.02) -0.19 (0.03) -0.26 (0.03)  
 
Predictors 
Business group scope Performance 
Business group scale 0.47 (68.08) 0.09 (10.53) 
   
Business group scope  -0.13 (-15.62) 
Leverage  -0.13 (-16.45) 
R&D  0.02 (2.58) 
Risk  -0.22 (-28.79) 
Harmonic mean N 16,353  
X2 172.10 (0.00)  
GFI 0.99  
RMSR 0.02  
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the dichotomous categorical schema through which scholars and policy makers have 
tended to approach BGs.  
First, we conducted a meta-analysis synthesizing all evidence on the effect of 
affiliation on performance (Geyskens et al., 2009). Whereas this effect is negative and 
significant, its magnitude (-.02) offers no grounds to discard BGs as a dysfunctional 
organizational form. Rather, our research synthesis shows that the performance 
implications of affiliation are very heterogeneous, and must be qualified by the 
moderating effects of institutional contingencies and the mediating effects of strategic 
actions taken by group- and affiliate-level managers.    
Second, we unpacked the notion of ‘institutional voids’ (Khanna & Palepu, 
1997; 2000b) by exploring the moderating effects of a broad set of theoretically derived 
institutional variables on the focal relationship. We revealed that affiliates perform 
relatively well in contexts characterized by ‘soft’ voids in labor and financial market 
institutions, but also that BGs add no value in contexts lacking ‘hard’ infrastructure 
and actually impair affiliate performance in settings with underdeveloped legal 
institutions. Scholars and policy makers therefore need to avoid labeling national 
contexts in terms like “developed,” “emerging,” and “developing,” and instead place 
greater emphasis on the varied effects played by different types of institutions.  
Third, we identified differences in the revealed strategic choices of BG 
affiliates (relative to non-affiliates) and assessed the performance implications of these 
choices. We found that affiliates tend to be more leveraged, diversified, and locally 
oriented than their standalone counterparts, which explains much of the performance 
discount they incur. These results both reveal previously unidentified strategic 
mediators (e.g. financing and product-market strategies) and point to the 
underexplored effect of managerial processes on affiliate performance.  
Fourth, we advanced prevailing theoretical accounts of the drivers of group-
level performance (e.g. Chang & Hong, 2002; Luo & Chung, 2005; Mahmood & 
Mitchell, 2004). Whereas current theorizing often conflates various processes 
associated with BG size, we disentangle these into positive scale and negative scope 
effects. Owing to factors like size-related cost savings and increased market and 
political power, greater scale improves BG performance. However, greater scale also 
tends to broaden the operational scope of BGs which increases bureaucratic and 
control costs and negatively impacts their performance. Scope is therefore best seen as 
a mediator suppressing the otherwise positive effect of scale on group-level 
performance. 
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6.5.1 Complexity and nuance in the affiliation-performance relationship 
Our analyses reveal a small but significant negative relationship between affiliation 
and performance (cf. Hypotheses 1a and 1b). This suggests that on average the costs of 
BG affiliation, such as the agency problems described by Morck and Yeung (2003) and 
the insurance premiums discussed by Lincoln, Gerlach, and Ahmadjian (1996), slightly 
outweigh benefits like access to internal capital markets and dispute resolution 
mechanisms (Chang & Hong, 2000; Khanna & Palepu, 1997). However, more striking 
than this modest negative relationship, is the heterogeneity of the focal effect 
illustrated by the considerable differences found in the direction and strength of the 
performance effect of affiliation across national contexts (Table 3).  
Thus, our findings indicate that BGs are highly variegated, complex 
phenomena, implying that nuanced methodologies and theories are necessary to bring 
their core attributes to light. In terms of methodologies, we advocate research designs 
adopting middle-range perspectives (Merton, 1968), centering on conceptual 
frameworks that are more generic than descriptive case studies of individual groups 
and their affiliates, but also more specific than universalistic approaches that treat all 
cases as essentially similar. For instance, future research may be usefully directed 
towards in-depth comparative studies explaining cross-national performance 
differentials (see Table 3). We expect that these differences can only partly be traced to 
variation in institutional development and that cross-country differences in the 
behavior of managerial actors will also prove to be an important driver of BG 
performance.   
The theoretical frameworks used to understand BG behavior will likewise 
have to evolve and become more nuanced. To date, most BG studies have employed 
mono-theoretical lenses such as agency theory (Morck & Yeung, 2003), transaction cost 
theory (Luo & Chung, 2005), exchange theory (Keister, 2001), and the RBV (Guillén, 
2000). Whereas each of these theories offers a useful perspective on BG behavior and 
performance, none of them in isolation suffices to explain this complex and variegated 
organizational form. Therefore, we see a need for future studies offering concurrent 
tests of multiple theories, as well as studies developing and testing eclectic explanatory 
frameworks combining variables from multiple source theories. 
6.5.2 Local institutions and the institutional voids thesis 
Our meta-analytic approach allowed us to consider a more heterogeneous set of 28 
jurisdictions than any previous study (e.g. Khanna & Rivkin, 2001) in assessing the 
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moderating effects of institutions on the focal relationship. In addition to data obtained 
from earlier studies, we also collected data for 10 institutional variables pertaining to 
financial infrastructure as well as legal and labor market institutions. We thus 
considered a broader range of institutional-level variables than previous studies and 
explored their effects over a more inclusive set of national contexts. This allowed us to 
unpack the notion of “institutional voids,” which has emerged as a umbrella term for a 
nation’s stage of development (cf. Khanna & Palepu, 1997, Khanna & Palepu, 2000b), 
and our findings indicate that while some institutional-level factors moderate the focal 
relationship in the conventionally theorized direction, others do not.  
As suggested by the institutional voids thesis, we found that firms benefited 
from affiliation in contexts characterized by weak financial and labor market 
infrastructure (Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c). Yet, even though the view that affiliation 
benefits firms in contexts with weak legal safeguards is widely held (cf. Almeida & 
Wolfenzon, 2006), we find little evidence for this position. While our results support 
the institutional voids thesis in general, they also suggest the need for researchers and 
practitioners to make finer-grained distinctions between specific types of institutional 
voids and their consequences for firms and economies.  
Our findings indicate that we should exercise caution in drawing broad 
conclusions regarding institutional development and affiliate performance. Figure 1, 
which combines insights from our jurisdiction-level HOMA and MARA analyses 
(Tables 3 and 4), testifies to the need for further middle-range theorizing. Its horizontal 
axis was computed by transforming the scores of a given country on all statistically 
significant variables capturing institutional voids (Table 4) to z-scores, and then 
adding and averaging them, such that we obtain a scaled measure of institutional 
development ranging from near-perfect development (left) to grave voids (right). The 
vertical axis shows the country-specific mean effect sizes we retrieved (Table 3), 
ranging from substantial affiliate underperformance (bottom) to outperformance (top). 
The figure also portrays a best-fitting line, showing the general tendencies flowing 
from the empirical observations, obtained by regressing country-specific mean effect 
sizes on the first, second, third, and fourth power terms of these countries’ institutional 
development scores.  
It shows that the institutional voids thesis as it is conventionally stated is only 
applicable to the nations in the right-upper quadrant (e.g., Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey), 
where group membership compensates for missing institutions, and the left-lower 
quadrant (e.g., Belgium, France, and Japan), where affiliates suffer from the 
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conglomerate discount that is commonly observed in developed nations (Khanna & 
Palepu, 1997). However, the nations in the remaining two quadrants present some 
enigmatic questions for institutional voids theorists. Why do BG members do so well 
relative to unaffiliated firms in contexts with generally well-functioning institutions, 
like Malaysia, Singapore, and Sweden? And why do they do so unexpectedly poorly in 
contexts with severe voids, like Nigeria, Pakistan, and Peru? Additional studies are 
needed to explore why these outliers are so poorly explained by extant institutional 
voids theory, and to reveal which institutional variables are responsible for their 
counter-theorized positioning. 
 
Figure 1: Relationship between Institutional Voids and Affiliate Performancea 
 
a HID = high institutional development; LID = low institutional development. 
6.5.3  Strategic choices and affiliate performance 
Given the mixed and contingent findings of empirical research on the affiliation-
performance link (cf. Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Hypotheses1a and 1b), it is surprising 
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that little prior research has examined the influence on this relationship of affiliate-
level strategic processes. As noted above, only a few studies have explored how 
affiliation affects the strategic choices that firms make (e.g. Kim et al., 2004), and no 
prior work has explicitly evaluated the extent to which such choices mediate the focal 
relationship. On this point, our findings indicate that greater financial leverage and 
more diversified product market strategies are pathways associated with lower 
performance among BG affiliates. As both high levels of leverage and diversification 
are suggestive of pyramiding and tunneling behavior (cf. Morck & Yeung, 2003; 
Mitton, 2002), which results in the inefficient allocation of resources (Scharfstein & 
Stein, 2000), our findings are supportive of agency-theoretic perspectives on BGs, at 
least for affiliates that are on the high end of the leverage and diversification 
distributions. On the other hand, the application of other theoretical perspectives, such 
as the RBV (cf. Guillén, 2000) and the institutional voids thesis (cf. Khanna & Palepu, 
2000b), may be necessary to explain affiliation-strategy-performance dynamics among 
affiliates with moderate to low leverage and diversification levels.  
More generally, our findings are suggestive of an important role played by 
affiliate-level strategic choice in the affiliation-performance link. However, due to the 
scarcity of strategy variables in the body of primary empirical BG studies, we have 
been unable to evaluate a more comprehensive set of potential strategy mediators. We 
view this gap in the body of empirical research as an area of great opportunity for BG 
scholars. Our leverage and diversification findings provide evidence that certain 
strategic choices represent pathways through which BG affiliation can harm firm 
performance. On the other hand, given the evidence that many firms benefit from BG 
affiliation, there should also be other strategic choice pathways which lead to 
improved performance levels. Accordingly, we call for future research directed 
towards identifying those specific types of strategies and competence-building 
activities associated with superior performance among BG affiliates and reason that 
frameworks and hypotheses drawn from multiple theoretical perspectives represent a 
logical point of departure for such inquiries.  
6.5.4 Group-level size effects: Scale and scope both matter (differently) 
Our results on the effects of BG size on group-level performance highlight a salient 
distinction between the related effects of group scale (Hypothesis 4a) and scope 
(Hypothesis 4b). In this regard, we find that scope mediates the relationship between 
group-level scale and performance. More specifically, we find that while the direct 
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effect of scale is strongly positive, scale also tends to increase the operational scope of 
BGs and that such scope actually counteracts some of the performance-enhancing 
benefits of scale.  
In terms of their relevance to alternative theoretical accounts of the size-
performance relationship, these findings support views that size affords performance-
enhancing benefits related to economies of scale in central management functions (e.g. 
Amsden & Hikino, 1994), reputation benefits (e.g. Morck et al., 2005), and the 
accumulation of market and political power (e.g. Claessens et al., 2000b; Khanna & 
Yafeh, 2007). On the other hand, we find no benefits associated with scope, such as 
those suggested by Khanna and Palepu (1997), Chang and Hong (2000), and others. On 
the contrary, our results support the findings of Hoskisson, Johnson, Tihanyi and 
White (2005), who highlight the bureaucratic and other costs of managing widely 
diversified BGs. Thus, while some researchers (e.g. Khanna & Palepu, 1997) have 
argued that greater scope benefits BGs as it allows them to fill institutional voids in 
emerging economies, our findings indicate that the capacity to fill such voids through 
increased scope is not without concomitant costs (cf. Hoskisson et al., 2005). Viewed in 
this light, the evident scope of many BGs is better described as a cost of doing business 
in their institutional contexts, rather than as a source of competitive advantage in its 
own right.  
More generally, our findings concerning the contrasting effects of scale and 
scope suggest that the relationship between group size and performance is complex. 
That is, rather than being singular in nature, size consists of multiple contrasting 
effects. Like other findings reported earlier, these results point to the need for 
researchers, practitioners and policy makers to adopt theories and methodologies 
which allow them to make sufficiently fine-grained distinctions to capture the complex 
associations that underlie BG performance characteristics. In this respect, our findings 
highlight the need for BG researchers to distinguish between the effects of scale and 
scope both conceptually and empirically. Future research exploring how BG executives 
manage the complex trade-offs between scale benefits and scope costs and the effects 
such choices have on their group’s competence building and developmental 
trajectories can yield important new insights regarding the performance characteristics 
of this important organizational form.   
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6.5.5  Limitations 
While the various meta-analytical techniques we employed have allowed us to address 
several previously untested research questions, our study also has two limitations that 
can only be remedied by means of future primary BG studies. A first limitation is that 
while we have been able to identify mediating roles for variables like diversification 
and leverage at both the affiliate and group-levels of analysis, data limitations 
prevented us from exploring any cross-level interactions involving these variables. 
Future primary studies are needed, for example, to test whether group-level 
diversification leads to more focus amongst affiliates due to the intent of avoiding 
competition between affiliates (Gerlach, 1992), or to more affiliate-level diversification 
due to pyramiding and tunneling behavior (Morck & Yeung, 2003).  
A second limitation of our study design is that meta-analyses do not allow for 
modeling the influence of time, except in a crude way as a moderator of the focal effect 
(Coombs et al., 2010) as we have done in our MARA analyses. Additional primary 
longitudinal studies are therefore needed to capture more nuanced time-dependent 
performance effects of BG affiliation. For instance, several authors have suggested the 
hypothesis that the benefits of affiliation decrease over time, as the gradual filling of 
institutional voids by BGs creates positive externalities which erode the originating 
benefits of affiliation (Carney, Shapiro, & Tang, 2009) 
6.5.6 Conclusion 
BGs come in many shapes and sizes and their heterogeneity across time and place 
defies any simple explanation. So what should one conclude? On the evidence 
assembled in this paper, we conclude that highly polarized characterizations of BGs as 
either heroic paragons or as villainous robber barons are unwarranted and 
unproductive. Historical accounts tell us that their emergence and early establishment 
often occurred under very difficult institutional conditions and that they played a 
pivotal role in the early stages of many a country or region’s economic development 
(Carney & Gedajlovic, 2002a; Gerlach, 1992; Keister, 1998). These descriptions indicate 
that BGs are complex social and economic phenomena serving diverse purposes 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Yiu et al., 2007). As a result, BGs are likely to have multiple, 
conflicting, and complementary effects on their host societies and the firms that 
affiliate with them.  
We should then eschew mono-theoretical accounts which characterize BGs in 
singular terms, such as an internal capital market, an extraction device for wealthy 
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families, or a generalized response to chronic institutional failure, since they will likely 
divert attention away from their evident structural and strategic complexity and the 
kinds of performance they can attain. More productive in our view is research that 
employs insights from multiple theoretical streams and is attuned theoretically and 
methodologically to the complex tensions embodied in BGs. Thus, the development of 
appropriately nuanced theories and methodologies is both the challenge and 
opportunity for future research on this important and multifaceted organizational 
form. 
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Chapter 7. Do U.S. publicly listed family firms 
differ? Does it matter? A meta-analysis50 
 
ABSTRACT  
A research question that has recently risen to prominence in the strategy literature is 
whether publicly listed family firms (FFs) underperform or outperform other types of 
public corporations. An unambiguous answer to this question is absent from the 
literature because both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence are inconclusive 
across studies. Through a combination of research synthesis and theory-extension 
efforts, we shed new light on this relationship in three ways. First, we answer this 
open question by providing a meta-analysis of the relationship between family control 
and performance among U.S.-based firms, finding that the balance of evidence 
indicates that FFs outperform other types of public corporations. Second, we extend 
current theory by showing that FFs exhibit strategic patterns of behavior that differ 
from other public corporations, and that these patterns are a key driver of their 
superior performance. Third, we show that FF outperformance is not stable across 
first- and successor-generation-led firms. We also trace the source of this instability to 
intergenerational shifts in strategy and governance. Empirically, our study draws on a 
pooled database comprising 55 studies, 123 effect sizes, and 187,999 firm-year 
observations. 
7.1 Introduction 
Few would have predicted a decade ago the lavish attention placed on the humble 
family firm (FF) in leading management (e.g. Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia, 
Larraza-Kintana and Makri, 2003; Luo and Chung, 2005; Miller, Le Breton-Miller and 
Lester, 2010; Schulze et al., 2001) and finance (e.g. Anderson and Reeb, 2003a, 2003b; 
Bennedsen et al., 2007; Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006, 
2008) journals in the intervening period. Long neglected by scholars and considered as 
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archaic and unremarkable, a consensus has emerged in recent literature that the FF 
represents a unique and theoretically interesting organizational form for a number of 
related reasons.  
First, relative to the classic public corporation, which is characterized by the 
separation of ownership and control (Berle and Means, 1932; Chandler, 1977), the 
executives of FFs (and their families) often own a controlling stake. This unification of 
ownership and control has important implications in terms of the incentives 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003a), objectives (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Palmer and Barber, 
2001) and quality of top management (Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2005). Second, the 
maintenance of effective control in the hands of the family has important implications 
regarding the ability of the FF to acquire and make use of external sources of financial 
capital (Claessens et al., 2002; Peng et al., 2008) and skilled and professional human 
resources (Schulze et al., 2001). Third, the placement of family members in key 
managerial positions (Villalonga and Amit, 2006) has the effect of centralizing 
decision-making authority (Gedajlovic, Lubatkin and Schulze, 2004; Gomez-Mejia et 
al., 2003) and may lead to the adoption of important decisions on the basis of 
particularistic criteria (Carney, 2005; Luo and Chung, 2005). Fourth, their identification 
of a focal organization as a FF may influence the degree of attachment various 
stakeholders experience (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Lester and Canella, 2006) and, in 
particular, has significant implications regarding the treatment (and motivation levels) 
of family versus non-family employees (Schulze et al., 2001). Fifth, the 
transgenerational intent of FFs (i.e. the intent to hand over control of the firm to a 
succeeding generation of family members) results in complex executive succession 
issues not apparent in other firms (Bennedsen et al., 2007; Perez-Gonzalez, 2006). 
Transgenerational intent also has important implications regarding the effective time 
horizon for decision-making (Luo and Chung, 2005; Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2005, 
Miller, Le Breton Miller and Scholnick, 2008; Sraer and Thesmar, 2007) and the ability 
to develop complex capabilities based on tacit knowledge, social networks and 
experience (Arregle et al., 2007; Sirmon and Hitt, 2003) as well as reputation (Dyer and 
Whetten, 2006; Lester and Canella, 2006).  
Accordingly, as is evident in the range and quality of topics addressed by 
recent FF research in leading academic outlets, there is broad consensus in the 
literature that the FF represents a unique and theoretically interesting organizational 
form. Despite this agreement, FF research is still in a pre-paradigmatic state, and the 
field is cluttered by conflicting theories and findings, as well as significant open 
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questions regarding the essential characteristics and performance attributes of this 
ubiquitous organizational form (Schulze and Gedajlovic, 2010). On no point is the field 
more conflicted than it is over the basic question of whether FFs outperform or 
underperform other types of organizations in terms of their financial performance.  
The longer established view holds that FFs underperform due to inefficiencies 
associated with the personalization of authority in complex organizations (Weber, 
1947) and the relative superiority of non-family professional management (Chandler, 
1977). More recently, the underperforming view has been expressed through economic 
theorizing highlighting specific inefficiencies of FFs that stem from conflict between 
controlling and minority shareholders (e.g. Claessens et al., 2002) as well as value-
destroying tensions within the controlling family and between family and non-family 
employees (e.g. Schulze et al., 2001). These perspectives suggest that FFs are relatively 
inefficient organizations that survive in niche and non-competitive markets where 
they face little competition from more efficient forms of business enterprise. Set against 
these arguments are theoretical perspectives suggesting that FFs will outperform 
public corporations operated by salaried executives, due to various inefficiencies in the 
latter that are attributable to the separation of ownership and control (Berle and 
Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). More recent expressions of this perspective 
suggest that FFs benefit from the relative advantages of superior management (e.g. 
Miller et al., 2008) or capacities for developing certain rent generating capabilities (e.g. 
Sirmon and Hitt, 2003).  
Which of these views is supported by the body of empirical evidence? Despite 
scores of empirical studies examining this single issue, the answer to this fundamental 
question is still subject to a great deal of ambiguity and controversy, with theories and 
evidence available to support either view. In such situations, where there are a large 
number of studies with mixed and conflicting findings, meta-analytic techniques can 
play an important role in providing a comprehensive and rigorous assessment of the 
balance of evidence with data that are closer to definitive than those reported in any 
single primary study (Miller and Cardinal, 1994). With this paper, we provide such a 
synthetic meta-analysis in order bring the data from multiple studies and sources to 
bear on the open question of whether FFs underperform or outperform other types of 
business enterprise. We focus on how FFs perform in the context of U.S. medium- to 
large-sized publicly traded corporations, a setting explored by 55 prior empirical 
studies and one that is both highly competitive and where a well-developed legal and 
institutional environment requires organizations to establish and maintain specialized 
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exchange relationships and complex business systems (Coffee, 1999; Gilson, 2006). We 
achieve our aim of synthesizing all prior studies through the utilization of Hedges and 
Olkin-type meta-analytical techniques (HOMA: Hedges and Olkin, 1985). 
However, this paper seeks to go beyond assessing the balance of evidence on 
the underperformance versus outperformance issue and treat this initial objective as a 
point of departure from which we explore the processes and causal mechanisms that 
underlie FF performance differences. In particular, we theorize about and evaluate the 
extent to which FF performance differences are attributable to their tendencies with 
respect to particular strategic choices. To do so, we develop, model, and test novel 
hypotheses which posit that the FF-performance relationship is mediated by a firm’s 
strategic choices with respect to diversification, internationalization, and financing. To 
evaluate these theory-extending hypotheses, we make use of recent advances in meta-
analytic techniques which allow for path analysis through structural equations 
modeling (MASEM: Cheung and Chan, 2005).   
To further explicate the causal factors underlying FF performance 
characteristics, we hypothesize and evaluate the extent to which firms controlled by 
founding generations of family members outperform those controlled by successor 
generations. We also consider whether any observed performance differences across 
generations are attributable to variations in their strategic choices and governance 
practices. Using meta-analytic regression analysis (MARA: Lipsey and Wilson, 2001), 
we also further establish the robustness of our core findings against methodological 
moderating influences. In the closing sections of the paper, we review our findings in 
relation to the competing theories of FFs present in the literature and provide specific 
suggestions regarding open questions and fertile avenues for future research.  
7.2 Theory and Hypotheses 
The central question in strategic management is “why do some firms perform better 
than others?” (Barnett, Greve and Park, 1994: 11; Sirmon and Hitt, 2003: 340). Viewed 
in this light, the field of family business is still very much in a pre-paradigmatic state 
with many alternative theoretical perspectives offering a mixture of divergent and 
convergent views on the relative efficacy of the FF. To capture and parse the range of 
views on the performance characteristics of FFs, we provide Figure 1, which 
distinguishes between theoretical arguments based on the relative strengths and 
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weaknesses of FFs alongside the relative strengths and weaknesses of the classic public 
corporation, which is characterized by the separation of ownership and control. 
 
Figure 1: Theoretical Arguments Regarding the Relative Advantages and 
Disadvantages of Family Control 
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 Whereas both quadrants 1 and 4 capture perspectives suggesting that FFs will 
outperform classical public corporations, those from quadrant 1 suggest that this is 
due to inherent weaknesses in the latter, while quadrant 4 captures perspectives 
highlighting the relative strengths of FFs. 
 The primary theoretical explanation associated with quadrant 1 is the 
principal-agent (PA) variant of agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). According to this view, family control over the company obviates a variety of 
incentive problems endemic to arrangements where salaried professional managers 
with little or no ownership stake of the own exercise decision control over the firm on 
the behalf of widely dispersed shareholders (Berle and Means, 1932; Fama and Jensen, 
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1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In this view, family control provides owners with an 
enhanced ability to monitor and discipline managers (McConaugby et al., 1998). 
Consequently, PA theory is predicated on the ideas that salaried professional 
managers have the incentive to pursue non-profit-maximizing strategies, which benefit 
themselves at the expense of shareholders (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Marris, 1964) and 
widely dispersed shareholders have little incentive or ability to monitor their 
managerial agents (Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi, 1997). Conversely, the PA 
perspective also suggests that family control over a company provides strong 
incentives for owner-managers to manage costs efficiently (Brickley and Dark, 1987; 
McConaughy et al., 1998), to pursue profit-maximizing strategies (Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1972; Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998), and that members of the controlling 
family are ideally able and motivated to monitor and discipline salaried managers 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003a, 2003b). The PA variant of agency theory therefore 
suggests that family control will be positively associated with financial performance.  
 Though less well developed in the literature, there are additional perspectives 
suggesting that FFs will outperform classical corporations because of certain inherent 
strengths rather than due to the shortcomings of corporations. These perspectives are 
captured in quadrant 4 of Figure 1. Notable among such perspectives is Sirmon and 
Hitt (2003), which broke new ground by providing an analysis based on the Resource 
Based View of the firm (RBV), highlighting the advantages FFs have in managing and 
leveraging certain types of rent producing assets (i.e. human, social, patient and 
survivability capital). Consistent with Sirmon and Hitt’s RBV-inspired framework and 
their notion of survivability capital, Miller and his colleagues have argued that FFs 
often benefit from the profound commitment family managers provide to their firms, 
as well as a concomitant longer time horizon for decision-making (Miller et al., 2008). 
Others have similarly argued that FFs have unique strengths in developing, sustaining 
and appropriating value from various forms of social capital (Arregle et al., 2007; 
Gedajlovic and Carney, 2010). More generally, Le Breton-Miller and Miller (2006) 
assert that the governance properties of FFs engender competitive advantages tied to 
organizational resources that are hard to replicate or create in other firms.  
 In short, whether due to the inherent weaknesses of the classical public 
corporation or their own inherent strengths, there is a large body of research 
suggesting that FFs have relative advantages. Consequently, it is hypothesized that: 
 Hypothesis 1a: Family firms are more profitable than 
other forms of public corporations.  
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Although the view expressed in Hypothesis 1a is prominent in the family 
business literature, there are similarly well-grounded theoretical arguments predicting 
that FFs will underperform relative to other forms of corporations. These perspectives 
can divided into explanations emphasizing the relative strengths of the classical public 
corporation (quadrant 3), as well as those that point to inherent deficiencies of the FF 
form of organization (quadrant 2).  
The theoretical arguments corresponding to quadrant 3 are closely associated 
with Chandler’s body of work (Chandler, 1962, 1977, 1990) on corporations based in 
the U.S. and U.K. This perspective emphasizes the important role that professional 
salaried executives have played in developing and managing the sorts of complex 
organizational systems capable of reaping benefits from economies of scale and scope 
(Chandler, 1990). In this perspective, highly educated and trained professional 
managers (Chandler, 1977) vetted through competitive managerial labor markets 
(Fama, 1980) are uniquely suited to manage large and complex organizations. 
Chandler’s thesis that professional managers are inherently superior to those selected 
on the basis of family ties has been illustrated through detailed case studies and 
historical accounts by Chandler himself (Chandler, Amatori and Hikino, 1997; 
Chandler and Daems, 1980), as well as other business historians (e.g. Church, 1986).  
 The second set of theoretical perspectives suggesting that FFs will 
underperform other sorts of public corporations is based upon their own inherent 
weaknesses (quadrant 2). Prominent among these perspectives is the so-called 
Principal-Principal (PP) variant of agency theory (cf. Dharwadkar, George and 
Brandes, 2000). In this view, the control of a corporation by a group of family members 
creates various investment hazards for minority shareholders (Heugens, Van Essen, 
and Van Oosterhout, 2009; Peng and Jiang, 2010). In this respect, family control is seen 
as a device to entrench managers who are difficult to remove through proxy contests 
or the market for corporate control (Morck, Wolfenzon and Yeung, 2005; Young et al., 
2008). Such entrenchment allows for controlling families to utilize a variety of 
techniques, such as pyramid building (Morck and Yeung, 2003), tunneling (Bertrand 
and Schoar, 2006) or propping (Cheung, Rau and Stouraitis, 2006) to expropriate the 
wealth of minority shareholders for their own benefit. Such agency problems have 
been linked to inefficient resource allocation practices (Burkart et al., 2003) and higher 
effective costs of capital (Claessens et al., 2002; McConaughy, 1999) for family-
controlled firms, both of which put them at a relative disadvantage to other sorts of 
corporations.  
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 A second type of PP agency problem has been described by Jensen (1994) as 
“agency problems with one-self”. Closely associated with the work of Schulze and his 
colleagues (e.g. Schulze et al., 2001; Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino, 2003), this perspective 
is based on the core idea that the non-economically motivated preferences of FF 
management leads them to make decisions and adopt practices that threaten their own 
welfare, as well as that of those around them (Schulze et al., 2001: 102). In particular, 
these authors emphasize the negative effects of asymmetric altruism between parents 
and children, which may lead to practices favoring family members over more 
qualified employees (Schulze et al., 2003). Similarly, research by Gomez-Mejia and his 
colleagues finds that family managers may harm their firm’s profitability or even 
endanger its survival through their efforts to entrench familial control (Gomez-Mejia, 
Larraza-Kintana and Makri, 2003) or secure privately appropriable “socio-emotional 
wealth” (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). 
 Thus, along with the theory-based arguments supporting Hypothesis 1a, there 
are similarly compelling arguments supporting the position that FFs will 
underperform relative to other types of corporations. Given the compelling theoretical 
arguments on either side of this debate, we offer the following competing hypothesis 
to Hypothesis 1a, rather than opting to select one set of arguments over the other. In 
doing so, we treat the question of whether FFs outperform- or underperform other 
corporations as an open empirical question to be directly addressed through our 
subsequent meta-analyses.  
 Hypothesis 1b: Family firms are less profitable than other 
forms of public corporations.  
7.2.1 Family firm strategy and financial performance 
While many empirical studies have examined the relationship between family control 
and financial performance, only relatively few have looked at its effects on firm 
strategy (e.g. Anderson and Reeb, 2003b; Fernández and Nieto, 2005; Gomez-Mejia et 
al., 2010; Zahra, 2003) and none have explicitly examined the mediating role that 
revealed strategic choices play in the family control-performance relationship. In terms 
of Figure 1, the lack of prior evidence regarding the performance effects of strategic 
choices leaves open the important question of whether these strategies result in 
relative advantages (quadrant 4) or disadvantages (quadrant 2) for family-controlled 
corporations. Consequently, the body of empirical research on FFs is largely silent on 
the important questions of whether corporations under family control make distinctive 
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strategic choices, and, if so, whether their revealed strategies explain performance 
differences between them and other types of corporations. We reason that this gap is 
highly relevant for two main reasons.  
First, given the conflicting theory and evidence regarding the relative 
performance of family- and non-family-controlled corporations (cf. Hypotheses 1a and 
1b), we reason that research geared towards explicating the mediating strategic 
processes linking family control and performance outcomes can shed important light 
on the organization-level contingencies which underlie these conflicting research 
findings. Second, we reason that the use of strategy variables as controls in many of 
the empirical models tested in prior work indicates that these variables are empirically 
relevant. The presence of such variables in others’ empirical estimates also represents 
an opportunity to harvest their effects. We do so, and through the use of the advanced 
meta-analytic technique of MASEM (Cheung and Chan, 2005) utilize these strategy 
variables to evaluate previously unexplored hypotheses related to the mediating 
effects of firm strategy on the family control-financial performance relationship. In 
particular, we focus on three measures of firm strategy (i.e. diversification, 
internationalization and financial leverage), which appear frequently in empirical 
research on FFs. 
Diversification. Given the widely held view that FF managers are risk averse 
(e.g. Chandler, 1990; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001) as well as the extensive literature on risk 
reduction as an important motive for diversification (e.g. Amihud and Lev, 1981; 
Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998), it is surprising that scant empirical research has 
examined the effect of family control on corporate diversification.  
The PP agency perspective described in relation to quadrant 2 of Figure 1 
suggests that since family members have a large percentage of their wealth 
concentrated in the firms they control, they may have an incentive to favor corporate 
diversification in order to reduce the risk to their personal wealth. However, contrary 
to this view, two major empirical studies have found that family control is actually 
associated with less diversification. In the first study, Anderson and Reeb (2003b: 659) 
attribute their finding to the sound management of highly committed managers who 
“forgo corporate diversification because of its substantial negative effects” and because 
they perceive that “the firm-specific knowledge of an acquisition or new business lies 
beyond the firm’s competitive advantage”. These explanations are consistent with the 
view associated with quadrant 4 (Figure 1) that the commitment and quality of FF top 
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management represents a relative strength (Sirmon and Hitt, 2003). In the second 
study, Gomez-Mejia and colleagues (2010) also find a negative relationship between 
family control and diversification, which they attribute to a desire on the part of family 
members to retain control over the firm’s operations from which they receive socio-
emotional wealth. In this view, diversification threatens familial socio-emotional 
wealth, because it requires additional financing and human capital above that which 
can be provided by the family and, consequently, represents a risk to family control 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). As a consequence of their loss aversion with respect to the 
socio-emotional wealth they derive from corporate control, this view suggests that 
family managers will be more willing to “accept below-target performance relative to 
the performance of referent firms in order to retain family control” (Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2007: 112). 
Although these explanations of a possible negative relationship between 
family control and diversification imply that such strategic behavior has important 
performance implications, neither study directly evaluates the impact on corporate 
profitability of their observed lower diversification levels. Whereas Gomez-Mejia and 
associates (2010: 244) see lower diversification levels as the consequence of non-
economic motivations that are “difficult to defend on financial grounds”, Anderson 
and Reeb (2003b: 659) actually see the same restrained level of diversification as the 
outcome of a desire on the part of family managers to maximize shareholder wealth.  
In the strategy literature, firm-level diversification is widely seen as 
detrimental to firm performance, as it results in additional organizational complexity, 
which calls for a separate coordination function that can set targets, perform audits, 
and provide incentives (Chandler, 1962; Williamson, 1975). More greatly diversified 
firms are therefore generally less profitable, as their more focused competitors either 
do not incur such coordination costs or can shift a greater part of these costs to 
investors and other market parties (Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1988). We therefore 
expect that the greater product-market focus of FFs will have a positive effect on their 
performance vis-à-vis the generally more diversified non-family controlled 
corporation.  
Hypothesis 2a: Diversification mediates the relationship 
between family control and the financial performance 
of public corporations.  
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Internationalization. As is the case with diversification, only a few empirical 
studies have examined the relationship between family control and a corporation’s 
degree of internationalization. Gomez-Mejia and his associates (2010) find that FFs 
internationalize less than non-FFs. Analogous to their explanation of FF diversification 
activity, they theorize that this stems from a desire among family management to 
retain tight familial control and to safeguard the socio-emotional wealth it provides 
them. This view is supported by other research suggesting that FFs seek to avoid 
international operations, due to the costs and complexity associated with managing 
geographically dispersed operations (e.g. Fernández and Nieto, 2005). As a results, FFs 
may be less well equipped to manage complex international activities, because they 
may limit participation in the top management team to a small cadre of trusted 
insiders (Gedajlovic et al., 2004), and are accordingly less likely to recruit professional 
managers with detailed knowledge of international markets. Moreover, a family’s 
most valuable external ties and social capital may be embodied in the human capital of 
specific family members and their local networks (Areggle et al., 2007; Lester and 
Canella, 2006; Sirmon and Hitt, 2003) and these may have little value when transferred 
across international boundaries (Dixit, 2004; Gilson, 2007). In terms of Figure 1, these 
arguments and findings suggest that the resource-based competitive strengths of FFs 
(quadrant 4) do not transfer well to international markets. Accordingly, we expect FFs 
to engage in fewer international activities than non-family corporations.  
While no prior study has directly examined the performance implications of 
such a diminished tendency among FFs to engage in international activities, there is 
some indirect evidence suggesting the effect will be negative. In this regard, there 
appears to be broad agreement that the impact of internationalization on firm financial 
performance is generally positive (Hitt, Hoskisson, and Kim, 1997), because 
internationalization allows firms to tap into foreign factor markets more readily, avoid 
quota and tariffs through domestication of production, and leverage valuable firm-
specific skills across a wider range of product markets (Sanders and Carpenter, 1998). 
We therefore expect their greater focus on domestic markets will cause family-
controlled corporations to incur a performance discount relative to more 
internationally oriented non-family corporations.  
Hypothesis 2b: International orientation mediates the 
relationship between family control and the financial 
performance of public corporations.  
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 Financial leverage. Among the few studies that have directly examined 
whether family-controlled corporations employ different financing strategies than 
other firms, there is some agreement that FFs are less inclined to make use of debt 
financing and consequently have less levered capital structures. The utilization of 
greater debt financing is often seen as a factor that could increase the risk to both the 
financial and socio-emotional wealth that family members have concentrated in the 
firms they control (Anderson and Reeb, 2003b; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001, 2007, 2010; 
Mishra and McConaugby, 1999). In other words, because of the primacy of their claims 
on the firm’s cash flow (Jensen, 1986), payments to debt holders must be made before 
income flows to owners. As a consequence, debt financing not only increases the 
riskiness of cash flows to family owners, but also increases the risk of business failure 
or bankruptcy (Jensen, 1986). Similarly, debt covenants and the primacy of creditor 
rights represent binding constraints on family prerogatives, thereby increasing the risk 
that the family will lose control of the firm (Mishra and McConaughy, 1999), which 
puts the socio-emotional wealth that family members derive from FFs at risk (Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2010).  
Though there are both some theoretical arguments and results indicating that 
FFs avoid the use of debt financing, there is no direct evidence regarding the 
performance implications of such a strategic choice. Viewed from the perspective of PP 
agency theory (Figure 1, quadrant 2), the risk aversion and control needs of family 
members may lead to a firm’s underinvestment in risky, but potentially profitable 
activities (Chandler, 1990). On the other hand, others such as Anderson and Reeb 
(2003b), suggest that FFs may eschew debt financing due to sound business practice 
and the promotion of a longer time horizon for decision-making. There is some 
consensus in the literature that high levels of debt financing are detrimental to long-
term performance, because under conditions of high leverage excessive emphasis is 
placed on meeting short-term goals and preventing default risk rather than 
maximizing long-term firm value (Smith and Warner, 1979). Viewed in this light, the 
characteristic debt-avoiding financial strategies of FFs are likely to be a source of 
relative strength related to their long-term focus (cf. Anderson and Reeb, 2003b; 
Arregle et al., 2007; Miller, Le Breton and Scholnick, 2004; Figure 1, quadrant 4) rather 
than a weakness (cf. Figure 1, quadrant 2). We consequently hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis 2c: Financial leverage mediates the relationship 
between family control and the financial performance 
of public corporations.  
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In summary, we have reasoned that family corporate control tends to go 
hand-in-hand with a unique set of strategic choices in the areas of diversification, 
internationalization, and leverage. We have further reasoned that these strategic 
choices are likely to have previously unexplored implications regarding the 
performance differences between FFs and other types of corporations. We therefore 
hypothesized that the aforementioned strategic variables mediate the relationship 
between family control and financial performance in the manner illustrated in Figure 
2.   
 
Figure 2: Strategy Mediators of the Family Control – Financial Performance 
Relationship 
 
 
7.2.2 Family firm generation effects  
It is now widely accepted that corporations controlled by the founding generations of 
family members are more profitable than those controlled by successor generations 
(e.g. Bennedsen et al., 2007; Burkart et al., 2003; Perez-Gonzalez, 2006; Villalonga and 
Amit, 2006). In terms of Figure 1, this conventional wisdom suggests that while the 
relative strengths of FFs (quadrant 4) are dominant when the founding generation is in 
control, relative weaknesses caused by PP agency problems (quadrant 2) assert 
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themselves more aggressively in FFs controlled by successor generations. Thus, as a 
point of departure in our consideration of FF generational effects, we formally propose 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3a: Family firms controlled by founding 
generations are more profitable than those controlled 
by successor generations.  
 
Extending the theoretical logic behind Hypothesis 3a, we reason that a clear 
answer to the question of whether family-controlled corporations outperform or 
underperform other types of firms requires an analysis of how firms controlled by 
founding and successor generations differ. To provide such an analysis, we consider 
the extent to which founding and successor generation-controlled firms exhibit 
different tendencies with respect to their strategies and governance practices. These 
are questions that have not yet been closely examined in the body of empirical 
research on family-controlled corporations. With regard to the strategic behavior of 
successor-controlled FFs, we reason that the intra-family conflicts and agency 
problems described by Schulze and his colleagues (2001, 2003; cf. Figure 1, quadrant 2) 
are likely to lead to diminished managerial capacity and/or PP agency conflicts 
resulting in risk averse strategic behavior for several reasons. First, heir CEOs may be 
less capable than either founder or salaried professional CEOs (Burkart et al., 2003) 
because the latter represent a self- and circumstantially-selected group of driven 
individuals who are exposed ‘to the permanent pressure to perform from labor 
markets’ (Perez-Gonzalez, 2006: 1560), while heir CEOs are recruited from a shallower 
talent pool. Moreover, since an executive’s skill set is not fully inheritable, descendants 
will tend to regress towards the average talent level with each new generation.  
Additionally, in terms of their strategic behavior, successor-managed firms 
are more likely to be conservative in their orientation. For instance, they have been 
portrayed as less likely to engage in innovation (Morck, Stangeland and Yeung, 2000) 
and more concerned with wealth preservation over generations (e.g. Chandler, 1990). 
The number of heirs dependent on income from the FF is likely to increase with each 
successive generation and if such heirs have little direct involvement in the firm’s 
activities, they will tend to prefer that management disgorge cash rather than reinvest 
it in new corporate activities (Wong, 1985). Such generational dynamics suggest that 
FFs controlled by successor generations will be less innovative and growth-oriented 
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and more risk averse in their strategies than those controlled by founding generations. 
Formally stated, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 3b: Family firms controlled by successor 
generations adopt less innovative and more 
conservative (wealth preservation) strategies. 
Notwithstanding the strategic intent of successor-controlled FFs described 
above, family-controlled corporations are normally subjected to many of the same the 
capital market and institutional constraints that other publicly traded corporations face 
(cf. Walsh and Seward, 1990). Such pressures can impose discipline and narrow the 
discretion and ability of executives to pursue their favored strategies (Jensen, 1989). To 
manage and attenuate the impact of these constraints, research has shown that the 
executives of FFs (Faccio, Lang and Young, 2001) including those top managers at U.S.-
based publicly traded corporations (Villalonga and Amit, 2008), use a variety of 
governance practices such as the issuance of dual class shares which allow them to 
exert greater effective corporate control than their ownership stake would otherwise 
provide. Given the sub-optimal performance and strategies associated with control by 
successor generations (cf. Hypothesis 3a and 3b), we expect that the utilization of 
governance practices designed to augment family control will be more needed and 
widely employed by successor generations as compared to founding generations. 
Hypothesis 3c: Successor-generation-controlled FFs are more 
likely to adopt governance practices permitting family 
to exert greater corporate control than their ownership 
stake provides. 
7.3  Methods 
7.3.1 Sample and coding 
To identify the population of studies on the performance effects of family control in 
the context of U.S. publicly traded firms, we employed five complementary search 
strategies. First, we consulted several prior review articles (e.g. Astrachan and 
Zellweger, 2008; Sharma, 2004). Second, we explored five electronic databases: (1) 
ABI/INFORM Global, (2) EconLit, (3) Google Scholar, (4) JSTOR, and (5) SSRN, using 
the following search terms: ‘blockholder’, ‘families’, ‘family business’, ‘family control’, 
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‘family firm’, ‘family ownership’, ‘founder’, ‘founding family’, and ‘ownership 
concentration’. Third, we conducted a manual search of 25 leading economics, finance, 
and management journals. Fourth, we backward-traced all references reported in the 
studies identified in the first three steps of the search process, and forward-traced all 
articles citing these studies using Google Scholar and ISI Web of Knowledge. Fifth, we 
corresponded with 10 researchers whose papers did not contain effect size 
information, asking them for a correlation table. These five strategies yielded a final 
sample of 55 primary studies. We finished the search for data in December 2009. Table 
1 provides a description of the variables harvested from these primary studies that are 
included in our meta-analyses. 
7.3.2 HOMA procedure 
We use HOMA (Hedges and Olkin, 1985) to test Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 3a, 3b, and 3c. 
HOMA refers to a set of statistical procedures for calculating the meta-analytic mean 
correlation between two variables, as well as the corresponding confidence interval 
(Hedges and Olkin, 1985; Lipsey and Wilson, 2001). The data used in HOMA are 
effects capturing the associational strength of the focal relationship in a given sample, 
such as the Pearson product-moment correlation r or the partial correlation coefficient 
rxy.z. In this study we employ both r and rxy.z. We use r because it is easily interpretable 
and a scale-free measure of linear association. Yet r is a bivariate measure, which 
ignores the effect of other variables researchers may use as controls in tests of the focal 
relationship. We therefore also use rxy.z., which can be computed directly from 
regression results (Doucouliagos and Ulubaşoğlu, 2008). In our case, rxy.z captures the 
association between family control (X) and performance (Y), given a set of n control 
variables (Z).51 When multiple measurements of a focal effect such as family control, 
diversification and firm performance are reported, we include all of them in our 
analyses, as Monte Carlo simulations show that procedures using the complete set of 
measurements outperform those representing each study by a single value in areas like 
parameter significance testing and parameter estimation accuracy (Bijmolt and Pieters, 
2001). 
                                                             
51 The partial correlation coefficient is calculated as follows:
)( 2
2
dft
t
  , where t is the t-statistic and df 
represents the degrees of freedom. Note that this formula will always produce positive numbers, so it 
is necessary to convert it to negative numbers if the regression coefficients are negative (see Greene 
2008 chapter 3). 
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Table 1: Description of Variables 
Variables Description 
Public family firm A variable to indicate whether the firm is public family firm or a 
non-family firm. 
Accounting performance Any indicator of the financial performance of the firm that is 
expressed in the form of an accounting-based measure of firm 
profits (ROA, ROE, ROS, ROI, EPS, and PM). 
Market performance Any indicator of the financial performance of the firm that is 
expressed in the form of a market-based measure of firm value 
(stock returns, market-to-book ratio, Tobin’s Q). 
Diversification A variable which reflects the degree to which firms are 
simultaneously active in many different businesses (entropy index, 
Herfindahl index, or number of segments). 
Internationalization A variable which reflects the degree of international orientation of 
an enterprise in terms of the presence of international trade 
(number of foreign countries) and the intensity of international 
trade (ratio of export to total sales). 
Leverage A variable which reflects the degree of leverage of the firm, 
commonly measured as ratio of total debts to total assets. 
Risk A variable which reflects the degree to which the financial 
valuation of a firm’s stock varies in relation to movements of the 
broader market. A commonly used measure of such risk is the Beta 
of a firm’s stock, computed by regressing a firm’s monthly stock 
return on the corresponding country’s market index return. 
Firm size An indicator of the size of the firm commonly measured as a firm’s 
total assets, sales, or employees. 
Outside blockholder The extent to which ownership is in the hands of blockholders 
other than the founding family. 
Dual class shares A variable measuring the difference between control rights and 
cash flow rights held by the controlling shareholder. 
Published article A dummy variable measuring whether a specific study was 
published in a scholarly journal (1) or not (0). 
Peer reviewed article A dummy variable measuring whether a specific study was 
published in a scholarly peer reviewed journal (1) or not (0). 
ISI rated (5 year period) A dummy variable indicating whether a journal has continuously 
been included in the ISI Social Science Citation Index over the past 
5 years (1) or not (0). 
Top 10 journals A dummy variable indicating whether a journal belongs to the 
sample subset of 10 journals with the highest 5-year average rating 
in the ISI Social Science Citation Index (1) or not (0).  
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Since HOMA procedures assume that effect sizes are normally distributed, we 
use Fisher’s (1928) Zr-transformation to correct for possible skewness in the effect size 
distribution (Hedges and Olkin, 1985).52 In line with current conventions, we used 
random-effects HOMA for combining study estimates (Geyskens et al., 2009; 
Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). To estimate mean effect size appropriately, differences in 
precision across effect sizes have to be accounted for, so we weight effect sizes by their 
inverse variance weight w (Hedges and Olkin, 1985): the inverse of their squared 
standard error.53 We also use these weights to calculate the standard error of the mean 
effect size and its confidence interval.54  
7.3.3 MASEM procedure 
We use MASEM, which combines the techniques of structural equation modeling with 
those of meta-analysis (Cheung and Chan, 2005; Viswesvaran and Ones, 1995), to test 
Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c. MASEM allows us to assess all necessary conditions for a 
mediation effect (Baron and Kenny, 1986), notably whether: (1) FFs score differently on 
all three hypothesized mediating variables (i.e., diversification, internationalization, 
                                                             
52 Fisher’s Zr transformed correlations are calculated as follows: ¹¸
·
©¨
§

 
r
rzr 1
1ln
2
1
, where r is the 
untransformed correlation coefficient.   
53 w is calculated as follows: 
Tvse
w
i
i ˆ
1
2  , where SE is the standard error of the effect size and 
Tvˆ is the random effects variance component. 
, which is in turn calculated as: 
3
1).(.  nzes r  
, and the formula of random effect variance is: 
¦ ¦
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kQv T
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1
Tˆ  
54 The meta-analytic mean is calculated as follows: ¦
¦ u 
w
ESw
ES
)(
, with its standard error: 
¦ wseES
1
, and with its 95% confidence interval computed as: 
)(96.1 ESseESLower  , )(96.1 ESseESUpper   
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and leverage); (2) FFs underperform or outperform other firms in absence of these 
mediators; (3) the predicted mediators have a significant unique effect on performance; 
and (4) the FF effect on performance is affected when the mediators are added to the 
model. We also control for the effect of firm size and risk on a firm’s revealed strategy 
choices, because both have long been recognized as important contingency variables 
that firms consider in strategic decision making (Beatty and Zajac, 1994). Jointly, this 
yields the following system of structural equations: 
 
(3) Diversification = β1 family firm + β2 risk + β3 size + ε 
(4) Internationalization = β4 family firm + β5 risk + β6 size + ε 
(5) Leverage = β7 family firm + β8 risk + β9 size + ε 
(6) Performance = β10family firm + β11 diversification + β12 internationalization +  
β13 leverage + ε 
 
As testing these equations independently could produce biased estimates, due to 
the potential endogeneity of firms’ strategy choices on performance, we test them 
concurrently to avoid simultaneity biases (Geyskens et al., 2009). MASEM tests foresee 
in a two-stage procedure. First, effect size information for all possible correlations 
between independent and dependent variables are combined into pooled estimates to 
produce a meta-analytic correlation matrix (Viswesvaran and Ones, 1995). Second, this 
matrix is subjected to regular maximum likelihood structural equation modeling 
(Cheung and Chan 2005). We use the harmonic mean number of observations of all 
included effect sizes as our sample size (N = 7,257), to compute correct, but 
conservative t-values for the parameter estimates (Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar, 
2006). 
7.3.4 MARA procedure 
Following Lipsey and Wilson (2001), we employ MARA to evaluate the robustness of 
our results. MARA is a special type of weighted least squares (WLS) regression 
analysis, designed to assess the relationship between effect size and moderator 
variables and model previously unexplored heterogeneity in the effect size 
distribution (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001). As we include all available studies in our 
analysis, we have to ensure the robustness of our findings against two data quality 
concerns. A first concern is that comprehensive sampling, to some extent, results in 
overlapping firm-year observations. To test whether sampling overlap materially 
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affects a focal relationship, we incorporate ‘same data’ control variables in our 
regression models. These controls consist of a set of dummy variables, one for each 
subset of (partially) overlapping samples. A second concern relates to the inclusion of 
studies with varying publication status and/or quality. To assess whether publication 
status or quality affect a focal relationship, we include a ‘published paper’ dummy in 
our regression models and control for journal impact factors in separate r-based 
HOMA analyses. 
To obtain correct parameter estimates, effect sizes must be weighted by their 
precision, so we employ WLS regression. Again, the preferred weighting variable is w 
(Hedges, 1982; Hedges and Olkin, 1985). We use a modified type of WLS because most 
statistical packages provide correct estimates of regression coefficients, but incorrect 
standard errors and significance levels for MARA (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001). We 
estimate regression parameters using mixed-effects models (Geyskens et al., 2009; 
Lipsey and Wilson, 2001). These attribute effect size variability to systematic between-
study differences and firm-level sampling error (as in fixed-effects models) to a 
remaining unmeasured random component (as in random effects models).  
7.4 Results 
Table 2 reports the r- and rxyz-based HOMA results related to Hypotheses 1a and 1b. 
These results show that US publicly-listed FFs outperform the control group (i.e. non-
family publicly-listed firms). In particular, we find that the overall mean r for the focal 
relationship is .07 (K=123). Following Hedges and Olkin (1985), we find that the 
associated 95 percent confidence interval around the mean effect size does not include 
zero, indicating a statistically significant positive relationship. Further, our analyses 
using rxyz-based HOMA which controls for the effects of firm age, size, and industry 
yield similar results (mean rxyz = .05; k = 49).   
Our finding of a performance advantage for FFs is robust across alternative 
measures of performance (see: Table 2). To assess the possibility that our results are an 
artifact of family control being endogenous upon firm performance (cf. Demsetz and 
Villalonga, 2001), we conducted an rxyz-based HOMA on the subset of studies (k = 6) 
that include endogeneity controls. In these tests, we find a mean rxyz that is nearly 
identical to that obtained on the larger sample (.06 versus .05), suggesting that 
endogeneity is not a concern. On the basis of these tests, we conclude that family 
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control is positively associated with performance among US publicly listed firms. 
Consequently, Hypothesis 1a is supported and Hypothesis 1b is rejected. 
 
Table 2: HOMA Results for the Focal Relationshipa, b 
a Mean effect sizes marked with an asterisk (*) are statistically significant (p < .05). 
b k = number of samples; N = total sample size; SE = the standard error of the mean effect size; CI 95% 
= 95 percent confidence interval around the meta-analytic mean; Q test = Hedges and Olkin (1985) chi-
square test for heterogeneity. 
7.4.1 FF strategy and financial performance 
Tables 3 and 4 report the results pertaining to Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c. Table 3 
depicts the meta-analytic correlation matrix. The cells below the diagonal represent 21 
separate meta-analyses and report the meta-analytic mean correlation and the 
standard error (SE) for each relationship. Above diagonal cells report the number of 
observations (N) and the number of samples (k) on which the meta-analytic mean is 
based. Mean effects and standard errors (printed in bold) indicate the presence of 
moderating variables as indicated by a significant Q-test.  
Table 4 contains MASEM results which support Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c. 
Overall, the model fits the data well (χ2 = 361.06; RMSR = .099; GFI = .99), and 
demonstrates that all three hypothesized strategy variables mediate the focal 
relationship. First, FFs are less diversified than non-FFs (β = -.03, p < .05). This benefits 
FFs, because diversification tends to worsen FF performance (β = -.04, p < .05). Second, 
in comparison with non-FFs, FFs are less internationally oriented (β = -.05, p < .05). 
This hurts their relative performance, because the more internationalized FFs become, 
the better their financial results (β = .21, p < .05). Third, FFs have lower leverage ratios 
than non-FFs (β = -.09, p < .05). This is beneficial to their performance, as increased 
Predictor K N Mean SE CI 95% Q test 
r-based HOMA results 
Family firm to firm 
performance 
123 187,999 0.07* 0.01 0.06 / 0.09 1,338.79 (0.00) 
Accounting measures 67 88,309 0.06* 0.01 0.04 / 0.08 634.01 (0.00) 
Market measures 56 99,690 0.08* 0.01 0.06 / 0.10 678.67 (0.00) 
rxyz-based HOMA results 
Family firm to firm 
performance 
49 103,451 0.05* 0.00 0.04 / 0.06 92.54 (0.00) 
Accounting measures 13 31,795 0.05* 0.01 0.04 / 0.06 8.94 (0.71) 
Market measures 36 71,656 0.05* 0.01 0.04 / 0.06 81.81 (0.00) 
Endogeneity control 6 13,258 0.06* 0.01 0.04 / 0.08 5.07 (0.41) 
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leverage is detrimental to their results (β = -.14, p < .05). As the direct relationship 
between FFs and performance is stronger in the path model (β =.09, p < .05) (after 
controlling for risk, firm size, and the strategic variables), we conclude that the focal 
relationship is partially mediated by FF strategic choices. Formal tests confirm that a 
significant portion of the FF outperformance effect is carried through the strategy 
mediators (Sobel: z = 7.65, p < .001; Aroian: z = 7.64, p < .001; Goodman: z = 7.68, p < 
.001; cf. MacKinnon et al., 1995).  
7.4.2 Generation effects on financial performance and strategy 
Table 5 reports results related to Hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 3c. The results support 
Hypothesis 3a. Founder-led FFs outperform the control group of non-family controlled 
firms by a considerable margin (.15). However, the performance of FFs drops rather 
dramatically when successor generations take over, to below that of the control group 
(-.05), indicating relative underperformance of post-succession FFs.  
The results also largely confirm Hypotheses 3b and 3c. Hypothesis 3b is 
concerned with intergenerational changes in substantive strategizing. Whereas 
founder-led FFs invest considerably more in R&D activities than the control group 
(.16), successor-led FFs invest substantially less (-.18). Likewise, founder-led FFs are 
more risk-prone than professionally managed firms (.15), whereas successor-led FFs 
are less so (-.06). Jointly, these results suggest that after founder succession, FFs lose 
much of their entrepreneurial character and become more geared more towards 
wealth preservation than maximization (cf. Chandler, 1990). 
Hypothesis 3c is concerned with intergenerational differences in control 
preservation strategies. Since, external shareholders who own large blocks of shares 
(i.e. ‘blockholders’) are in a stronger position to monitor and discipline top-managers 
than widely dispersed shareholder (cf. Berle and Means, 1932), we expect that 
managers seeking to maintain control over their firm will avoid such forms of equity 
ties. In this respect, we find that in general FFs are less likely than non-family 
controlled firms to have large block shareholders, but this tendency is much more 
pronounced in firms controlled by successor (-.16) than founding generations (-.07). 
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Table 5: Correlation-Based HOMA Results for Generation Effectsa 
a Mean effect sizes marked with an asterisk (*) are statistically significant (p < .05). 
 
Similarly, the use of dual class shares with unequal voting rights is widely 
recognized as a device used to augment insider control relative to outsiders 
(Villalonga and Amit, 2008), and again, while we find that this practice is more 
common in FFs than non-FFs, it is much more widely used in successor (.36) than 
founding generation led FFs (.20). Together, these results indicate that successor 
generation controlled FFs are more likely to adopt governance practices permitting 
family members to exert greater corporate control than their ownership stake 
provides. Thus, Hypothesis 3c is supported. 
Predictor K N Mean SE CI 95% Q test 
Performance variables       
First generation to firm 
performance 
21 27,444 0.15* 0.03 0.10 / 0.21 437.53 (0.00) 
Successor generations to firm 
performance 
13 22,280 -0.05* 0.02 -0.10 / -0.01 126.11 (0.00) 
       
Substantive strategy variables       
First generation to R&D 6 6,853 0.16* 0.06 0.04 / 0.28 209.82 (0.00) 
Successor generation to R&D 3 5,330 -0.18* 0.07 -0.31 / -0.05 20.93 (0.00) 
       
First generation to risk 13 19,465 0.15* 0.03 0.09 / 0.21 140.50 (0.00) 
Successor generation to risk 8 16,642 -0.06* 0.02 -0.10 / -0.02 45.45 (0.00) 
       
First generation to leverage 10 11,835 -0.03 0.02 -0.08 / 0.02 52.00 (0.00) 
Successor generation to leverage 5 9,906 -0.12* 0.06 -0.23 / -0.01 104.34 (0.00) 
       
Governance variables       
First generation to outside 
blockholder 
4 2,367 -0.07* 0.03 -0.13 / -0.01 6.52 (0.09) 
Successor generation to outside 
blockholder 
1 674 -0.16 - - - 
       
First generation to dual class 
shares   
4 2,367 0.20* 0.08 0.04 / 0.36 44.52 (0.00) 
Successor generation to dual 
class shares 
2 2,784 0.36* 0.02 0.32 / 0.40 1.10 (0.29) 
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7.4.3 Robustness checks   
Table 6 and a non-tabularized MARA analysis contain additional information 
concerning the robustness of our results. As described above, we have made extensive 
efforts to include all available empirical studies in our meta analyses. While such a 
comprehensive inclusion strategy is highly desirable (cf. Eden, 2002; White, 1994), it 
also raises issues pertaining the possible effects of overlapping samples and the 
publication status and outlet quality of the primary studies included in the meta 
analyses. Sampling overlap may lead to the inclusion of samples with similar 
correlation structures. To assess the materiality of this problem in the context of our 
study, we estimated a MARA model in which a dummy variable was included for 
each set of primary samples based on (partially) overlapping firm-year data. The 
model constant (i.e., the control variable-adjusted mean correlation) produced by this 
analysis is .07. Feingold’s z-test for meta-analytic mean differences (Feingold, 1992) 
shows more formally that the differences between the corrected and uncorrected mean 
correlations are not statistically significant (z = .64; p = .52), indicating that sampling 
overlap does not materially affect our results.  
Table 6 reports a separate set of r-based HOMA results, which explores the 
publication outlet quality differences issue. The table reports the meta-analytic means 
of four nested sets of effect sizes, notably all effects published in: (1) academic journals 
(k = 85), (2) peer-reviewed academic journals (k = 79), (3) peer-reviewed academic 
journals with a five-year ISI rating (k = 63), (4) the top-10 peer-reviewed academic 
journals in our dataset, as measured by their five-year ISI impact factor (k = 43). All 
mean correlations are within the .05 to .08 range. As a consequence of these tests, we 
conclude that publication outlet characteristics do not meaningfully moderate the focal 
relationships evaluated. 
 
Table 6: Correlation-Based HOMA Results for Source Quality Effectsa 
a Mean effect sizes marked with an asterisk (*) are statistically significant (p < .05). 
 
Criteria K N Mean SE CI 95% Q test 
Published article 85 102,437 0.08* 0.01 0.06 / 0.10 738.11 (0.00) 
Peer reviewed article 79 98,753 0.07* 0.01 0.05 / 0.09 685.18 (0.00) 
ISI rated (5 year period) 63 74,360 0.08* 0.01 0.05 / 0.10 549.29 (0.00) 
Top 10 journals 43 65,782 0.05* 0.01 0.03 / 0.07 430.42 (0.00) 
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7.5 Discussion and Directions for Future Research 
As noted in our introduction, the past decade has been marked by a substantial and 
growing interest in the family business enterprise in leading management, economics, 
and finance journals. Also, as evidenced by the quality and range of research being 
conducted on them, we noted that a consensus has emerged in the literature that FFs 
represent a unique and theoretically interesting organizational form. Despite (or 
possibly because of) this lavish attention placed on FFs by established scholars 
adopting a broad range of theoretical and disciplinary perspectives, this body of 
knowledge has been characterized as a “cluttered and conflicted landscape” (Schulze 
and Gedajlovic, 2010: 121). As a point of departure in our analysis, we employ meta-
analytic techniques to take stock of the available empirical evidence on these areas of 
dissensus and contention. Subsequently, we develop and test novel theory-extending 
hypotheses which address gaps in the literature regarding the mediating strategic 
processes linking family control with performance outcomes as well as to explicate 
strategy and governance differences between founder and successor controlled FFs. In 
this section, we describe three general areas of contributions provided by this study 
and discuss their implications regarding open questions in the body of FF research and 
the types of future research efforts needed to address them. 
7.5.1 Family firms outperform in competitive and complex business environments 
We use research synthesizing meta-analytic techniques to assess of the balance of 
evidence on the question of whether FFs outperform or underperform other types of 
firms in competitive business environments. As detailed above and summarized in 
Figure 1, alternative theoretical perspectives on this fundamental question are in clear 
contrast and some empirical evidence exists that can be used to support starkly 
different points of view. In situations such as these, research synthesizing meta-
analytic techniques like HOMA can be used productively to harvest and combine the 
findings reported by multiple studies in order to address open and contentious issues. 
We find that family control has a modest, but statistically significant positive effect on 
firm performance. Moreover, we find that the performance-enhancing effect of family 
control is not endogenous to the explanatory variables commonly employed in studies 
on FF performance (Table 2) and is robust across both alternative model specifications 
and measures of performance.  
Given that the primary studies included in our dataset are empirical inquiries 
of U.S.-based publicly listed firms, our findings indicate that the family business 
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enterprise enjoys performance-enhancing advantages in precisely the sort of highly 
competitive and complex business environment that many scholars see as 
incompatible with its capabilities, resources, and managerial capacities (cf. Chandler, 
1990). As such, our analysis represents a strong test of the performance characteristics 
of FFs insofar as the data is drawn from firms operating in an environment thought to 
be inhospitable to them. Thus, our results offer strong support for Hypothesis 1a as 
well as for theoretical perspectives suggesting that family control provides net 
performance advantages (e.g. Sirmon and Hitt, 2003).   
 To date, a large body of research has emerged describing the sources of 
relative competitive advantages FFs possess in developing and emerging economies 
(e.g. Luo and Chung, 2005; Peng and Jiang, 2010; Whitley, 1999), but research 
regarding their possible advantages in developed economies is still in its formative 
stage (Schulze and Gedajlovic, 2010). The presumption in much of the emerging / 
developing market literature is that the relative strengths of FFs pertain to advantages 
they possess in developing and utilizing types of social capital (e.g. Granovetter, 2005), 
reputational assets (e.g. Carney and Gedajlovic, 2002) and their capacity to excel at 
informal contracting (e.g. Gilson, 2007), which allow them to fill institutional voids 
better than other types of firms. By theorizing about the advantages that FFs have in 
relation to their ability to address problems associated with organizing business 
activities in the presence of weak institutional support, this literature suggests that the 
advantages of FFs are context-specific and not likely to be applicable to highly 
developed business environments such as the U.S.  
Our findings indicating a net positive performance effect of family control 
among U.S. publicly-traded firms brings into question this line of argumentation. 
More generally, it raises questions concerning the extent to which FF advantages are 
contextually bound and suggests that researchers need to re-examine existing 
theoretical accounts regarding the sorts of institutional arrangements which most 
advantage and disadvantage them. We therefore conclude that there is a compelling 
need for additional cross-national comparative research examining the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of FFs in relation to specific types of formal and 
informal institutional features (e.g. legal, financial, economic, and labor market 
infrastructure) as well as research which examines how their strategic and capability 
development processes adapt, or fail to adapt, to differing types of local requirements. 
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7.5.2 Strategy differences as a source of advantage 
Through the use of meta-analytic structural equations modeling techniques (i.e. 
MASEM), we have been able to evaluate theory-extending hypotheses which specify 
strategic pathways linking family control with performance outcomes. Utilizing this 
approach, we were able to harvest effects pertaining to the diversification, 
internationalization, and financing strategies from a sufficient number of primary 
studies to assess whether they act as mediators in the family control – performance 
relationship. While the tendencies of FFs with respect to these strategies have been 
examined in a few earlier studies (e.g. Anderson and Reeb, 2003b; Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2010), these studies did not examine the performance implications of such choices. 
Through our MASEM analyses we corroborated Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c, 
providing some new evidence and insights regarding the complex causal chain linking 
family control to specific strategic choices and ultimately to firm performance. In 
particular, and in accord with the hypothesized effects portrayed in Figure 2, we find 
that whereas the tendency of FFs to engage in fewer international ventures than non-
FFs harms their performance, their inclinations to diversify less and utilize less debt 
provide them with profit-enhancing advantages. These findings suggest that the net 
positive effect of family control on performance (cf. Hypothesis1a and Table 2) is 
partially attributable to specific strategic choices made by FF managers, rather than to 
inherent weaknesses in other forms of business enterprise.  
These results offer support for the RBV and other perspectives emphasizing 
the inherent advantages of FFs (e.g. Arregle et al., 2007; Le Breton-Miller and Miller; 
2006; Sirmon and Hitt, 2003, and quadrant 4 of Figure 1). In considering these findings, 
we reason that an open question facing family business scholars is why non-FFs are 
unable to close the performance gap by readily mimicking the performance-enhancing 
patterns of strategic decision-making that benefit FFs? We suspect that some answers 
to this largely unaddressed question lie in the path-dependent resource accumulation 
trajectories characterizing the life cycle of FFs, which are paved with unique learning 
obstacles and opportunities.  
For FFs, their pattern of investment in social assets of predominantly local 
value, like social capital, reputation, and business relationships (Arregle et al.,2007; 
Sanders and Nee, 1996) appear to hamper their ability to exploit new international 
business opportunities (Figure 2 and Table 4). At the same time, their need for autarky 
during their formative stages in order to surmount their unique resource constraints 
(Carney, 2005) can harbor important learning opportunities (Baker and Nelson, 2005) 
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and provide the basis for the development of valuable tacit knowledge and routines in 
FFs. These long-learnt practices born from early resource privation are likely to be 
difficult to imitate for less resource-constrained firms.  
Similarly, with respect to our diversification findings, we note that FFs often 
grow around a distinct set of personal interests and competencies that focuses them on 
a delineated set of core activities and reduces their inclination to invest in new 
businesses which lie beyond the family’s knowledge set (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). 
We suspect that such restraint is more difficult to enact in non-FFs because they are 
more susceptible to capital market pressures compelling their managers to achieve 
profit and growth targets (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a). Looking forward, a challenge 
for scholars is to more precisely identify and explain the barriers to imitation which 
underlie such strategy mediated performance advantages of FFs identified here. 
7.5.3 The successor generation discount and its implications for future research 
The findings related to our final set of hypotheses confirm (Hypothesis 3a) and add 
additional nuance (Hypothesis 3b and 3c) to prior research regarding performance 
differences between founding and successor generation FFs (e.g. Bennedsen et al., 2007; 
Villalonga and Amit, 2006). That is, consistent with prior research, we find that firms 
controlled by founding generations are substantially more profitable than those 
controlled by successor generations (Table 5). In fact, successor generation FFs 
underperform not only founding generation FFs, but also non-family public 
corporations, effectively turning the founding generation premium into a successor 
generation discount (Table 5). These findings suggest a stark difference in the 
performance characteristics of first and successive generation FFs. These same results 
suggest that the general performance advantages of FFs (Hypothesis 1a) are driven by 
first generation, founder-controlled firms.  
While the lower performance levels of successor generation firms are well-
documented in prior research (e.g. Bennedsen et al., 2007; Perez-Gonzales, 2006; 
Villalonga and Amit, 2006), the empirical literature is largely silent on the possible 
strategic and governance causes behind the successor discount. Our findings, which 
highlight the different strategic and governance choices made by founding and 
successor generation FFs, are suggestive of some of the factors that explain the drop in 
successor generation FF performance. Of note, our findings indicate that successor 
firms employ more conservative strategies by investing much less in R&D and by 
generally avoiding risk (Table 5). Moreover, we find that successor FFs are less likely 
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to have their shares in the hands external blockholders (Table 5) and more likely to 
utilize dual class shares (Table 5), traits suggestive of attempts to entrench family 
control and avoid external constraints on the discretion of the controlling family 
(Villalonga and Amit, 2008).  
The picture of successor firms that emerges from a consideration of these 
findings is one of less innovative and more risk averse firms using governance devices 
to entrench family control and resist external demands for greater accountability. In 
contrast, firms controlled by founding generations appear highly innovative, risk 
taking, and much more profitable. In terms of Figure 1, these findings suggest that 
while theories from quadrant 4 (e.g. RBV) may best explain the behavior and 
performance of founding generation FFs, other theories such as PP agency theory 
(Dhawadkar et al., 2000; Peng and Jiang, 2010) and the work of Schulze and his 
associates (2001) on asymmetric familial altruism from quadrant 2 may be more 
applicable to those controlled by successor controlled FFs. 
More generally, these findings not only provide some insights regarding 
possible causes of the successor generation discount, they also suggest that founder 
and successor-controlled FFs are quite distinct in terms of their strategic behaviors. As 
a consequence, we reason that the successor discount may actually be an artifact of 
more profound differences regarding their respective organizational-level process. To 
date, the primary distinction emphasized in most FF research has been between 
family- and non-family-controlled firms (Hypothesis 1a, 1b). Our findings indicate that 
founding and successor controlled FFs may be similarly distinct, but we note that this 
distinction has only recently begun to be considered in empirical research (e.g. 
Bennedsen et al., 2007; Miller et al., 2007; Villalonga and Amit, 2006) and these few 
studies have focused on differences in performance outcomes rather than differences 
in strategic or governance choices. As such, scarcely little beyond the results reported 
here (Hypothesis 3b and 3c; Table 5) is known about the strategic and governance 
processes that underlie the successor discount effect.  
Thus, we see a compelling need for additional primary studies, which explore 
strategic and governance differences between founding and successor generation FFs 
with theories, samples, and analytical techniques attuned to address this important 
gap in the body of research. Primarily through papers examining the unique 
characteristics of FFs relative to other types of organizations, research published in 
leading management, economics and finance journals over the past decade has 
successfully established the legitimacy of family business research as a unique and 
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valuable field of study (Schulze and Gedajlovic, 2010). Having surmounted this 
important hurdle, and on the basis of the findings reported here, we believe that the 
primary challenge for FF researchers in the coming years will be to go beyond this 
distinction and to pose and probe more subtle, but no less important ones, such as 
those between founding and successor generation FFs.  
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Gu & Kim # 2009 SIJ USA 
Guest * 2009 WP UK 
Guest * 2009 CJE UK 
Guest #* 2009 EA UK 
Gunasekargea & Wilkinson #* 2002 IJBS New Zealand 
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Author Year Publication Country 
Hahn #  2007 WP UK 
Hall & Liebman * 1998 QJE USA 
Hallock * 1997 JFQA USA 
Hambrick & Finkelstein #* 1995 SMJ USA 
Harjoto & Mullineaux * 2003 JFR USA 
Harm & Raible #* 2008 CHAP Germany 
Haye * 1997 JEB USA 
Haynes, Thompson & Wright #* 2007 JBFA UK 
He # 2008 JBV USA 
He * 2008 WP USA 
Hebner & Kato * 1997 IREF Japan & USA 
Hempel & Fay # 1994 HRM USA 
Henderson & Fredrickson #* 1996 AMJ USA 
Henderson & Fredrickson # 2001 AMJ USA 
Hengartner #* 2006 DIS Switzerland 
Hill & Phan * 1991 AMJ USA 
Hillman, Shropshire, Certo, Dalton & Dalton # 2008 WP USA 
Hogan & Mcpheters * 1980 SEJ USA 
Horton, Millo & Serafeim # 2009 WP UK 
Houston & James * 1995 JME USA 
Hubbard & Palia * 1995 JFE USA 
Hutchinson & Gul # 2004 JCF Australia 
Iyengar & Zampelli * 2008 AF USA 
Izan, Sidhu & Taylor * 1998 CGIR Australia 
Jaiswal & Firth #* 2007 WP India 
Jalbert, Chan, Jalbert & Landry #* 2007 JDM USA 
Jensen & Murphy * 1989 JPE USA 
Jiang, Habib & Smallman #* 2009 PAR New Zealand 
Jiraporn, Kim & Davidson * 2005 JEF USA 
Joh * 1999 RES Japan 
Johnston * 2005 AE UK 
Jones & Kato * 1996 LE Bulgaria 
Jones & Kato * 1998 WP Bulgaria 
Jones & Szychowska * 2001 WP Russia 
Joyce #* 2001 ABR USA 
Kacperczyck #* 2007 WP USA 
Kalyta #* 2009 SMJ USA 
Kaplan * 1994 JPE Japan & USA 
Kato * 1997 IJIO Japan 
Kato, Kim & Lee * 2007 PBFJ South Korea 
 234 
 
Author Year Publication Country 
Kato & Kubo #* 2006 JJIE Japan 
Kato & Long * 2004 WP China 
Kato & Long * 2006 WP China 
Kato & Rockel * 1992 JJIE Japan 
Kerr & Kren #* 1992 AMJ USA 
Khan, Dharwadkar & Brandes #* 2005 JBR USA 
Khorana & Zenner * 1998 JCF USA 
Kim & Gu # 2005 JHTR USA 
Knight, Madura & Martin * 1994 GFJ Japan 
Kren & Kerr # 1997 AB USA 
Kruse & Rennie # 2006 WP USA 
Kumar, Ghicas & Pastena # 1993 MF USA 
Laan van der, van Ees & van Witteloostuijn #* 2008 WP Netherlands 
Laing & Weir #* 1999 PR UK 
Larcker, Richardson, Seary & Tuna * 2005 WP USA 
Lau & Vos * 2004 NZJABR New Zealand 
Lawrence & Stapledon #* 1999 WP Australia 
Lazarides, Drimpetas & Dimitrios #* 2008 WP Greece 
Leone, Wu & Zimmerman # 2006 JAE USA 
Li, Moshirian, Nguyen & Tan #* 2007 RIBF China 
Lin #* 2004 ARA Taiwan 
Lin # 2005 CGIR Taiwan 
Lin, Shen & Su * 2009 WP China 
Madanoglu & Karadag #* 2008 JFBR USA 
Magnan & StOnge # 1997 SMJ USA 
Main * 1991 MDE UK 
Main, Bruce & Buck * 1996 EJ UK 
Main, O’Reilly & Wade #* 1995 ICC USA 
Mangel & Singh #* 1993 AB USA 
Mäkinen #* 2007 WP Finland 
Martin & Thomas * 2005 JCF USA 
Matolcsy #* 2000 CAR Australia 
McClelland & Barker # 2007 WP USA 
McGuire, Chiu & Elbing # 1962 AER USA 
McKnight * 1996 BJIR UK 
McKnight & Tomkins * 1999 IJEB UK 
McKnight & Tomkins # 2004 WP UK 
Meeks & Whittington * 1975 JIE UK 
Mengistae & Xu * 2004 JLE China 
Merhebi, Pattenden, Swan & Zhou * 2006 AF Australia 
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Author Year Publication Country 
Mertens, Knop & Strootman #* 2008 WP Netherlands 
Miller # 1995 AMJ USA 
Miller, Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia * 2002 AMJ USA 
Mitsudome, Weintrop & Hwang * 2008 JJIE Japan & USA 
Murphy * 1986 RAND USA 
Ning, Hu & Garza-Gomez * 2009 WP USA 
Nourayi & Daroca #* 2008 MF USA 
Nourayi & Mintz #* 2008 MF USA 
Nwaeze, Yang & Yin * 2006 CAR USA 
Ogden & Watson #* 2007 AB UK 
O’Reilly, Main & Crystal #* 1988 ASQ USA 
Oreland * 2008 CHAP Sweden 
Ortega & Martin #* 2008 WP Spain 
Otten & Heugens * 2008 WP Mixed 
Oxelheim & Randøy #* 2005 JIBS Mixed 
Oxelheim & Randøy #* 2008 CHAP Mixed 
Oxelheim, Wihlborg & Zhang #* 2008 CHAP Sweden 
Ozkan * 2007 WP UK 
Ozkan #* 2007 JMFM UK 
Pan, Tian & Cao #* 2009 WP China 
Parthasarathy, Menon & Bhattacherjee 2006 EPW India 
Pathak, Hoskisson & Johnson #* 2008 WP USA 
Pennathur & Shelor * 2002 JREFE USA 
Porac, Wade & Pollock # 1999 ASQ USA 
Rajagopalan & Finkelstein # 1992 SMJ USA 
Rajagopalan & Prescott #* 1990 JM USA 
Ramaswamy, Veliyath & Gomes #* 2000 MIR India 
Randøy & Nielsen #* 2002 JMG 
Sweden & 
Norway 
Randøy & Oxelheim #* 2002 WP Sweden 
Rankin * 2007 WP Australia 
Riahi-Belkaoui & Pavlik #* 1993 MF USA 
Riahi-Belkaoui & Picur #* 1993 MF USA 
Roberts * 2005 WP New Zealand 
Rose # 2005 CGIR Denmark 
Rose & Wolfram * 2002 JLE USA 
Rost & Osterlich #* 2007 WP Switzerland 
Roulstone * 2003 JAR USA 
Sakawa & Watanabel * 2006 WP Japan 
Sakawa & Watanabel * 2008 WP Japan 
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Author Year Publication Country 
Salami #* 2009 WP Canada 
Salim & Wan-Hussin #* 2009 WP Malaysia 
Sandell # 2002 SJM Sweden 
Sanders # 2001 AMJ USA 
Sanders & Carpenter #*  1998 AMJ USA 
Sapp * 2008 EFM Canada 
Schaefer * 1998 RES USA 
Schnatterly # 2003 SMJ USA 
Seo & Carpenter #* 2008 WP USA 
Shah, Javed & Abbas #* 2009 IRJFE Pakistan 
Shim & Lee #* 2003 RAF USA 
Shim, Lee & Joo #* 2009 CMR USA 
Shin # 2004 WP USA 
Shuto #* 2007 JIAAT Japan 
Sigler * 2003 MRN USA 
Sigler & Haley # 1995 MF USA 
Singh & Agarwal #* 2002 CJAS Canada 
Skalpe #* 2007 TM Norway 
Sloan * 1993 JAE USA 
Smith & Swan #* 2008 WP USA 
Smith & Swan #* 2008 WP USA 
Srinivasan, Sayrak & Nagarajan #* 2004 WP USA 
Stanwick & Stanwick #* 2001 BSE USA 
Staw & Epstein #* 2000 ASQ USA 
Suh * 2009 WP Australia 
Talmor & Wallace * 2001 WP USA 
Tian & Twite #* 2006 WP Australia 
Tinaikar #* 2006 WP Canada & USA 
Tinaikar #* 2008 WP USA 
Tosi, Misangyi, Fanelli, Waldman & Yammarino #*  2004 LQ USA 
Tripp & Kenny * 1995 ABR USA 
Unite, Sullivan, Brookman, Majadillas & Taningco * 2008 PBFJ Philippines 
Vafeas & Afxentiou #* 1998 JAPP USA 
Vafeas #  2003 FM USA 
Veliyath # 1999 JMS USA 
Veliyath & Bishop # 1995 IJOA USA 
Veliyath & Ramaswamy #* 2000 FBR India 
Wade, Porac, Pollock & Graffin #* 2006 AMJ USA 
Wan * 2003 WP USA 
Wanzenried, Piazza & Pedergnana * 2005 WP Switzerland 
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a Studies marked with a # are included in the bivariate analysis; those with a * are in the partial 
analysis. 
b Abbreviations for the journals are as follows: AB: Accounting & Business Research; ABR: American 
Business Review; AE: Applied Economics; AEB: ASEAN Economic Bulletin; AER: American Economic 
Review; AF: Accounting and Finance; AMJ: Academy of Management Journal; AMP: Academy of Management 
Perspectives; APJM: Asia Pacific Journal of Management; AR: Accounting Review; ARA: Asian Review of 
Accounting; ASQ: Administrative Science Quarterly; BAR: British Accounting Review; BJIR: British Journal 
of Industrial Relations; BSE: Business Strategy and the Environment; CAR: Contemporary Accounting 
Research; CG: Corporate Governance; CGIR: Corporate Governance: An International Review; CHAP: Book 
Chapter; CJAS: Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences; CJE: Cambridge Journal of Economics; CMR: 
Contemporary Management Research; COC: Corporate Ownership & Control; CRR: Corporate Reputation 
Review; DIS: Dissertation; EA: Economica; EFM: European Financial Management; EFR: European Finance 
Review; EG: Economics of Governance; EJ: Economic Journal; EMFT: Emerging Markets, Finance and Trade; 
ET: Economics of Transition; FAM: Financial Accountability & Management; FBR: Family Business Review; 
FM: Financial Management; GFJ: Global Finance Journal; GOM: Group & Organization Management; HR: 
Human Relations; HRM: Human Resource Management; ICC: Industrial and Corporate Change; IJBS: 
International Journal of Business Studies; IJEB: International Journal of the Economics of Business; IJIO: 
International Journal of Industrial Organization; IJLIC: International Journal Learning and Intellectual Capital; 
IJOA: International Journal of Organizational Analysis; ILRR: Industrial and Labor Relations Review; IREF: 
International Review of Economics & Finance; IRJFE: International Research Journal of Finance and Economics; 
IRLE: International Review of Law and Economics; JAAB: Journal of American Academy of Business; JAAF: 
Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance; JAAT: Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and 
Taxation; JAE: Journal of Accounting and Economics; JAPP: Journal of Accounting and Public Policy; JAR: 
Journal of Accounting Research; JBE: Journal of Business Ethics; JBER: Journal of Business & Economics 
Research; JBF: Journal of Banking & Finance; JBFA: Journal of Business Finance & Accounting; JBR: Journal of 
Business Research; JBV: Journal of Business Venturing; JCF: Journal of Corporate Finance; JDM: Journal of 
Diversity Management; JEB: Journal of Economics and Business; JEF: Journal of Empirical Finance; JFBR: 
Journal of Foodservice Business Research; JF: Journal of Finance; JFE: Journal of Financial Economics; JFI: 
Author Year Publication Country 
Werner, Tosi & Gomez-Mejia # 2005 SMJ USA 
Westphal & Zajac #* 1995 ASQ USA 
Winfrey & Logan #* 1998 CRR USA 
Wright & Kroll #* 2002 JMG USA 
Wright, Kroll, Lado & Elenkov # 2005 SO USA 
Wu #* 2008 WP China 
Wu & Tu # 2007 JBR USA 
Yang & Yang * 2009 PER China 
Young #* 2008 IJLIC Taiwan 
Young & Buchholtz # 2002 JMI USA 
Young & Tsai * 2008 JBR Taiwan 
Yu #* 2008 WP China 
Yurtoglu & Haid * 2006 WP Germany 
Zhou * 2000 CJE Canada 
Zhou # 2006 WP USA 
Zhu #* 2007 JAAB China 
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Journal of Financial Intermediation; JFR: Journal of Financial Research; JFQA: Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis; JHTR: Journal of Hospitality & Tourism Research; JIBS: Journal of International 
Business Studies; JJIE: Journal of the Japanese and International Economics; JLE: Journal of Labor Economics; 
JLR: Journal of Labor Research; JM: Journal of Management; JME: Journal of Monetary Economics; JMFM: 
Journal of Multinational Financial Management; JMG: Journal of Management and Governance; JMI: Journal 
of Managerial Issues;JMS: Journal of Management Studies;JPE: Journal of Political Economy; JREFE: Journal of 
Real Estate Financial Economics; JSBM: Journal of Small Business Management; IR: Industrial Relations; 
IRJFE: International Research Journal of Finance and Economics; LAB: LABOUR; LE: Labour Economics; 
LRP: Long Range Planning; LQ: Leadership Quarterly; MDE: Managerial and Economics; MF: Managerial 
Finance; MIR: Management International Review; MRN: Management Research News; NZJABR: New 
Zealand Journal of Applied Business Research; OBES: Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics; OJMS: 
Omega-International Journal of Management Science; PAR: Pacific Accounting Review; PBFJ: Pacific-Basin 
Finance Journal; PER: Pacific Economic Review; PR: Personnel Review; QJE: Quarterly Journal of Economics; 
RAF: Review of Accounting & Finance; RAND: RAND Journal of Economics; RAS: Review of Accounting 
Studies; RES: Review of Economics and Statistics; RF: Review of Finance; RIBF: Research in International 
Business and Finance; SEJ: Southern Economic Journal; SIJ: Service Industries Journal; SJM: Scandinavian 
Journal of Management; SMJ: Strategic Management Journal; SO: Strategic Organization; TM: Tourism 
Management; WP: Working Paper. 
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Appendix D. Studies included in the meta-analysisab (Chapter 6) 
Author Year Publication 
Aburime 2008 WP 
Ananchotikul 2006 WP 
Ang & Constand 2002 JMFM 
Bae & Jeong 2007 JBFA 
Baek, Kang & Park 2001 WP 
Basu, Hwang, Mitsudome &Weintrop 2007 PBFJ 
Belenzon & Berkovitz 2008 WP 
Bertrand, Mehta & Mullainathan 2002 QJE 
Beuselinck & Deloof 2006 WP 
Black, Jang & Kim 2006 JCF 
Black & Khanna 2007 JELS 
Boubaker 2007 MFJ 
Buysschaert, Deloof, Jegers & Rommens 2008 CGIR 
Carney, Shapiro & Tang  2009 MOR 
Chang, Cho & Sin 2007 CGIR 
Chang & Shin 2006 CGIR 
Chang 2003 AMJ 
Chang & Hong 2000 AMJ 
Chang, Chung & Mahmood 2006 OS 
Cheng & Firth 2005 CGIR 
Cheng & Firth 2006 MDE 
Choe & Roehl 2007 LRP 
Choi, Park & Yoo 2005 WP 
Choi & Yoo 2005 WP 
Chu  2004 SBE 
Chung 2008 WP 
Chung & Luo 2008 OS 
Chung & Luo 2008 OS 
Chung 2006 APJM 
Chung, Ho & Kim 2004 JIAAT 
Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang 1999 WP 
Claessens, Fan, & Lang 2006 EMR 
Collin 2002 WP 
Colpan 2006 ABM 
David, Hitt & Liang 2003 WP 
Dewaelheyns & Van Hulle  2009 EFM 
Douthett & Jung 2001 JIFMA 
Douthett, Jung & Kwak 2004 RQFA 
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Author Year Publication 
Dow & McGuire 2004 WP 
Dow & McGuire 2007 WP 
Elango & Chinmay 2007 JIBS 
Estrin, Poukliakova & Shapiro 2009 JMS 
Faccio & Sengupta 2006 WP 
Ferris, Kim & Kitsabunnarat 2003 JBF 
Ferris, Kumar, & Sarin 1995 PBFJ 
Filatotchev, Lien & Piesse 2005 APJM 
Firth, Tam & Tang 1999 OME 
Fisman & Khanna 2004 WD 
Flath 1994 CEP 
Gadhoum 2002 WP 
Gadhoum, Gueyié & Zoubeidi 2007 CG 
Gaur & Kumar 2008 BJM 
George & Kabir 2008 JBR 
George, Kabir & Qian 2005 WP 
George 2007 SAJM 
Ghosh 2006 EMFT 
Ginglinger & Hamon 2007 WP 
Gohar 2008 WP 
Gonenc & Aybar 2006 CGIR 
Gonenc, Kan & Karadagli 2007 EMFT 
Gormley, Johnson & Rhee 2008 WP 
Gramlich, Limpaphayom & Rhee 2004 JAE 
Guillén 2000 AMJ 
Guillén 2002 AMJ 
Guillén 2003 JIBS 
Gutierrez & Pombo 2007 WP 
Habib 2006 RAF 
Hoskisson, Cannella, Tihanyi & Faraci 2004 SMJ 
Hundley & Jacobson 1998 SMJ 
Isobe, Makino & Goerzen 2006 APJM 
Jung, Kim & Kim 2007 WP 
Kakani 2001 WP 
Kato, Kim, & Lee 2007 PBFJ 
Keister 1998 AJS 
Khanna & Palepu 2000 AMJ 
Khanna & Rivkin 2001 SMJ 
Khanna & Rivkin 2006 OS 
Kim & Chizema 2008 WP 
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Author Year Publication 
Kim, Jung & Kim 2005 RQFA 
Kim, Heshmati & Aoun 2006 AEJ 
Kim & Kim 2008 WP 
Kim & Kim 2008 WP 
Kim, Kim, & Lee 2008 OS 
Kim & Yi 2006 CAR 
Kim, Lim & Sung 2007 PBFJ 
Kim, Lyn, Park & Zychowicz 2005 JBFA 
Kim 2005 CG:IR 
Kim, Park, Ratti & Shin 2004 HJE 
Kobeissi 2004 WP 
Lamin 2006 WP 
Lee & Hahn 2007 SJE 
Lee, Peng & Lee 2008 JWB 
Lee, Park & Shin 2009 JBF 
Lefort & Walker 2005 WP 
Lensink, van der Molen & Gangopadhyay 2003 JDS 
Lichtenberg & Pushner 1994 JWE 
Lincoln, Gerlach & Ahmadjian 1996 ASR 
Lu & Yao 2006 APJM 
Luo & Chung 2005 ASQ 
Ma, Yao & Xi 2006 APJM 
Mahmood & Mitchell 2004 MS 
Majumdar & Sen 2006 PC 
Manos, Murinde & Green 2007 JEB 
Marisetty & Subrahmanyam 2010 JFM 
Mitton 2002 JFE 
Morck, Nakamura & Shivdasani 2000 JB 
Mueller, Dietl & Peev 2003 JIIDT 
Mursitama 2006 APJM 
Nguyen & Nivoix 2009 AFE 
Pak & Park 2004 MIR 
Pallathitta 2005 DIS 
Park & Kim 2008 JWB 
Park, Lee & Jang 2004 WP 
Peng & Jiang 2006 WP 
Peng & Jiang  2010 JMS 
Perotti & Gelfer 2001 EER 
Piga & Vivarelli 2004 OBES 
Ramaswamy, Li & Petitt 2004 APJM 
 242 
 
a Abbreviations for the journals are as follows: ABM: Asian Business & Management; AEJ: Asian 
Economic Journal; AFE: Applied Financial Economics; AJS: American Journal of Sociology; AMJ: Academy of 
Management Journal; APJM: Asia Pacific Journal of Management; ASQ: Administrative Science Quarterly; 
ASR: American Sociological Review; BJM: British Journal of Management; CAR: Contemporary Accounting 
Research; CEP: Contemporary Economic Policy; CG: Corporate Governance; CGIR: Corporate Governance: An 
International Review; DIS: Dissertation; EER: European Economic Review; EFM: European Financial 
Management; EMFT: Emerging Markets, Finance and Trade; EMR: European Management Review; ETP: 
Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice Journal; HJE: Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics; IBR: International 
Business Review; JAE: Journal of Accounting and Economics; JB: Journal of Business; JBF: Journal of Banking & 
Finance;JBFA: Journal of Business Finance & Accounting; JBR: Journal of Business Research; JCF: Journal of 
Corporate Finance; JEB: Journal of Economics and Business; JEF: Journal of Economics and Finance; JELS: 
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies; JFM: Journal of Financial Markets; JFE: Journal of Financial 
Economics;JIAAT: Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation;JIBS: Journal of International 
Business Studies; JIE: Journal of Industrial Economics; JIFMA: Journal of International Financial Management 
and Accounting; JIIDT: Journal for Institutional Innovation Development and Transition; JMFM: Journal of 
Multinational Financial Management; JMS: Journal of Management Studies; JWB: Journal of World Business; 
JWE: Japan and the World Economy; LRP: Long Range Planning; MDE: Managerial and Decision Economics; 
MFJ: Multinational Finance Journal; MIR: Management International Review; MOR: Management and 
Organization Review; MS: Management Science; OBES: Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics; OME: 
Omega; OS: Organization Science; QJE: Quarterly Journal of Economics; PBFJ: Pacific-Basin Finance Journal; 
PC: Public Choice; RAF: Review of Accounting and Finance; RQFA: Review of Quantitative Finance and 
Accounting; SAJM: South Asian Journal of Management; SBE: Small Business Economics; SJE: Seoul Journal of 
Economics; SMJ: Strategic Management Journal; WD: World Development; WP: Working Paper. 
Author Year Publication 
Rommens, Cuyvers & Deloof 2007 WP 
Sambharya & Banerji 2006 MIR 
Selarka 2005 EMFT 
Shumilov & Volchkova 2004 WP 
Silva, Majluf & Paredes 2006 JBR 
Singh 2009 IBR 
Singh & Gaur 2009 CG:IR 
Singh, Nejadmalayeri & Mathur 2007 JBR 
Sirmon, Arregle, Hitt & Webb 2008 ETP 
Suetorsak 2007 JEF 
Tabeta & Rahman 1999 APJM 
Unite, Sullivan, Brookman, Majadillas & Taningco 2008 PBFJ 
van der Molen & Lensink 2004 WP 
Volchkova 2001 WP 
Weinstein & Yafeh 1995 JIE 
White, Hoskisson, Yiu & Bruton 2008 MOR 
Xu 2008 WP 
Yamak & Üsdiken 2006 BJM 
Yiu, Bruton & Lu 2005 JMS 
Yoo 2008 WP 
Yoshikawa & Colpan 2008 WP 
Yoshikawa & Gedajlovic 2002 APJM 
Yu, Lensink & Van Ees 2007 WP 
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Appendix E. Studies included in the meta-analysis (Chapter 7) 
* Adams R, Almeida H, Ferreira D. 2009. Understanding the relationship between 
founder–CEOs and firm performance. Journal of Empirical Finance 16(1): 136-150. 
* Ali A, Chen TY, Radhakrishnan S. 2007. Corporate disclosures by family firms. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 44: 238-286. 
* Anderson RC, Brouthers KD, Reeb DM. 2009. The competitor tracking paradox. 
Working Paper. 
* Anderson RC, Duru A, Reeb DM. 2008. Founders, heirs, and corporate opacity in the 
U.S. Working Paper. 
* Anderson RC, Duru A, Reeb DM. 2009. Family preferences and investment policy: 
evidence from capital expenditures and R&D spending. Working Paper. 
* Anderson RC, Mansi SA, Reeb DM. 2003. Founding family ownership and the agency 
cost of debt. Journal of Financial Economics 68(2): 263-285. 
* Anderson RC, Reeb DM. 2003a. Founding-family ownership and firm performance: 
evidence from the S&P 500. Journal of Finance 58(3): 1301-1328. 
* Anderson RC, Reeb DM. 2003b. Founding-family ownership, corporate 
diversification, and firm leverage. Journal of Law & Economics 46(2): 653-683. 
* Anderson RC, Reeb DM. 2004. Board composition: balancing family influence in S&P 
500 firms. Administrative Science Quarterly 49: 209-237. 
* Bagnoli M, Liu HT, Watts SG. 2008. Family firms, debtholder-shareholder agency 
costs and the use of covenants in private dent. Working Paper.  
* Basu N, Dimitrova L, Paeglis I. 2009. Family control and dilution in mergers. Journal 
of Banking & Finance 33(5): 829-841.  
* Bathala CT. 1996. Determinants of managerial stock ownership: the case of CEOs. 
Financial Review 31(1): 127-141. 
* Bauguess S, Stegemoller M. 2008. Protective governance choices and the value of 
acquisition activity. Working Paper. 
* Berrone P, Gomez-Mejia LR. 2009. Environmental performance and executive 
compensation: an integrated agency-institutional perspective. Academy of 
Management Journal 52(1): 103-126. 
* Block JH. 2008. The impact of family ownership and family management on 
employment downsizing: evidence from S&P 500 firms. Working Paper. 
* Block JH, Thams A. 2008. Long-term orientation in family firms: a Bayesian analysis 
of R&D spending. Working Paper. 
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* Braun M, Sharma A. 2007. Should the CEO also be chair of the board? An empirical 
examination of family-controlled public firms. Family Business Review 20(2): 111-
126. 
* Chaganti R, Damanpour F. 1991. Institutional ownership, capital structure, and firm 
performance. Strategic Management Journal 12(7): 479-491.  
* Chen T-Y. 2006. CEO compensation contracts of family firms. Working Paper. 
* Chen S, Chen X, Cheng Q. 2007. Do family firms provide more or less voluntary 
disclosure? Working Paper.  
* Chen S, Chen X, Cheng Q, Hutton A. 2008. Conservative financial reporting in family 
firms. Working Paper. 
* Chen S, Chen X, Cheng Q, Shevlin T. 2010. Are family firms more tax aggressive than 
non-family firms? Journal of Financial Economics 95(1): 41-61. 
* Chen X, Cheng Q, Dai Z. 2007. Are US family firms subject to agency problems? 
Evidence from CEO turnover and firm valuation. Working Paper. 
* Davis GF, Stout SK. 1992. Organization theory and the market for corporate control: a 
dynamic analysis of the characteristics of large takeover targets, 1980-1990. 
Administrative Science Quarterly 37(4): 605-633. 
* Dyer WG, Whetten DA. 2006. Family firms and social responsibility: preliminary 
evidence from the S&P 500. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 30(6): 785-802. 
* Fich EM, Slezak SL. 2008. Can corporate governance save distressed firms from 
bankruptcy? An empirical analysis. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 
30(2): 225-251. 
* Gomez-Mejia LR, Larraza-Kintana M, Makri M. 2003. The determinants of executive 
compensation in family controlled public corporations. Academy of Management 
Journal 46(2): 226-237. 
* Gomez-Mejia LR, Makri M, Larraza-Kintana M. 2010. Diversification decisions in 
family-controlled firms. Journal of Management Studies 47(2): 223-252. 
* Hadani M. 2007. Family matters founding family firms and corporate political 
activity. Business & Society 46(4): 395-428.  
* Hufft EM Jr. 1999. Growth of family businesses and small firms. Working Paper. 
* Hwang BH, Kim S. 2009. It pays to have friends. Journal of Financial Economics 93(1): 
138-158.  
* Jayaraman N, Khorana A, Nelling E, Covin J. 2000. CEO founder status and firm 
financial performance. Strategic Management Journal 21(12): 1215-1224. 
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* Jiraporn P, DaDalt PJ. 2009. Does founding family control affect earnings 
management? Applied Economics Letters 16(2): 113-119. 
* Jones CD, Makri M, Gomez-Mejia LR. 2008. Affiliate directors and perceived risk 
bearing in publicly traded, family-controlled firms: the case of diversification. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 32(6): 1007-1026.  
* Lee J. 2004. The effects of family ownership and management on firm performance. 
Advanced Management Journal 69(4): 46-53. 
* Lee J. 2006. Family firm performance: further evidence. Family Business Review 19(2): 
103-114. 
* Martikainen M, Nikkinen J, Vahamaa S. 2009. Production functions and productivity 
of family firms: evidence from the S&P 500. Quarterly Review of Economics and 
Finance 49(2): 295-307. 
* McConaughty DL. 2000. Family CEOs vs. nonfamily CEOs in the family-controlled 
firm: an examination of the level and sensitivity of pay to performance. Family 
Business Review 13(2): 121-131. 
* McConaughty DL, Walker MC, Henderson GV, Mishra CS. 1998. Founding family 
controlled firms: efficiency and value. Review of Financial Economics 7(1):1-19. 
* Miller D, Le Breton-Miller I, Lester RH. 2010. Family and lone founder ownership 
and strategic behavior: social context, identity and institutional logics. Journal of 
Management Studies (forthcoming). 
* Miller D, Le Breton-Miller I, Lester RH, Cannella AA Jr. 2007. Are family firms really 
superior performers? Journal of Corporate Finance 13(4): 829–858. 
* Mishra CS, McConaughy DL. 1999. Founding family control and capital structure: 
the risk of loss of control and the aversion to debt. Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice 23(1): 53-64.  
* Nelson T. 2003. The persistence of founder influence: Management, ownership, and 
performance effects at initial public offering. Strategic Management Journal 24: 
707-724. 
* Palia D, Ravid SA. 2002. The role of founders in large companies: entrenchment or 
valuable capital? Working Paper. 
* Palia D, Ravid SA, Wang CJ. 2008. Founders versus non-founders in large companies: 
financial incentives and the call for regulation. Journal of Regulatory Economics 
33(1): 55-86.  
* Shivdasani A, Yermack D. 1999. CEO involvement in the selection of new board 
members: an empirical analysis. Journal of Finance 54(5): 1829-1853. 
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* Srinivasan S. 2005. Consequences of financial reporting failure for outside directors: 
evidence from accounting restatements and audit committee members. Journal of 
Accounting Research 43(2): 291-334. 
* Stavrou E, Kassinis G, Filotheou A. 2007. Downsizing and stakeholder orientation 
among the fortune 500: does family ownership matter? Journal of Business Ethics 
72(2): 149-162. 
* Tinaikar S. 2008. Voluntary disclosure and ownership structure: an analysis of dual 
class firms. Working Paper. 
* Tong YH. 2008. Financial reporting practices of family firms. Advances in Accounting 
23: 231-261. 
* Villalonga B, Amit R. 2006. How do family ownership, control, and management 
affect firm value? Journal of Financial Economics 80(2): 385-417. 
* Villalonga B, Amit R. 2008. Family control of firms and industries. Working Paper. 
* Villalonga B, Amit R. 2009. How are U.S. family firms controlled? The Review of 
Financial Studies 22(8): 3047-3091. 
* Wang D. 2006. Founding family ownership and earnings quality. Journal of 
Accounting Research 44(3): 619-656. 
* Willard GE, Krueger DA, Feeser HR. 1992. In order to grow, must the founder go: a 
comparison of performance between founder and non-founder managed high-
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Summary (Dutch)  
In dit proefschrift staat de rol van aandeelhouders in corporate governance centraal. 
Het klassieke onderzoeksprobleem in de corporate governance literatuur betreft 
zogenoemde agency problemen, die ontstaan door de scheiding van eigendom en 
zeggenschap in beursvennootschappen, en de belangenconflicten tussen 
aandeelhouders en bestuurders die daaruit voortkomen. Veruit het meeste empirische 
corporate governance onderzoek gaat dan ook over de vraag in welke mate 
verschillende corporate governance praktijken, zowel binnen als buiten 
beursvennootschappen, deze agency problemen kunnen verminderen en zodoende de 
waarde en financiële prestaties van een beursvennootschap kunnen maximaliseren. 
Naast eigendomsconcentratie en de identiteit van aandeelhouders, zijn de meest 
onderzochte corporate governance mechanismen: het toezicht door raden van 
commissarissen, het binden van bestuurders aan organisatiedoelen door prestatie-
afhankelijke beloningsstructuren, en disciplinering door de markt door al dan niet 
vijandige overnames.  
Het beschikbare empirisch bewijs ten aanzien van de relatie tussen 
eigendomsconcentratie en de waarde en financiële prestaties van ondernemingen laat 
echter zien dat grootaandeelhouders binnen Noord-Amerikaanse 
beursvennootschappen niet of nauwelijks een positieve bijdrage leveren aan de 
waarde of winstgevendheid van ondernemingen, waardoor er sprake is van een 
tegenstrijdigheid tussen gevestigde theoretische inzichten enerzijds en het beschikbare 
empirische bewijs anderzijds. Dit spanningsveld vraagt om een grondige herevaluatie 
van de rol en functie van (groot) aandeelhouders in corporate governance. Dit 
proefschrift beoogt hieraan een bijdrage te leveren, en wel aan een tweetal 
vraagstukken in het bijzonder.  
Ten eerste onderzoeken verschillende studies die in dit proefschrift worden 
gerapporteerd de invloed van zowel formele en informele instituties op de effectiviteit 
van eigendomsconcentratie of grootaandeelhouderschap. Niet alleen wordt het belang 
van instituties in het verklaren van de effectiviteit van deze corporate governance 
strategie voor aandeelhouders binnen Aziatische en Europese landen empirisch 
bevestigd, maar er wordt ook aangetoond dat institutionele factoren een belangrijke 
rol spelen bij de totstandkoming van introductieprijzen bij beursintroducties enerzijds, 
en het verklaren van de prestatie afhankelijkheid van bestuurdersbeloningen 
anderzijds.  
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Een tweede onderzoekslijn waarover in dit proefschrift bevindingen worden 
gerapporteerd betreft de identiteit van grootaandeelhouders, en de effecten daarvan 
op de strategie en winstgevendheid van beursondernemingen in diverse institutionele 
contexten. In het onderzoek naar de corporate governance strategie van 
eigendomsconcentratie wordt veelal impliciet of expliciet verondersteld dat de 
aandeelhouders van een onderneming een homogene groep vormen, hetgeen in 
verschillende empirische studies een onjuiste veronderstelling is gebleken. De studies 
die hierover in dit proefschrift worden gerapporteerd bevestigen empirisch dat zowel 
beursgenoteerde familiebedrijven, als bedrijven die al dan niet via 
eigendomsconstructies onderdeel zijn van een zogenoemde business group, significant 
andere strategische keuzes maken en andere financiële prestaties leveren dan 
beursvennootschappen waarin dit soort eigendomsrelaties afwezig zijn.  
Tezamen dragen de twee onderzoekslijnen die in dit proefschrift in 
verschillende empirische studies worden verkend bij aan wat ik een ‘institutioneel 
perspectief’ op aandeelhouderschap in beursvennootschappen heb genoemd. 
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Summary (English)  
The past two decades have witnessed an exponential growth of research on corporate 
governance around the world and on the role of the ownership concentration more 
specifically. In line with a longer tradition of ownership studies in the U.S. context, 
most corporate governance researchers have commonly taken a classical agency-
theoretical view of ownership concentration. The research presented in this 
dissertation shows that this classical view of ownership seems overly crude.  
I provide a more fine-grained understanding of the role of ownership in 
different contexts; one that takes into account the subtly different formal and informal 
institutional constellations that can be found around the world on the one hand, and 
that distinguishes between the various identities of different concentrated owner types 
on the other. I show, first, that a crucial factor with respect to the ownership 
concentration – firm strategy and performance relationships is owner identity: who 
owns a firm matters significantly for that firm’s objectives, strategies, and 
performance. Second, I contribute to the emerging institution-based view of corporate 
governance by expanding its empirical domain and by testing novel hypotheses 
concerning the interaction between formal and informal institutions. 
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l)AN INSTITUTION-BASED VIEW OF OWNERSHIP
The past two decades have witnessed an exponential growth of research on corporate
governance around the world and on the role of the ownership concentration more specifi -
cally. In line with a longer tradition of ownership studies in the U.S. context, most corpo -
rate governance researchers have commonly taken a classical agency-theoretical view of
ownership concentration. The research presented in this dissertation shows that this classical
view of ownership seems overly crude. 
I provide a more fine-grained understanding of the role of ownership in different
contexts; one that takes into account the subtly different formal and informal institutional
constellations that can be found around the world on the one hand, and that distinguishes
between the various identities of different concentrated owner types on the other. I show,
first, that a crucial factor with respect to the ownership concentration – firm strategy and
performance relationships is owner identity: who owns a firm matters significantly for
that firm’s objectives, strategies, and performance. Second, I contribute to the emerging
institution-based view of corporate governance by expanding its empirical domain and by
testing novel hypotheses concerning the interaction between formal and informal institutions.
ERIM
The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research School (Onder -
zoek school) in the field of management of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. The founding
participants of ERIM are Rotterdam School of Management (RSM), and the Erasmus School
of Econo mics (ESE). ERIM was founded in 1999 and is officially accre dited by the Royal
Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The research under taken by ERIM
is focused on the management of the firm in its environment, its intra- and interfirm
relations, and its busi ness processes in their interdependent connections. 
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in manage ment, and to offer an
ad vanced doctoral pro gramme in Research in Management. Within ERIM, over three
hundred senior researchers and PhD candidates are active in the different research pro -
grammes. From a variety of acade mic backgrounds and expertises, the ERIM commu nity is
united in striving for excellence and working at the fore front of creating new business
knowledge.
Erasmus Research Institute of Management - ERIM
Rotterdam School of Management (RSM)
Erasmus School of Economics (ESE)
P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam 
The Netherlands
Tel. +31 10 408 11 82
Fax +31 10 408 96 40
E-mail info@erim.eur.nl
Internet www.erim.eur.nl
B&T10827_ERIM_Omslag Essen_27dec10
